LECTURE 10

OBEDIENCE ENTIRE



The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to

the law of God.



But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever

called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though

apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may reasonably

excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths

of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that

are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They

maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there

is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all

Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not

one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts

as virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to

His law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith, that

obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of

heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic,

or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to obey the law; and

maintain that men may be, and are pious, and eminently so, who do

not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be

generally held by those who are styled orthodox Christians, must

assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides the moral

law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to any

law. In this discussion. I shall:



1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the

moral law; and, 



2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this

law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as

virtue or true religion.



There can be no rule of duty but the moral law.



Upon this proposition I remark:



(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the

law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of

God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the

course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and

relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and

relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if

this is right, nothing else can be right If this course is obligatory upon

us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly

be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and

relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can be right. 

If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.



(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should He

do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in His

arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can He alter it, or introduce any

other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else

right than to love Him with all the heart, and our neighbor as

ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of

faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is

not made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from

its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and

love or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been

said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can

be, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his

nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. 

Nor call any being render anything more than this obligatory Indeed,

there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law. 

There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions,

and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us

to the consideration of the second proposition, namely:



That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral

law.



That, every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,

will appear, if we consider:



(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion:



(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than

the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:



(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the

law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God. 

"Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law" (Romans 13:10). "Though I

speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity

(love), I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And

though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and

all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove

mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow

all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be

burned, and have not charity (love), it profiteth me nothing" (1 Cor.

13:1-3). Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible not only as

constituting true religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every

form of true religion is only a form of love or benevolence.



Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of

selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to

obedience to it.



Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and

the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ. 

Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we

come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God is

love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, or

the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of Him and of us. 

Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings. 

Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only benevolence

viewed in particular relations.



Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. 

That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,

virtue.



A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to

God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's

account, is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of

full or entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow

brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations, that God really

accepts from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what

His law requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they

render at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less

at every moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as

can well be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct

inquiries:



(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to

disobey, the moral law at the same time?



(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present

and full obedience to the moral law?



The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding

lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral

law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,

and partly disobey, at the same time. We will now attend to the

second question, namely:



Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and

full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can He accept

anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full

obedience, or all that the law requires?



The term justification is used in two senses:



(a.) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:



(b.) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has

sinned, as if he had not sinned.



It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that

Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted,

and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short

of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do

not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at

every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they are

justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and

personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts,

and in this sense justifies them when they are in the present

commission of an indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts them

righteous while, in fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully

pardoned and acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by

coming entirely and perpetually short of the obedience which, under

the circumstances the law of God requires. While voluntarily

withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and the

sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the

sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds. 

This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many

hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the

following inquiries, as of fundamental importance.



1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every

moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be

accepted and justified?



This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully

withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how

great a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all

our hearts, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted,

how much less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our

neighbor, will be accepted?



Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our

neighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our

neighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not

what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,

then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be

accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be

in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our

neighbor a little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our

neighbors, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God

must be loved supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme

love a loving with all the heart? But this is full and not partial

obedience; yet the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or

is supreme love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree

of love than we exercise toward any other being? But how much

greater must it be? Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In

what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard are we to measure,

our love, so as to know whether we love God a little more than any

other being? But how much are we to love our neighbor, in order to

our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than ourselves,

how much less, and still be justified? These are certainly questions of

vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why should

they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must not

only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The

advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if

they cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that

their theory should be true, and yet no one be able to answer such

vital questions as these just proposed? If a partial obedience can be

accepted, it is a momentous question, how partial, or how complete

must that obedience be? I say again, that this is a question of

agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in the dark here. 

But again, 



2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which

would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do

not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which

we are forgiven?



The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this

world, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always

withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very

act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God

and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services, fully

forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and

pertinacious rebellion? Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch!

Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in! Yes, this

must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present full

obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents

God as receiving to favor a rebel who has one hand filled with

weapons against His throne.



3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,

by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be

honored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear,

and honor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself

to the intelligence of the universe? Will pardon and justification save

the sinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his

heart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can

heaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such

a method of justification?



4. But again: Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of?



Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a

question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has

God, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some

course of conduct which is suitable to Him? Has He not given us

intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the

propriety of His public acts? Does He not invite and require scrutiny? 

Why has He required an atonement for sin, and why has He required

repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate

has a right to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest terms upon which

any ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same

thing, a return to obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a

rebel's being pardoned, while he only renounced a part of his

rebellion? To pardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered

in, were to sanction by a public act that which is lacking in his

repentance. It were to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to

render full obedience.



5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the

sin of withholding a part of our hearts from Him?



God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire Him to

forgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness. 

While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we cannot

profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And

shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even profess

repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease

from sin, is a gross insult to God.



6. But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while

unrepented of? Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is

represented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully

forsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this

always stands revealed, expressly or impliedly, on every page of

divine inspiration.



7. Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin? Where is

such a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every

degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose

heart the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be

condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely,

if the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most

unequivocally teaches this: "If any man keep the whole law, and yet

offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10). What is this but

asserting, that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be

unavailing, since the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that

partial obedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable

obedience at all? The doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense

that the law is not at any time fully obeyed, is accepted of God, is

sheer antinomianism. What! A sinner justified while indulging in

rebellion against God!



But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must

intend fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his

purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of

perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is

intended by this language? We have seen in former lectures, that

moral character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then,

perfection of intention be an indispensable condition of justification,

what is this, but an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a

condition of justification? But this is what we hold, and they deny. 

What then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is

intended by the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a

sinner cannot be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes and

intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he seriously

intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God. Intends

to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why, love,

good willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is intending to

intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is absurd.



What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of

justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an

intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be intended,

to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. Unless he

intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full obedience to the

law; that he intends to live without sin. The supposition is, that he is

now sinning; that is, for nothing else is sin, voluntarily withholding from

God and man their due. He chooses, wills, and intends this, and yet

the supposition is, that at the same time he chooses, wills, intends,

fully to obey the law. What is this but the ridiculous assertion, that he

at the same time intends full obedience to the law, and intends not

fully to obey, but only to obey in part, voluntarily withholding from God

and man their dues.



But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in

him? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless

the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while

there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can he

be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense,

while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the

law, unless it be repealed, continues to condemn him while there is

any degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both

be pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the

time coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which

the law is not uttering its curses against him. "Cursed is every one

that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to

do them" (Gal. 3:10). The fact is, there never has been, and there

never can be, any such thing as sin without condemnation. "Beloved,

if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20),

that is, He much more condemns us. "But if our heart condemn us

not, then have we confidence towards God" (1 John 3:21). God

cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in His arbitrary will. It is as

unalterable and unrepealable as His own nature. God can never

repeal nor alter it. He can for Christ's sake dispense with the

execution of the penalty, when the subject has returned to full present

obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon no other

possible conditions. To affirm that He can, is to affirm that God can

alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral law and moral

government.



8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial

repentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to

present full obedience to the law of God?



To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose

a new end, to begin a new life, to turn from self seeking to seeking the

highest good of being, to turn from selfishness to disinterested

benevolence, from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience. 

Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a

thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists

in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former

lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot coexist, at the same

time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite

ends. These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of

partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to

overlook the very nature of repentance. What! A man both turn away

from, and hold on to sin at the same time! Serve God and mammon at

one and the same time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed

both by reason and by Christ. But perhaps it will be objected, that the

sin of those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God

pardons and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the inquiry:



9. Can there be any other than voluntary sin?



What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires

benevolence, good willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing,

but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary to the

commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in choosing,

willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it must be intelligent

and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that sin

is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary sin. 

Benevolence is willing the good of being in general, as an end, and, of

course, implies the rejection of self-gratification, as an end. So sin is

the choice of self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the

rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness,

naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal

opposites and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of

the other in the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and

there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.



10. Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?



Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that

present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking

both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin is selfish

willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These

two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly coexist. 

Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of

God, is voluntarily sinning against God, and is impenitent. It is

nonsense to say, that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that

he is penitent so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he

disobeys. This really seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man

can be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time. This

idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that repentance consists in

sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the sensibility. But repentance

consists in a change of ultimate intention a change in the choice of

an end a turning from selfishness to supreme disinterested

benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly impossible for one to be partly

penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time; inasmuch as

penitence and impenitence consist in supreme opposite choices.



So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the

government of God, but present full obedience to His law.



If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen into a

great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present

sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this life. 

If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very beginning

of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin

ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must that

error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in conscious

sin; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in this world;

that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning, even for an hour

or a moment, in this world; and yet to hope for heaven!



How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated

upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may

be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of

more or less sin! This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the

universalism that ever cursed the world.



We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die in

his sin, he must sink to hell. Whenever a Christian sins he comes

under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be

lost.



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LECTURE 11



OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW



We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in

the single word, love, that this word is synonymous with benevolence;

that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of

God and of the universe, as an end, or for its own sake; that this

choice is an ultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good will

to being in general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question

before us is, what is not implied in this goodwill, or in this benevolent

ultimate intention?



Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and

the only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and

what is, implied in entire sanctification, is to be decided, it is of

fundamental importance, that we understand what is, and what is not,

implied in entire obedience to this law. Our judgment of our own state,

or of the state of others, can never be relied upon, till these inquiries

are settled. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were the notions

of the Jews, in regard to what constituted perfection, that they thought

Him possessed with a devil, instead of being holy, as He claimed to

be. I will state then, what is not implied in entire obedience to the

moral law, as I understand it. The law, as epitomized by Christ, "Thou

shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and

with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself"

(Deut. 6:5), I understand to lay down the whole duty of man to God,

and to his fellow creatures. Now, the questions are, what is not, and

what is, implied in perfect obedience to this law?



What is not implied in perfect obedience to this law.



1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of

the soul or body, for this the law does not require; and it would not be

obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent with

natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the entire

consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not imply any

change in them, but simply the right use of them.



2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of

character, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is

nothing, certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional

traits to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly directed

in their exercise.



3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional

appetites or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that

the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities are in themselves

sinful, and that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies

their entire annihilation. I have been not a little surprised to find, that

some persons who, I had supposed, were far enough from embracing

the doctrine of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to this

assumption, in order to set aside the doctrine of entire sanctification in

this life. But let us appeal to the law. Does the law anywhere,

expressly or impliedly, condemn the constitution of man, or require the

annihilation of any thing that is properly a part of the constitution itself? 

Does it require the annihilation of the appetite for food, or is it satisfied

merely with regulating its indulgence? In short, does the law of God

any where require any thing more than the consecration of all the

powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body and mind to the service

of God?



4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural

affection, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that

certain persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to

have had a natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean,

that, from the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to

injustice or ill treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge

ourselves is consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to

the law of God does not imply that we should have no sense of injury

and injustice, when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have

it, and so has every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself,

does not imply, that if he injure you, you should feel no sense of the

injury or injustice, but that you should love him and do him good,

notwithstanding his injurious treatment.



5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind. 

Moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical law. 

God's laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral law

cannot require such a state of constant mental excitement as will

destroy the physical constitution. It cannot require any more mental

excitement than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and

circumstances of both soul and body. It does not imply that any organ

or faculty is to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its

capacity. This would soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ

of the body. Whatever may be true of the mind, when separated from

the body, it is certain, while it acts through a material organ, that a

constant state of excitement is impossible. When the mind is strongly

excited, there is of necessity a great determination of blood to the

brain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue, without

producing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And the

law of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental

excitement, inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ

does not appear to have been in a state of continual mental

excitement. When He and His disciples had been in a great

excitement for a time, they would turn aside, "and rest a while" (Mark

6:31).



Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that

the high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in

revivals of religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must

become deranged? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a

high degree of excitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public

and individual attention, and draw off people from their pursuits, to

attend to the concerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high

degree of excitement is either necessary or desirable, or possible to

be long continued, they have not well considered the matter. And here

is one grand mistake of the church. They have supposed that the

revival consists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in

conformity of the human will to the law of God. Hence, when the

reasons for much excitement have ceased, and the public mind begins

to grow more calm, they begin immediately to say, that the revival is

on the decline; when, in fact, with much less excited emotion, there

may be vastly more real religion in the community. Excitement is often

important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will are

infinitely more important. And this state of mind may exist in the

absence of highly excited emotions.



Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or

intellectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not need the

same strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they are

not produced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth as

strong a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames of a

burning house? Should a mother, watching over her sleeping nursling,

when all is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful volitions, as might

be required to snatch it from the devouring flames? Now, suppose

that she were equally devoted to God, in watching her sleeping babe,

and in rescuing it from the jaws of death. Her holiness would not

consist in the fact, that she exercised equally strong volitions, in both

cases; but that in both cases the volition was equal to the

accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So that persons

may be entirely holy, and yet continually varying in the strength of their

affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their circumstances, the

state of their physical system, and the business in which they are

engaged.



All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and

disposal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral

energy are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature

and the circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from

the truth than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of

emotion and mental action, on any and every subject alike.



6. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the

direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible in

the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to think of

or love our neighbor as ourselves.



The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is

meant that the mind's supreme preference should be of God that

God should be the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of

mind is perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary

business of life giving to that business that attention, and exercising

about it all those affections and emotions, which its nature and

importance demand.



If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the

promotion of His glory, if his eye be single, his affections and conduct,

so far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy when

necessarily engaged in the right transaction of his business, although,

for the time being, neither his thoughts nor affections are upon God;

just as a man, who is intensely devoted to his family, may be acting

consistently with his supreme affection, and rendering them the most

important and perfect service, while he does not think of them at all. 

The moral heart is the mind's supreme preference. The natural heart

propels the blood through all the physical system. Now there is a

striking analogy between this and the moral heart. And the analogy

consists in this, that as the natural heart, by its pulsations, diffuses life

through the physical system, so the moral heart, or the supreme

governing preference, or ultimate intention of the mind, is that which

gives life and character to man's moral actions. For example, suppose

that I am engaged in teaching mathematics; in this, my ultimate

intention is to glorify God in this particular calling. Now in

demonstrating some of its intricate propositions, I am obliged, for

hours together, to give the entire attention of my mind to that object. 

While my mind is thus intensely employed in one particular business, it

is impossible that I should have any thoughts about God, or should

exercise any direct affections, or emotions, or volitions, towards Him. 

Yet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is excluded, and my

supreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a state of entire

obedience, even though, for the time being, I do not think of God.



It should be understood, that while the supreme preference or

intention of the mind has such efficiency as to exclude all selfishness,

and to call forth just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and

emotion, that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty to which the

mind may be called, the heart is in a right state. By a suitable degree

of thought and feeling, to the right discharge of duty, I mean just that

intensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature and

importance of the particular duty, to which, for the time being, I am

called, demand, in my honest estimation.



In making this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain together

with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that the requisite

amount of thought, feeling, etc., are possible. If the physical

constitution be in such a state of exhaustion, as to be unable to put

forth that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might

otherwise demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far

below the importance of the subject, would be all that the law of God

requires. Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire

obedience implies a state of entire abstraction of mind from everything

but God, labors under a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as

inconsistent with duty, as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh.



The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have been and

generally are, grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what

they never did, or can, mean, consistently with natural justice. Many a

mind has been thrown open to the assaults of Satan, and kept in a

state of continual bondage and condemnation, because God was not,

at all times, the direct object of thought, affection, and emotion; and

because the mind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and

excited to the utmost at every moment.



7. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ

was not in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of His mind

was never broken up, but the surface or emotions of His mind were

often in a state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of

great calmness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have His

history in the Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken. 

For example: Christ had all the constitutional appetites and

susceptibilities of human nature. Had it been otherwise, He could not

have been "tempted in all points like as we are" (Heb. 4:15), nor could

He have been tempted in any point as we are, any further than He

possessed a constitution similar to our own. Christ also manifested

natural affection for His mother and for other friends. He also showed

that He had a sense of injury and injustice, and exercised a suitable

resentment when He was injured and persecuted. He was not always

in a state of great excitement. He appears to have had His seasons of

excitement and of calm of labor and rest of joy and sorrow, like

other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience to

the law, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as

if every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of love to

God, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a

great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In

short, His history would lead to the conclusion that His calmness and

excitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case. 

And although He was sometimes so pointed and severe in His reproof,

as to be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet His emotions and

feelings were only those that were called for, and suited to the

occasion.



8. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without

any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners. Anger at sin is only a

modification of love to being in general. A sense of justice, or a

disposition to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the

government, is only another of the modifications of love. And such

dispositions are essential to the existence of love, where the

circumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ, that He was

angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. "God is angry

with the wicked every day" (Psalms 7:11). And holiness, or a state of

obedience, instead of being inconsistent with, always implies, the

existence of anger, whenever circumstances occur which demand its

exercise.



9. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no

sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love. 

Justice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is

another of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings,

exercise all those dispositions that constitute the different

modifications of love, under every possible circumstance.



10. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike,

irrespective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being

may have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more

importance to the universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of

love require us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all beings

and things according to their nature, relations, circumstances, and

value.



11. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations. Such

an interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to

yield obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in

us the possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is

not a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation. 

And a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite

knowledge. It is plain that the law of God cannot require any such

thing as this.



12. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever. 

It is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every

man perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him

from any mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but

would merely say, the law does not expressly or impliedly require

infallibility of judgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use

we can of all the light we have.



13. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge we might have

possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The

law might require us to love God or man, as well as we might have

been able to love them, had we always improved all our time in

obtaining all the knowledge we could, in regard to their nature,

character, and interests. If this were implied in the requisition of the

law, there is not a saint on earth or in heaven that does, or ever can,

perfectly obey. What is lost in this respect is lost, and past neglect can

never be so remedied, that we shall ever be able to make up in our

acquisitions of knowledge what we have lost. It will no doubt be true to

all eternity, that we shall have less knowledge than we might have

possessed, had we filled up all our time in its acquisition. We do not,

cannot, nor shall we ever be able to, love God as well as we might

have loved Him, had we always applied our minds to the acquisition of

knowledge respecting Him. And if entire obedience is to be

understood as implying that we love God as much we should, had we

all the knowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a

saint on earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.



14. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have

rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or

suppose, that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of

body or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it

simply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of

the law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demand only to the full

amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral

being, however great or small.



The most perfect development and improvement of our powers,

must depend upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure

from their perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development,

and a curtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and

best manner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and

curtailing the powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so

much, incapable of performing the service they might otherwise have

rendered.



To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught an

opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed His feet with

her tears, when He said, "To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth

much" (Luke 7:47). But can it be that Christ intended to be understood

as teaching, that the more we sin the greater will be our love, and our

ultimate virtue? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that

the more sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If our

virtue is really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would not be

good economy, both for God and man, to sin as much as we can while

in this world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such principle as

this. He undoubtedly meant to teach that a person who was truly

sensible of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the love

of gratitude than would be exercised by one who had a less affecting

sense of ill-desert.



15. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that

might have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin. We

cannot believe anything about God of which we have neither evidence

nor knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intellectual

perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to believe

in Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have no

knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than

in a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and

greater faith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would imply

much greater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more

of God than man does. Let it be always understood, that entire

obedience to God never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is

naturally impossible for us to believe that of which we have no

knowledge. Entire obedience implies, in this respect, nothing more

than the heart's faith or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by

the intellect.



16. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our

prayers. It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience

implies the offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. 

To this I reply: then Christ did not obey, for He offered no such prayer. 

The law of God makes no such demands, either expressly or

impliedly. We have no right to believe that all men will be converted in

answer to our prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise

to that effect. As, therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no

obligation to offer such a prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the

world imply, that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God's

law.



It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an

express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas

was not converted in answer to Christ's prayer, does not prove that

Christ did not fully obey.



Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or

impliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers; or, in

other words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant of

the existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect love

implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly speaking

can be duty of which the mind has no knowledge. It cannot, therefore,

be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely ignorant, or

the application of which to any specific object we do not understand.



If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the soul

neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be

understood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the

neglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is

inconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth; for such

neglect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that of

which we have no knowledge. James says, "He that knoweth to do

good and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (James 4:17). "If ye were blind,"

says Christ, "ye should have no sin, but because ye say, We see,

therefore your sin remaineth" (John 9:41).



17. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others will

of course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely

conformed to the law.



It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ

was possessed of a wicked instead of a holy spirit. Such were their

notions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed Him to be actuated

by any other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on

account of His opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the

ungodliness of the religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not

see, that when the church is, in a great measure, conformed to the

world, a spirit of holiness in any man would certainly lead him to aim

the sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life of those in this state, whether

in high or low places? And who does not see, that this would naturally

result in His being accused of possessing a wicked spirit? And who

does not know, that where a religious teacher finds himself under the

necessity of attacking a false orthodoxy, he will certainly be hunted,

almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of his day, whose

authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed?



18. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering. It

was not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for our

own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and

vigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had

sinned less; or sorrow for those around us sorrow in view of human

sinfulness, or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of joyful

love to God and man, and indeed are the natural results of it.



19. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society with

mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as

some have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of

papists in retiring to monasteries, and convents in taking the veil,

and, as they say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state

of voluntary exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent

with any degree of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love

to our neighbor.



20. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing

is further from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom,

perhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that "he was so cheerful as

often to be accused of being gay." Cheerfulness is certainly the result

of holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this

world than it does in heaven.



In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian

holiness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does

obedience to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply? 

Instead of bringing everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. 

On the one hand, they include things that the law of God never

required of man in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block

and a snare for the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage,

supposing that this is the way to keep them humble, to place the

standard entirely above their reach. Or, on the other hand, they really

abrogate the law, so as to make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter

away what is really implied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements,

but a sickly, whimsical, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism,

which in its manifestations and results, appears to me to be anything

but that which the law of God requires.



21. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do

our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or ever,

terminates on duty as an ultimate end. It is our duty to aim at or intend

the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, or

for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end at which we are at

all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this. While we aim at this, we

do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing duty.



Nor does it imply that we always think, at the time, of its being duty,

or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation

is a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral

agent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral

agency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to the

moral law, that moral obligation should at all times be present to the

thoughts as an object of attention.



Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of

benevolence is, at all times, the object of the mind's attention. We

may intend the glory of God and the good of our neighbor, without at

all times thinking of the moral character of this intention. But the

intention is not the less virtuous on this account. The mind

unconsciously, but necessarily, assumes the rightness of

benevolence, or of willing the good of being, just as it assumes other

first truths, without being distinctly conscious of the assumption. It is

not therefore, at all essential to obedience to the law of God, that we

should at all times have before our minds the virtuousness or moral

character of benevolence.



22. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself

should be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind's attention. 

The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in the form

of an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which every moral

agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a rule of duty,

is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in the mind of

every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily takes along

with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to himself. 

Nevertheless, this law or idea, is not always the object of the mind's

attention and thought. A moral agent may exercise good will or love to

God and man, without at the time being conscious of thinking, that this

love is required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I am not mistaken, the

benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so spontaneously,

as not, for much of the time, even to think that this love to God is

required of him. But this state of mind is not the less virtuous on this

account. If the infinite value of God's well-being and of His infinite

goodness constrains me to love Him with all my heart, can any one

suppose that this is regarded by him as the less virtuous, because I

did not wait to reflect, that God commanded me to love Him, and that it

was my duty to do so?



The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the

good of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I will

that end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the law

be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will that

end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not virtue; that

unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend obedience to moral

law, or to God, it is not virtue; I answer, that the objection involves an

absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the good of God and of

being, as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The reason of the

choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I will the good of

being as an ultimate end, I will it for the right reason.



It is impossible to will God's good as an end, out of regard to His

authority. This is to make His authority the end chosen, for the reason

of a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will anything

for the reason that God requires it, is to will God's requirement as an

ultimate end. I cannot, therefore, love God with any acceptable love,

primarily, because He commands it. God never expected to induce

His creatures to love Him, or to will His good, by commanding them to

do so.



23. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should

practically treat all interests that are of equal value according to their

value. For example, the precept, "Love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt.

19:19), cannot mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul, and

the soul of every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does

it mean that I should take the same care and oversight of my own, and

of all the families of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of

property, or time, or talent I have, equally among all mankind. This

were:



(1.) Impossible.



(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the

universe by each individual's giving his attention particularly to the

promotion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so

under his influence that he possesses particular advantages for

promoting them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its

relative value; but our efforts to promote particular interests should

depend upon our relations and capacity to promote them. Some

interests of great value we may be under no obligation to promote, for

the reason that we have no ability to promote them, while we may be

under obligation to promote interests of vastly less value, for the

reason, that we are able to promote them. We are to aim at promoting

those interests that we can most surely and extensively promote, but

always in a manner that shall not interfere with others promoting other

interests, according to their relative value. Every man is bound to

promote his own, and the salvation of his family, not because they

belong to self, but because they are valuable in themselves, and

because they are particularly committed to him, as being directly within

his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the government

of God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we proceed in

our investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent

misapprehension, and, on the other, avoid the necessity of

circumlocution, when we wish to express the same idea; the true intent

and meaning of the moral law, no doubt, is, that every interest or good

known to a moral being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic

value, and that, in our efforts to promote good, we are to aim at

securing the greatest practicable amount, and to bestow our efforts

where, as it appears from our circumstances and relations, we can

accomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all

question, only by each one attending to the promotion of those

particular interests which are most within the reach of his influence.



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LECTURE 12



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



It has been shown that the sum and spirit of the whole law is properly

expressed in one word love. It has also been shown, that this love is

benevolence or good willing; that it consists in choosing the highest

good of God and of universal being, for its own intrinsic value, in a

spirit of entire consecration to this as the ultimate end of existence. 

Although the whole law is fulfilled in one word love, yet there are

many things implied in the state of mind expressed by this term. It is,

therefore, indispensable to a right understanding of this subject, that

we inquire into the characteristics or attributes of this love. We must

keep steadily in mind certain truths of mental philosophy. I will,

therefore:



Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy as they are

revealed in consciousness.



1. Moral agents possess intellect, or the faculty of knowledge.



2. They also possess sensibility, and sensitivity, or in other words,

the faculty or susceptibility of feeling.



3. They also possess will, or the power of choosing or refusing in

every case of moral obligation.



These primary faculties are so correlated to each other, that the

intellect or the sensibility may control the will, or the will may, in a

certain sense, control them. That is, the mind is free to choose in

accordance with the demands of the intellect, which is the lawgiving

faculty, or with the desires and impulses of the sensibility, or to control

and direct them both. The will can directly control the attention of the

intellect, and consequently its perceptions, thoughts, etc. It can

indirectly control the states of the sensibility, or feeling faculty, by

controlling the perceptions and thoughts of the intellect. We also know

from consciousness, as was shown in a former lecture, that the

voluntary muscles of the body are directly controlled by the will, and

that the law which obliges the attention, the feelings, and the actions of

the body to obey the decisions of the will, is physical law, or the law of

necessity. The attention of the intellect and the outward actions are

controlled directly, and the feelings indirectly, by the decisions of the

will. The will can either command or obey. It can suffer itself to be

enslaved by the impulses of the sensibility, or it can assert its

sovereignty and control them. The will is not influenced by either the

intellect, or the sensibility, by the law of necessity or force; so that the

will can always resist either the demands of the intelligence, or the

impulses of the sensibility. But while they cannot lord it over the will,

through the agency of any law of force, the will has the aid of the law

of necessity or force by which to control them.



Again: We are conscious of affirming to ourselves our obligation to

obey the law of the intellect rather than the impulses of the sensibility;

that to act virtuously we must act rationally, or intelligently, and not

give ourselves up to the blind impulses of our feelings.



Now, inasmuch as the love required by the moral law consists in

choice, willing, intention, as before repeatedly shown; and inasmuch

as choice, willing, intending, controls the states of the intellect and the

outward actions directly, by a law of necessity, and by the same law

controls the feelings or states of the sensibility indirectly, it follows that

certain states of the intellect and of the sensibility, and also certain

outward actions, must be implied in the existence of the love which the

law of God requires. I say, implied in it, not as making a part of it, but

as necessarily resulting from it. The thoughts, opinions, judgments,

feelings, and outward actions must be molded and modified by the

state of the heart or will.



Here it is important to remark, that, in common language, the same

word is often used to express either an action or attitude of the will, or

a state of the sensibility, or both. This is true of all the terms that

represent what are called the Christian graces or virtues, or those

various modifications of virtue of which Christians are conscious, and

which appear in their life and temper. Of this truth we shall be

constantly reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for we shall

find illustrations of it at every step of our progress.



Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is

important to remark, that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy

beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that

comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. This term

expresses comprehensively God's whole moral character. This love,

as we have repeatedly seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good

willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe, as

an end. But from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it

be, we are apt to receive very inadequate conceptions of what really

belongs to, as implied in, benevolence. To say that love is the fulfilling

of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true religion; that

the whole duty of man to God and his neighbor, is expressed in one

word, love these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as

to need with all minds much amplification and explanation. Many

things are implied in love or benevolence. By this is intended, that

benevolence needs to be viewed under various aspects and in various

relations, and its nature considered in the various relations in which it

is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate intention, or the choice of

an ultimate end. But if we suppose that this is all that is implied in

benevolence, we shall egregiously err. Unless we inquire into the

nature of the end which benevolence chooses, and the means by

which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but little of

the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many attributes

or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selection of its

end, and in its efforts to realize it. By this is intended that benevolence

is not a blind, but the most intelligent, choice. It is the choice of the

best possible end in obedience to the demand of the reason and of

God, and implies the choice of the best possible means to secure this

end. Both the end and the means are chosen in obedience to the law

of God, and of reason. An attribute is a permanent quality of a thing. 

The attributes of benevolence are those permanent qualities which

belong to its very nature. Benevolence is not blind, but intelligent,

choice. It is the choice of the highest well-being of moral agents. It

seeks this end by means suited to the nature of moral agents. Hence

wisdom, justice, mercy, truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as

we shall see, are essential elements, or attributes, of benevolence. To

understand what true benevolence is, we must inquire into its

attributes. Not everything that is called love has at all the nature of

benevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence any title to that

appellation. There are various kinds of love. Natural affection is

called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love. 

Hence we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, etc. Benevolence is

also called love, and is the kind of love, beyond all question, required

by the law of God. But there is more than one state of mind that is

called benevolence. There is a constitutional or phrenological

benevolence, which is often mistaken for, and confounded with, the

benevolence which constitutes virtue. This so-called benevolence is in

truth only an imposing form of selfishness; nevertheless it is called

benevolence. Many of its manifestations are like those of true

benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken, in giving religious

instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence, let it

be remembered, is the obedience of the will to the law of reason and

of God. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not to gratify

self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the impulses

of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to

gratify the desires and propensities, for the pleasure of the

gratification. Self-gratification is sought as an end, and as the

supreme end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of

being. Phrenological, or constitutional benevolence, is only obedience

to the impulse of the sensibility a yielding to a feeling of compassion. 

It is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really

selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever.



It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the

divine law, and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the

various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon

this discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the

enumeration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to

remark that the moral attributes of God, as revealed in His works,

providence, and word, throw much light upon the subject before us. 

Also the many precepts of the Bible, and the developments of

benevolence therein revealed, will assist us much, as we proceed in

our inquiries upon this important subject. As the Bible expressly

affirms that love comprehends the whole character of God that it is

the whole that the law requires of man that the end of the

commandment is charity or love we may be assured that every form

of true virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence; that is, that

every state of mind required by the Bible, and recognized as virtue, is,

in its last analysis, resolvable into love or benevolence. In other

words, every virtue is only benevolence viewed under certain aspects,

or in certain relations. In other words still, it is only one of the

elements, peculiarities, characteristics, or attributes of benevolence. 

This is true of God's moral attributes. They are, as has been said,

only attributes of benevolence. They are only the essential qualities

that belong to the very nature of benevolence, which are manifested

and brought into activity wherever benevolence is brought into certain

circumstances and relations. Benevolence is just, merciful, etc. Such

is its nature, that in appropriate circumstances these qualities, together

with many others, will manifest themselves in executive acts. This is

and must be true of every holy being. 



I will now proceed to point out the attributes of that love which

constitutes obedience to the law of God.



As I proceed I will call attention to the states of the intellect and of

the sensibility, and also to the course of outward conduct implied in the

existence of this love in any mind implied in its existence as

necessarily resulting from it by the law of cause and effect. These

attributes are:



1. Voluntariness. That is to say, it is a phenomenon of the will. 

There is a state of the sensibility often expressed by the term love. 

Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a

mere feeling or emotion. The term is often used to express the

emotion of fondness or attachment, as distinct from a voluntary state

of mind, or a choice of the will. This emotion or feeling, as we are all

aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a

phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind,

it has in itself no moral character. The law of God requires voluntary

love or goodwill, as has been repeatedly shown. This love consists in

choice, intention. It is choosing the highest well-being of God and the

universe of sentient beings as an end. Of course voluntariness must

be one of its characteristics. The word benevolence expresses this

idea.



If it consists in choice, if it be a phenomenon of the will, it must

control the thoughts and states of the sensibility, as well as the

outward action. This love, then, not only consists in a state of

consecration to God and the universe, but also implies deep emotions

of love to God and man. Though a phenomenon of the will, it implies

the existence of all those feelings of love and affection to God and

man, that necessarily result from the consecration of the heart or will

to their highest well-being. It also implies all that outward course of life

that necessarily flows from a state of will consecrated to this end. Let

it be borne in mind, that where these feelings do not arise in the

sensibility, and where this course of life is not, there the true love or

voluntary consecration to God and the universe required by the law, is

not. Those follow from this by a law of necessity. Those, that is,

feelings or emotions of love, and a correct outward life, may exist

without this voluntary love, as I shall have occasion to show in its

proper place; but this love cannot exist without those, as they follow

from it by a law of necessity. These emotions will vary in their

strength, as constitution and circumstances vary, but exist they must,

in some sensible degree, whenever the will is in a benevolent attitude.



2. Liberty is an attribute of this love. The mind is free and

spontaneous in its exercise. It makes this choice when it has the

power at every moment to choose self-gratification as an end. Of this

every moral agent is conscious. It is a free, and therefore a

responsible, choice.



3. Intelligence. That is, the mind makes choice of this end

intelligently. It not only knows what it chooses, and why it chooses,

but also that it chooses in accordance with the dictates of the intellect,

and the law of God; that the end is worthy of being chosen, and that

for this reason the intellect demands that it should be chosen, and

also, that for its own intrinsic value it is chosen.



Because voluntariness, liberty, and intelligence are natural attributes

of this love, therefore, the following are its moral attributes.



4. Virtue is an attribute of it. Virtue is a term that expresses the

moral character of benevolence; it is moral rightness. Moral rightness

is moral perfection, righteousness, or uprightness. The term marks or

designates its relation to moral law, and expresses its conformity to it.



In the exercise of this love or choice, the mind is conscious of

uprightness, or of being conformed to moral law or moral obligation. In

other words, it is conscious of being virtuous or holy, of being like God,

of loving what ought to be loved, and of consecration to the right end.



Because this choice is in accordance with the demands of the

intellect, therefore the mind, in its exercise, is conscious of the

approbation of that power of the intellect which we call conscience. 

The conscience must approve this love, choice, or intention.



Again: Because the conscience approves of this choice, therefore,

there is and must be in the sensibility a feeling of happiness or

satisfaction, a feeling of complacency or delight in the love that is in

the heart or will. This love, then, always produces self-approbation in

the conscience, and a felt satisfaction in the sensibility; and these

feelings are often very acute and joyous, insomuch that the soul, in the

exercise of this love of the heart, is sometimes led to rejoice with joy

unspeakable and full of glory. This state of mind does not always and

necessarily amount to joy. Much depends in this respect on the

clearness of the intellectual views, upon the state of the sensibility, and

upon the manifestation of Divine approbation to the soul. But where

peace, or approbation of conscience, and consequently a peaceful

state of the sensibility are not, this love is not. They are connected

with it by a law of necessity, and must of course appear on the field of

consciousness where this love exists. These, then, are implied in the

love that constitutes obedience to the law of God. Conscious peace of

mind, and conscious joy in God must be where true love to God exists.



5. Disinterestedness is another attribute of this love. By

disinterestedness, it is not intended that the mind takes no interest in

the object loved, for it does take a supreme interest in it. But this term

expresses the mind's choice of an end for its own sake, and not

merely upon condition that the good belongs to self. This love is

disinterested in the sense that the highest well-being of God and the

universe is chosen, not upon condition of its relation to self, but for its

own intrinsic and infinite value. It is this attribute particularly that

distinguishes this love from selfish love. Selfish love makes the

relation of good to self the condition of choosing it. The good of God

and of the universe, if chosen at all, is only chosen as a means or

condition of promoting the highest good of self. But this love does not

make good to self its end; but good to God and being in general, is its

end.



As disinterestedness is an attribute of this love, it does not seek its

own, but the good of others. "Charity (love) seeketh not her own" (1

Cor. 13:5). It grasps in its comprehensive embrace the good of being

in general, and of course, of necessity, secures a corresponding

outward life and inward feeling. The intellect will be employed in

devising ways and means for the promotion of its end. The sensibility

will be tremblingly alive to the good of all and of each; will rejoice in the

good of others as in its own, and will grieve at the misery of others as

in its own. It "will rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with

them that weep" (Romans 12:5). There will not, cannot be envy at the

prosperity of others, but unfeigned joy, joy as real and often as

exquisite as in its own prosperity. Benevolence enjoys everybody's

good things, while selfishness is too envious at the good things of

others even to enjoy its own. There is a Divine economy in

benevolence. Each benevolent soul not only enjoys his own good

things, but also enjoys the good things of all others so far as he knows

their happiness. He drinks at the river of God's pleasure. He not only

rejoices in doing good to others, but also in beholding their enjoyment

of good things. He joys in God's joy, and in the joy of angels and of

saints. He also rejoices in the good things of all sentient existences. 

He is happy in beholding the pleasure of the beasts of the field, the

fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea. He sympathizes with all joy

and all suffering known to him; nor is his sympathy with the sufferings

of others a feeling of unmingled pain. It is a real luxury to sympathize

in the woes of others. He would not be without this sympathy. It so

accords with his sense of propriety and fitness, that, mingled with the

painful emotion, there is a sweet feeling of self-approbation; so that a

benevolent sympathy with the woes of others is by no means

inconsistent with happiness, and with perfect happiness. God has this

sympathy. He often expresses and otherwise manifests it. There is,

indeed, a mysterious and an exquisite luxury in sharing the woes of

others. God and angels and all holy beings know what it is. Where

this result of love is not manifested, there love itself is not. Envy at the

prosperity, influence, or good of others, the absence of sensible joy in

view of the good enjoyed by others, and of sympathy with the

sufferings of others, prove conclusively that this love does not exist. 

There is an expansiveness, an ampleness of embrace, a universality,

and a divine disinterestedness in this love, that necessarily manifests

itself in the liberal devising of liberal things for Zion, and in the copious

outpourings of the floods of sympathetic feeling, both in joys and

sorrows, when suitable occasions present themselves before the

mind.



6. Impartiality is another attribute of this love: By this term is not

intended, that the mind is indifferent to the character of him who is

happy or miserable; that it would be as well pleased to see the wicked

as the righteous eternally and perfectly blessed. But it is intended

that, other things being equal, it is the intrinsic value of their well-being

which is alone regarded by the mind. Other things being equal, it

matters not to whom the good belongs. It is no respecter of persons. 

The good of being is its end, and it seeks to promote every interest

according to its relative value. Selfish love is partial. It seeks to

promote self-interest first, and secondarily those interests that sustain

such a relation to self as will at least indirectly promote the gratification

of self. Selfish love has its favorites, its prejudices, unreasonable and

ridiculous. Color, family, nation, and many other things of like nature,

modify it. But benevolence knows neither Jew nor Greek, neither

bond nor free, white nor black, Barbarian, Scythian, European,

Asiatic, African, nor American, but accounts all men as men, and, by

virtue of their common manhood, calls every man a brother, and seeks

the interests of all and of each. Impartiality, being an attribute of this

love, will of course manifest itself in the outward life, and in the temper

and spirit of its subject. This love can have no fellowship with those

absurd and ridiculous prejudices that are so often rife among nominal

Christians. Nor will it cherish them for a moment in the sensibility of

him who exercises it. Benevolence recognizes no privileged classes

on the one hand, nor proscribed classes on the other. It secures in the

sensibility an utter loathing of those discriminations, so odiously

manifested and boasted of, and which are founded exclusively in a

selfish state of the will. The fact that a man is a man, and not that he

is of our party, of our complexion, or of our town, state, or nation that

he is a creature of God, that he is capable of virtue and happiness,

these are the considerations that are seized upon by this divinely

impartial love. It is the intrinsic value of his interests, and not that they

are the interests of one connected with self, that the benevolent mind

regards.



But here it is important to repeat the remark, that the economy of

benevolence demands, that where two interests are, in themselves

considered, of equal value, in order to secure the greatest amount of

good, each one should bestow his efforts where they can be bestowed

to the greatest advantage. For example: every man sustains such

relations that he can accomplish more good by seeking to promote the

interest and happiness of certain persons rather than of others; his

family, his kindred, his companions, his immediate neighbors, and

those to whom, in the providence of God, he sustains such relations

as to give him access to them, and influence over them. It is not

unreasonable, it is not partial, but reasonable and impartial, to bestow

our efforts more directly upon them. Therefore, while benevolence

regards every interest according to its relative value, it reasonably puts

forth its efforts in the direction where there is a prospect of

accomplishing the most good. This, I say, is not partiality, but

impartiality; for, be it understood, it is not the particular persons to

whom good can be done, but the amount of good that can be

accomplished, that directs the efforts of benevolence. It is not

because my family is my own, nor because their well-being is, of

course, more valuable in itself than that of my neighbors' families, but

because my relations afford me higher facilities for doing them good, I

am under particular obligation to aim first at promoting their good. 

Hence the apostle says: "If any man provide not for his own, especially

for those of his own household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse

than an infidel" (1 Tim. 5:8). Strictly speaking, benevolence esteems

every known good according to its intrinsic and relative value; but

practically treats every interest according to the perceived probability

of securing on the whole the highest amount of good. This is a truth of

great practical importance. It is developed in the experience and

observation of every day and hour. It is manifest in the conduct of God

and of Christ, of apostles and martyrs. It is everywhere assumed in

the precepts of the Bible, and everywhere manifested in the history of

benevolent effort. Let it be understood, then, that impartiality, as an

attribute of benevolence, does not imply that its effort to do good will

not be modified by relations and circumstances. But, on the contrary,

this attribute implies, that the efforts to secure the great end of

benevolence, to wit, the greatest amount of good to God and the

universe, will be modified by those relations and circumstances that

afford the highest advantages for doing good.



The impartiality of benevolence causes it always to lay supreme

stress upon God's interests, because His well-being is of infinite value,

and of course benevolence must be supreme to Him. Benevolence,

being impartial love, of course accounts God's interests and

well-being, as of infinitely greater value than the aggregate of all other

interests. Benevolence regards our neighbor's interests as our own,

simply because they are in their intrinsic value as our own. 

Benevolence, therefore, is always supreme to God and equal to man.



7. Universality is another attribute of this love. Benevolence chooses

the highest good of being in general. It excludes none from its regard;

but on the contrary embosoms all in its ample embrace. But by this it

is not intended, that it practically seeks to promote the good of every

individual. It would if it could; but it seeks the highest practicable

amount of good. The interest of every individual is estimated

according to its intrinsic value, whatever the circumstances or

character of each may be. But character and relations may and must

modify the manifestations of benevolence, or its efforts in seeking to

promote this end. A wicked character, and governmental relations and

considerations, may forbid benevolence to seek the good of some. 

Nay, they may demand that positive misery shall be inflicted on some,

as a warning to others to beware of their destructive ways. By

universality, as an attribute of benevolence, is intended, that good will

is truly exercised towards all sentient beings, whatever their character

and relations may be; and that, when the higher good of the greater

number does not forbid it, the happiness of all and of each will be

pursued with a degree of stress equal to their relative value, and the

prospect of securing each interest. Enemies as well as friends,

strangers and foreigners as well as relations and immediate

neighbors, will be enfolded in its sweet embrace. It is the state of mind

required by Christ in the truly divine precept, "I say unto you. Love

your enemies, pray for them that hate you, and do good unto them

that despitefully use and persecute you" (Matt. 5:44). This attribute of

benevolence is gloriously conspicuous in the character of God. His

love to sinners alone accounts for their being today out of perdition. 

His aiming to secure the highest good of the greatest number, is

illustrated by the display of His glorious justice in the punishment of the

wicked. His universal care for all ranks and conditions of sentient

beings, manifested in His works and providence, beautifully and

gloriously illustrates the truth, that "His tender mercies are over all His

works" (Psalms 145:9).



It is easy to see that universality must be a modification or attribute

of true benevolence. It consists in good willing, that is, in choosing the

highest good of being as such, and for its own sake. Of course it

must, to be consistent with itself, seek the good of all and of each, so

far as the good of each is consistent with the greatest good upon the

whole. Benevolence not only wills and seeks the good of moral

beings, but also the good of every sentient existence, from the

minutest animalcule to the highest order of beings. It of course

produces a state of the sensibility tremblingly alive to all happiness

and to all pain. It is pained at the agony of an insect, and rejoices in

its joy. God does this, and all holy beings do this. Where this

sympathy with the joys and sorrows of universal being is not, there

benevolence is not. Observe, good is its end; where this is promoted

by the proper means, the feelings are gratified. Where evil is

witnessed, the benevolent spirit deeply and necessarily sympathizes.



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LECTURE 13



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



8. Efficiency is another attribute or characteristic of benevolence. 

Benevolence consists in choice, intention. Now we know from

consciousness that choice or intention constitutes the mind's deepest

source or power of action. If I honestly intend a thing, I cannot but

make efforts to accomplish that which I intend, provided that I believe

the thing possible. If I choose an end, this choice must and will

energize to secure its end. When benevolence is the supreme choice,

preference, or intention of the soul, it is plainly impossible that it should

not produce efforts to secure its end. It must cease to exist, or

manifest itself in exertions to secure its end, as soon as, and

whenever the intelligence deems it wise to do so. If the will has

yielded to the intelligence in the choice of an end, it will certainly obey

the intelligence in pursuit of that end. Choice, intention, is the cause of

all the outward activity of moral agents. They have all chosen some

end, either their own gratification, or the highest good of being; and all

the busy bustle of this world's teeming population, is nothing else than

choice or intention seeking to compass its end.



Efficiency, therefore, is an attribute of benevolent intention. It must,

it will, it does energize in God, in angels, in saints on earth and in

heaven. It was this attribute of benevolence, that led God to give His

only begotten Son, and that led the Son to give Himself, "that

whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting

life" (John 3:16).



If love is efficient in producing outward action, and efficient in

producing inward feelings; it is efficient to wake up the intellect, and

set the world of thought in action to devise ways and means for

realizing its end. It wields all the infinite natural attributes of God. It is

the mainspring that moves all heaven. It is the mighty power that is

heaving the mass of mind, and rocking the world like a smothered

volcano. Look to the heavens above. It was benevolence that hung

them out. It is benevolence that sustains those mighty rolling orbs in

their courses. It was good will endeavoring to realize its end that at

first put forth creative power. The same power, for the same reason,

still energizes, and will continue to energize for the realization of its

end, so long as God is benevolent. And O! What a glorious thought,

that infinite benevolence is wielding, and will forever wield, infinite

natural attributes for the promotion of good! No mind but an infinite

one can begin to conceive of the amount of good that Jehovah will

secure. O blessed, glorious thought! But it is, it must be a reality, as

surely as God and the universe exist. It is no vain imagination; it is

one of the most certain, as well as the most glorious, truths in the

universe. Mountains of granite are but vapor in comparison with it. 

But the truly benevolent on earth and in heaven will sympathize with

God. The power that energizes in Him, energizes in them. One

principle animates and moves them all, and that principle is love, good

will to universal being. Well may our souls cry out, Amen, go on,

God-speed the work; let this mighty power heave and wield universal

mind, until all the ills of earth shall be put away, and until all that can

be made holy are clothed in the garments of everlasting gladness.



Since benevolence is necessarily, from its very nature, active and

efficient in putting forth efforts to secure its end, and since its end is

the highest good of being, it follows that all who are truly religious will,

and must, from the very nature of true religion, be active in

endeavoring to promote the good of being. While effort is possible to

a Christian, it is as natural to him as his breath. He has within him the

very mainspring of activity, a heart set on the promotion of the highest

good of universal being. While he has life and activity at all, it will, and

it must, be directed to this end. Let this never be forgotten. An idle,

an inactive, inefficient Christian is a misnomer. Religion is an

essentially active principle, and when and while it exists, it must

exercise and manifest itself. It is not merely good desire, but it is good

willing. Men may have desires, and hope and live on them, without

making efforts to realize their desires. They may desire without action. 

If their will is active, their life must be. If they really choose an ultimate

end, this choice must manifest itself. The sinner does and must

manifest his selfish choice, and so likewise must the saint manifest his

benevolence.



9. Complacency in holiness or moral excellence, is another attribute

of benevolence. This consists in benevolence contemplated in its

relations to holy beings. This term also expresses both a state of the

intelligence and of the sensibility. Moral agents are so constituted,

that they necessarily approve of moral worth or excellence; and when

even sinners behold right character, or moral goodness, they are

compelled to respect and approve it, by a law of their intelligence. 

This they not infrequently regard as evidence of goodness in

themselves. But this is doubtless just as common in hell as it is on

earth. The vilest sinners on earth or in hell, have, by the unalterable

constitution of their nature, the necessity imposed upon them, of

paying intellectual homage to moral excellence. When a moral agent

is intensely contemplating moral excellence, and his intellectual

approbation is emphatically pronounced, the natural, and often the

necessary result, is a corresponding feeling of complacency or delight

in the sensibility. But this being altogether an involuntary state of

mind, has no moral character. Complacency, as a phenomenon of

will, consists in willing the highest actual blessedness of the holy being

in particular, as a good in itself, and upon condition of his moral

excellence.



This attribute of benevolence is the cause of a complacent state of

the sensibility. It is true, that feelings of complacency may exist, when

complacency of will does not exist. But complacency of feeling surely

will exist, when complacency of will exists. Complacency of will

implies complacency of conscience, or the approbation of the

intelligence. When there is a complacency of intelligence and of will,

there must follow, of course, complacency of the sensibility.



It is highly worthy of observation here, that this complacency of

feeling is that which is generally termed love to God and to the saints,

in the common language of Christians, and often in the popular

language of the Bible. It is a vivid and pleasant state of the sensibility,

and very noticeable by consciousness, of course. Indeed, it is

perhaps the general usage now to call this phenomenon of the

sensibility, love; and, for want of just discrimination, to speak of it as

constituting religion. Many seem to suppose that this feeling of delight

in, and fondness for, God, is the love required by the moral law. They

are conscious of not being voluntary in it, as well they may be. They

judge of their religious state, not by the end for which they live, that is,

by their choice or intention, but by their emotions. If they find

themselves strongly exercised with emotions of love to God, they look

upon themselves as in a state well-pleasing to God. But if their

feelings or emotions of love are not active; they of course judge

themselves to have little or no religion. It is remarkable to what extent

religion is regarded as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and as

consisting in mere feelings. So common is it, indeed, that almost

uniformly, when professed Christians speak of their religion, they

speak of their feelings, or the state of their sensibility, instead of

speaking of their conscious consecration to God, and the good of

being.



It is also somewhat common for them to speak of their views of

Christ, and of truth, in a manner that shows, that they regard the states

of the intellect as constituting a part, at least, of their religion. It is of

great importance that just views should prevail among Christians upon

this momentous subject. Virtue, or religion, as has been repeatedly

said, must be a phenomenon of the will. The attribute of benevolence

which we are considering, that is, complacency of will in God, is the

most common light in which the scriptures present it, and also the

most common form in which it lies revealed on the field of

consciousness. The scriptures often assign the goodness of God as a

reason for loving Him, and Christians are conscious of having much

regard to His goodness in their love to Him; I mean in their good will to

Him. They will good to Him, and ascribe all praise and glory to Him,

upon the condition that He deserves it. Of this they are conscious. 

Now, as was shown in a former lecture, in their love or good will to

God, they do not regard His goodness as the fundamental reason for

willing good to Him. Although His goodness is that, which, at the time,

most strongly impresses their minds, yet it must be that the intrinsic

value of His well-being is assumed, and had in view by them, or they

would no sooner will good than evil to Him. In willing His good they

must assume its intrinsic value to Him, as the fundamental reason for

willing it; and His goodness as a secondary reason or condition; but

they are conscious of being much influenced in willing His good in

particular, by a regard to His goodness. Should you ask the Christian

why he loved God, or why he exercised good will to Him, he would

probably reply, it is because God is good. But, suppose he should be

further asked, why he willed good rather than evil to God; he would

say, because good is good or valuable to Him. Or, if he returned the

same answer as before, to wit, because God is good, he would give

this answer, only because he would think t impossible for any one not

to assume and to know, that good is willed instead of evil, because of

its intrinsic value. The fact is, the intrinsic value of well-being is

necessarily taken along with the mind, and always assumed by it, as a

first truth. When a virtuous being is perceived, this first truth being

spontaneously and necessarily assumed, the mind thinks only of the

secondary reason or condition, or the virtue of the being, in willing

good to him.



Before I dismiss this subject, I must advert again to the subject of

complacent love, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and also as a

phenomenon of the intellect. If I mistake not, there are sad mistakes,

and gross and ruinous delusions, entertained by many upon this

subject. The intellect, of necessity, perfectly approves of the character

of God where it is apprehended. The intellect is so correlated to the

sensibility, that, where it perceives in a strong light the divine

excellence, or the excellence of the divine law, the sensibility is

affected by the perception of the intellect, as a thing of course and of

necessity; so that emotions of complacency and delight in the law, and

in the divine character, may and often do glow and burn in the

sensibility, while the will or heart is unaffected. The will remains in a

selfish choice, while the intellect and the sensibility are strongly

impressed with the perception of the Divine excellence. This state of

the intellect and the sensibility is, no doubt, often mistaken for true

religion. We have undoubted illustrations of this in the Bible, and

similar cases of it in common life. "Yet they seek Me daily, and delight

to know My ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not

the ordinance of their God: "they ask of Me the ordinances of justice,

they take delight in approaching to God" (Isaiah 58:2). "And, Lo, Thou

art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice,

and can play well on an instrument: for they hear Thy words, but they

do them not" (Ezek. 33:32).



Nothing is of greater importance, than forever to understand, that

religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will; that it

always and necessarily produces outward action and inward feeling;

that, on account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility,

almost any and every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as

produced by the perceptions of the intellect, whatever the state of the

will may be; that unless we are conscious of goodwill, or of

consecration to God and the good of being-unless we are conscious of

living for this end, it avails us nothing, whatever our views and feelings

may be.



And also it behooves us to consider that, although these views and

feelings may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist

when the heart is right; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling,

when the heart is in a selfish attitude, yet, that there will and must be

deep emotion and strenuous action, when the heart is right. Let it be

remembered, that complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is

always a striking characteristic of true love to God; that the mind is

affected and consciously influenced, in willing the actual and infinite

blessedness of God, by a regard to His goodness. The goodness of

God is not, as has been repeatedly shown, the fundamental reason for

the goodwill, but it is one reason or a condition, both of the possibility

of willing, and of the obligation to will His blessedness in particular. It

assigns to itself, and to others, His goodness as the reason for willing

His good, rather than the intrinsic value of good; because this last is so

universally, and so necessarily assumed, that it thinks not of

mentioning it, taking it always for granted, that this will and must be

understood.



10. Opposition to sin is another attribute or characteristic of true love

to God.



This attribute certainly is implied in the very essence and nature of

benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or willing the highest good

of being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more

destructive of this good than sin. Benevolence cannot do otherwise

than be forever opposed to sin, as that abominable thing which it

necessarily hates. It is absurd and a contradiction to affirm, that

benevolence is not opposed to sin. God is love or benevolence. He

must, therefore, be the unalterable opponent of sin of all sin, in every

form and degree.



But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that is

often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. Opposition to all sin

is, and must be, a phenomenon of the will, and on that ground alone it

becomes virtue. But it often exists also as a phenomenon of the

intellect, and likewise of the sensibility. The intellect cannot

contemplate sin without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often

mistaken for opposition of heart, or of will. When the intellect strongly

disapproves of, and denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily

a corresponding feeling of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion

of loathing, of hatred, of abhorrence. This is often mistaken for

opposition of the will, or heart. This is manifest from the fact, that

often the most notorious sinners manifest strong indignation in view of

oppression, injustice, falsehood, and many other forms of sin. This

phenomenon of the sensibility and of the intellect, as I said, is often

mistaken for a virtuous opposition to sin, which-it cannot be unless it

involve an act of the will.



But let it be remembered, that virtuous opposition to sin is a

characteristic of love to God and man or of benevolence. This

opposition to sin cannot possibly coexist with any degree of sin in the

heart. That is, this opposition cannot coexist with a sinful choice. The

will cannot at the same time, be opposed to sin and commit sin. This

is impossible, and the supposition involves a contradiction. Opposition

to sin as a phenomenon of the intellect, or of the sensibility, may exist;

in other words, the intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the

sensibility may feel strongly opposed to certain forms of it, while at the

same time, the will may cleave to self indulgence in other forms. This

fact, no doubt, accounts for the common mistake, that we can, at the

same time, exercise a virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to

commit it.



Many are, no doubt, laboring under this fatal delusion. They are

conscious, not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin in certain

forms, but also, at times, of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet

they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore

conclude, that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a

principle of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful at the same

time. Their opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a

holy opposition, when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even

more so than it is on earth, for the reason that sin is more naked there

than it generally is here.



But now the inquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and the

sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in? What

reason can the mind have for a sinful choice, when urged to it neither

by the intellect nor the sensibility? The philosophy of this

phenomenon needs explanation. Let us attend to it.



I am a moral agent. My intellect necessarily disapproves of sin. My

sensibility is so correlated to my intellect, that it sympathizes with it, or

is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate sin. I

necessarily disapprove of it, and condemn it. This affects my

sensibility. I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how is

this to be accounted for? The usual method is by ascribing it to a

depravity in the will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so

that it perversely chooses sin for its own sake. Although disapproved

by the intellect, and loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the

inherent depravity of the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin

notwithstanding, and will continue to do so, until that faculty is renewed

by the Holy Spirit, and a holy bias or inclination is impressed upon the

will itself



But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this

subject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is. It is

admitted on all hands, that selfishness is sin. Comparatively few seem

to understand that selfishness is the whole of sin, and that every form

of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of virtue

may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to show

that selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present to

take the admission, that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness? It

is the choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our

own gratification to the highest good of universal being. 

Self-gratification is the supreme end of selfishness. This choice is

sinful. That is, the moral of this selfish choice is sin. Now, in no case,

is or can sin be chosen for its own sake, or as an end. Whenever

anything is chosen to gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is

sinful, but notwithstanding it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the

choice upon which the choice fixes, as an end, or for its own sake, but

it is the gratification to be afforded by the thing chosen. For example,

theft is sinful. But the will, in an act of theft, does not aim at and

terminate on the sinfulness of theft, but upon the gain or gratification

expected from the stolen object. Drunkenness is sinful, but the

inebriate does not intend or choose the sinfulness for its own sake, or

as an end. He does not choose strong drink because the choice is

sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. We choose the gratification, but not

the sin, as an end. To choose the gratification as an end is sinful, but

it is not the sin that is the object of choice. Our mother Eve ate the

forbidden fruit. This eating was sinful. But the thing that she chose or

intended, was not the sinfulness of eating, but the gratification

expected from the fruit. It is not, it cannot in any case be true, that sin

is chosen as an end, or for its own sake. Sin is only the quality of

selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of sin as an end, or for its

own sake, but of self-gratification; and this choice of self-gratification

as an end is sinful. That is, the moral quality of the choice is sin. To

say that sin is, or can be, chosen for its own sake, is untrue and

absurd. It is the same as saying that a choice can terminate on an

element, quality, or attribute, of itself; that the thing chosen is really an

element of the choice itself.



But it is said, that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin

for its own sake, or because it is sin; that they possess such a

malicious state of mind, that they love sin for its own sake; that they

"roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue"; that "they eat up the

sins of God's people as they eat bread"; (Psalms 14:4), that is, that

they love their own sins and the sins of others, as they do their

necessary food, and choose it for that reason, or just as they do their

food; that they not only sin themselves with greediness, but also have

pleasure in them that do the same. Now all this may be true, yet it

does not at all disprove the position which I have taken, namely, that

sin never is, and never can be chosen as an end, or for its own sake. 

Sin may be sought and loved as a means, but never as an end. The

choice of food will illustrate this. Food is never chosen as an ultimate

end; it never can be so chosen. It is always as a means. It is the

gratification, or the utility of it, in some point of view, that constitutes

the reason for choosing it. Gratification is always the end for which a

selfish man eats. It may not be merely the present pleasure of eating

which he alone or principally seeks. But, nevertheless, if a selfish

man, he has his own gratification in view as an end. It may be that it is

not so much a present, as a remote gratification he has in view. Thus

he may choose food to give him health and strength to pursue some

distant gratification, the acquisition of wealth, or something else that

will gratify him.



It may happen that a sinner may get into a state of rebellion against

God and the universe, of so frightful a character, that he shall take

pleasure in willing, and in doing, and saying, things that are sinful, just

because they are sinful and displeasing to God and to holy beings. 

But, even in this case, sin is not chosen as an end, but as a means of

gratifying this malicious feeling. It is, after all, self-gratification that is

chosen as an end, and not sin. Sin is the means, and self-gratification

is the end.



Now we are prepared to understand how it is that both the intellect

and sensibility can often be opposed to sin, and yet the will cleave to

the indulgence. An inebriate is contemplating the moral character of

drunkenness. He instantly and necessarily condemns the

abomination. His sensibility sympathizes with the intellect. He loathes

the sinfulness of drinking strong drink, and himself on account of it. 

He is ashamed, and were it possible, he would spit in his own face. 

Now, in this state, it would surely be absurd to suppose that he could

choose sin, the sin of drinking, as an end, or for its own sake. This

would be choosing it for an impossible reason, and not for no reason. 

But still he may choose to continue his drink, not because it is sinful,

but notwithstanding it is so. For while the intellect condemns the sin of

drinking strong drink, and the sensibility loathes the sinfulness of the

indulgence, nevertheless there still exists so strong an appetite, not for

the sin, but for the liquor, that the will seeks the gratification,

notwithstanding the sinfulness of it. So it is, and so it must be, in every

case where sin is committed in the face of the remonstrances of the

intellect and the loathing of the sensibility. The sensibility loathes the

sinfulness, but more strongly desires the thing the choice of which is

sinful. The will in a selfish being yields to the strongest impulse of the

sensibility, and the end chosen is, in no case, the sinfulness of the act,

but the self-gratification. Those who suppose this opposition of the

intellect, or of the sensibility, to be a holy principle, are fatally deluded. 

It is this kind of opposition to sin, that often manifests itself among

wicked men, and that leads them to take credit for goodness or virtue,

not an atom of which do they possess. They will not believe

themselves to be morally and totally depraved, while they are

conscious of so much hostility to sin within them. But they should

understand, that this opposition is not of the will, or they cold not go on

in sin; that it is purely an involuntary state of mind, and has no moral

character whatever. Let it be ever remembered, then, that a virtuous

opposition to sin is always and necessarily an attribute of

benevolence, a phenomenon of the will; and that it is naturally

impossible, that this opposition of will should coexist with the

commission of sin.



As this opposition to sin is plainly implied in, and is an essential

attribute of, benevolence, or true love to God, it follows, that obedience

to the law of God cannot be partial, in the sense that we both love God

and sin at the same time.



11. Compassion for the miserable is also an attribute of

benevolence, or of pure love to God and man. This is benevolence

viewed in its relations to misery and to guilt.



There is a compassion also which is a phenomenon of the

sensibility. It may, and does often, exist in the form of an emotion. 

But this emotion being involuntary, has no moral character in itself. 

The compassion which is a virtue, and which is required of us as a

duty, is a phenomenon of the will, and is of course an attribute of

benevolence. Benevolence, as has been often said, is good willing, or

willing the highest happiness and well-being of God and the universe

for its own sake, or as an end. It is impossible, therefore, from its own

nature, that compassion for the miserable should not be one of its

attributes. Compassion of will to misery is the choice or wish that it

might not exist. Benevolence wills that happiness should exist for its

own sake. It must, therefore, wish that misery might not exist. This

attribute or peculiarity of benevolence consists in wishing the

happiness of the miserable. Benevolence, simply considered, is

willing the good or happiness of being in general. Compassion of will

is a willing particularly that the miserable should be happy.



Compassion of sensibility is simply a feeling of pity in view of misery. 

As has been said, it is not a virtue. It is only a desire, but not willing;

consequently, does not benefit its object. It is the state of mind of

which James speaks: "If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of

daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye

warmed and filled; notwithstanding ye give them not those things

which are needful to the body, what doth it profit?" (James 2:15, 16). 

This kind of compassion may evidently coexist with selfishness. But

compassion of heart or will cannot; for it consists in willing the

happiness of the miserable for its own sake, and of course impartially. 

It will, and from its very nature must, deny self to promote its end,

whenever it wisely can, that is, when it is seen to be demanded by the

highest general good. Circumstances may exist that render it unwise

to express this compassion by actually extending relief to the

miserable. Such circumstances forbid that God should extend relief to

the lost in hell. But for their character and governmental relations,

God's compassion would no doubt make immediate efforts for their

relief.



Many circumstances may exist in which, although compassion would

hasten to the relief of its object, yet, on the whole, the misery that

exists is regarded as the less of two evils, and therefore, the wisdom

of benevolence forbids it to put forth exertions to save its object.



But it is of the last importance to distinguish carefully between

compassion, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as a mere feeling,

and compassion considered as a phenomenon of the will. This, be it

remembered, is the only form of virtuous compassion. Many, who,

from the laws of their mental constitution, feel quickly and deeply,

often take credit to themselves for being compassionate, while they

seldom do much for the downtrodden and the miserable. Their

compassion is a mere feeling. It says, "Be ye warmed and filled," but

does not that for them which is needful. It is this particular attribute of

benevolence that was so conspicuous in the life of Howard,

Wilberforce, and many other Christian philanthropists.



It should be said, before I leave the consideration of this attribute,

that the will is often influenced by the feeling of compassion. In this

case, the mind is no less selfish in seeking to promote the relief and

happiness of its object than it is in any other form of selfishness. In

such cases, self-gratification is the end sought, and the relief of the

suffering is only a means. Pity is stirred, and the sensibility is deeply

pained and excited by the contemplation of misery. The will is

influenced by this feeling, and makes efforts to relieve the painful

emotion on the one hand, and to gratify the desire to see the sufferer

happy on the other. This is only an imposing form of selfishness. We,

no doubt, often witness displays of this kind of self-gratification. The

happiness of the miserable is not in this case sought as an end, or for

its own sake, but as a means of gratifying our own feelings. This is not

obedience of will to the law of the intellect, but obedience to the

impulse of the sensibility. It is not a natural and intelligent

compassion, but just such compassion as we often see mere animals

exercise. They will risk, and even lay down, their lives, to give relief to

one of their number, or to a man who is in misery. In them this has no

moral character having no reason, it is not sin for them to obey their

sensibility; nay, this is a law of their being. This they cannot but do. 

For them, then, to seek their own gratification as an end is not sin. But

man has reason; he is bound to obey it. He should will and seek the

relief and the happiness of the miserable, for its own sake, or for its

intrinsic value. When he seeks it for no higher reason than to gratify

his feelings, he denies his humanity He seeks it, not out of regard to

the sufferer, but in self-defense, or to relieve his own pain, and to

gratify his own desires. This in him is sin.



Many, therefore, who take to themselves much credit for

benevolence, are, after all, only in the exercise of this imposing form of

selfishness. They take credit for holiness, when their holiness is only

sin. What is especially worthy of notice here, is, that this class of

persons appear to themselves and others, to be all the more virtuous

by how much more manifestly and exclusively they are led on by the

impulse of feeling. They are conscious of feeling deeply, of being

more sincere and earnest in obeying their feelings. Every body who

knows them can also see, that they feel deeply, and are influenced by

the strength of their feelings, rather than by their intellect. Now, so

gross is the darkness of most persons upon this subject, that they

award praise to themselves and to others, just in proportion as they

are sure that they are actuated by the depth of their feelings, rather

than by their sober judgment.



But I must not leave this subject without observing, that when

compassion exists as a phenomenon of the will, it will certainly also

exist as a feeling of the sensibility. A man of a compassionate heart

will also be a man of compassionate sensibility. He will feel and he will

act. Nevertheless, his actions will not be the effect of his feelings, but

will be the result of his sober judgment. Three classes of persons

suppose themselves, and are generally supposed by others, to be

truly compassionate. The one class exhibit much feeling of

compassion; but their compassion does not influence their will, hence

they do not act for the relief of suffering. These content themselves

with mere desires and tears. They say, Be ye warmed and clothed,

but give not the needed relief. Another class feel deeply, and give up

to their feelings. Of course they are active and energetic in the relief

of suffering. But being governed by feeling, instead of being

influenced by their intellect, they are not virtuous, but selfish. Their

compassion is only an imposing form of selfishness. A third class feel

deeply, but are not governed by blind impulses of feeling. They take a

rational view of the subject, act wisely and energetically. They obey

their reason. Their feelings do not lead them, neither do they seek to

gratify their feelings. But these last are truly virtuous, and altogether

the most happy of the three. Their feelings are all the more gratified

by how much less they aim at the gratification. They obey their

intellect, and, therefore have the double satisfaction of the applause of

conscience, while their feelings are also fully gratified by seeing their

compassionate desire accomplished.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 14



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



12. Mercy is also an attribute of benevolence. This term expresses a

state of feeling, and represents a phenomenon of the sensibility. 

Mercy is often understood to be synonymous with compassion, but

then it is not rightly understood.



Mercy, considered as a phenomenon of the will, is a disposition to

pardon crime. Such is the nature of benevolence, that it will seek the

good even of those who deserve evil, when this can be wisely done. It

is "ready to forgive" (Psalms 86:5), to seek the good of the evil and

unthankful, and to pardon when there is repentance. It is good will

viewed in relation to one who deserves punishment. Mercy,

considered as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a desire

for the pardon or good of one who deserves punishment. It is only a

feeling, a desire; of course it is involuntary, and has, in itself, no moral

character.



Mercy will, of course, manifest itself in action, and in effort to pardon,

or to procure a pardon, unless the attribute of wisdom prevent. It may

be unwise to pardon, or to seek the pardon of a guilty one. In such

cases, as all the attributes of benevolence must necessarily

harmonize, no effort will be made to realize its end. It was this

attribute of benevolence, modified and limited in its exercise by

wisdom and justice, that energized in providing the means, and in

opening the way, for the pardon of our guilty race.



As wisdom and justice are also attributes of benevolence, mercy can

never manifest itself by efforts to secure its end, except in a manner

and upon conditions that do not set aside justice and wisdom. No one

attribute of benevolence is or can be exercised at the expense of

another, or in opposition to it. The moral attributes of God, as has

been said, are only attributes of benevolence, for benevolence

comprehends and expresses the whole of them. From the term

benevolence we learn, that the end upon which it fixes is good. And

we must infer, too, from the term itself, that the means are

unobjectionable; because it is absurd to suppose that good would be

chosen because it is good, and yet that the mind that makes this

choice should not hesitate to use objectionable and injurious means to

obtain its end. This would be a contradiction, to will good for its own

sake, or out of regard to its intrinsic value, and then choose injurious

means to accomplish this end. This cannot be. The mind that can fix

upon the highest well-being of God and the universe as an end, can

never consent to use efforts for the accomplishment of this end that

are seen to be inconsistent with it, that is, that tend to prevent the

highest good of being.



Mercy, I have said, is the readiness of benevolence to pardon the

guilty. But this attribute cannot go out in exercise, but upon conditions

that consist with the other attributes of benevolence. Mercy as a mere

feeling would pardon without repentance or condition; would pardon

without reference to public justice. But viewed in connection with the

other attributes of benevolence, we learn that, although a real attribute

of benevolence, yet it is not and cannot be exercised, without the

fulfillment of those conditions that will secure the consent of all the

other attributes of benevolence. This truth is beautifully taught and

illustrated in the doctrine and fact of atonement, as we shall see. 

Indeed, without consideration of the various attributes of benevolence,

we are necessarily all in the dark, and in confusion, in respect to the

character and government of God, the spirit and meaning of His law,

the spirit and meaning of the gospel, our own spiritual state, and the

developments of character around us. Without an acquaintance with

the attributes of love or benevolence, we shall not fail to be

perplexed to find apparent discrepancies in the Bible and in the

divine administration and in the manifestation of Christian character,

both as revealed in the Bible, and as exhibited in common life. For

example: how universalists have stumbled for want of consideration

upon this subject! God is love! Well, without considering the attributes

of this love, they infer that if God is love, He cannot hate sin and

sinners. If He is merciful, He cannot punish sinners in hell, etc. 

Unitarians have stumbled in the same way. God is merciful; that is,

disposed to pardon sin. Well, then, what need of an atonement? If

merciful He can and will pardon upon repentance without atonement. 

But we may inquire, if He is merciful, why not pardon without

repentance? If His mercy alone is to be taken into view, that is, simply

a disposition to pardon, that by itself would not wait for repentance. 

But if repentance is, and must be, a condition of the exercise of mercy,

may there not be, nay, must there not be, other conditions of its

exercise? If wisdom and public justice are also attributes of

benevolence, and conditionates the exercise of mercy, and forbid that

it should be exercised but upon condition of repentance, why may they

not, nay, why must they not, equally conditionates its exercise upon

such a satisfaction of public justice, as would secure as full and as

deep a respect for the law, as the execution of its penalty would do? 

In other words, if wisdom and justice be attributes of benevolence, and

conditionates the exercise of mercy upon repentance, why may and

must they not also conditionate its exercise upon the fact of an

atonement? As mercy is an attribute of benevolence, it will naturally

and inevitably direct the attention of the intellect to devising ways and

means to render the exercise of mercy consistent with the other

attributes of benevolence. It will employ the intelligence in devising

means to secure the repentance of the sinner, and to remove all the

obstacles out of the way of its free and full exercise. It will also secure

the state of feeling which is called mercy, or compassion. Hence it is

certain, that mercy will secure efforts to procure the repentance and

pardon of sinners. It will secure a deep yearning in the sensibility over

them, and energetic action to accomplish its end, that is, to secure

their repentance and pardon. This attribute of benevolence led the

Father to give His only-begotten and well-beloved Son, and it led the

Son to give Himself to die, to secure the repentance and pardon of

sinners. It is this attribute of benevolence that leads the Holy Spirit to

make such mighty and protracted efforts to secure the repentance of

sinners. It is also this attribute that energized in prophets, and

apostles, and martyrs, and saints of every age, to secure the

conversion of the lost in sin. It is an amiable attribute. All its

sympathies are sweet, and tender, and kind as heaven.



13. Justice is an attribute of benevolence.



This term also expresses a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. 

As an attribute of benevolence, it is the opposite of mercy, when

viewed in its relations to crime. It consists in a disposition to treat

every moral agent according to his intrinsic desert or merit. In its

relations to crime, the criminal, and the public, it consists in a tendency

to punish according to law. Mercy would pardon justice would punish

for the public good.



Justice, as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a feeling

that the guilty deserves punishment, and a desire that he may be

punished. This is an involuntary feeling, and has no moral character. 

It is often strongly excited, and is frequently the cause of mobs and

popular commotions. When it takes the control of the will, as it often

does with sinners, it leads to what is popularly called lynching, and a

resort to those summary methods of executing vengeance which are

so appalling.



I have said that the mere desire has no moral character. But when

the will is governed