HUMAN GOVERNMENT



Human governments a part of the moral government of God.



LECTURE 20



In the discussion of this subject I will:



Inquire into the ultimate end of God in creation.



We have seen in former lectures, that God is a moral agent, the

self-existent and supreme; and is therefore Himself, as ruler of all,

subject to, and observant of, moral law in all His conduct. That is, His

own infinite intelligence must affirm that a certain course of willing is

suitable, fit, and right in Him. This idea, or affirmation, is law to Him;

and to this His will must be conformed, or He is not good. This is

moral law, a law founded in the eternal and self-existent nature of

God. This law does, and must, demand benevolence in God. 

Benevolence is good willing. God's intelligence must affirm that He

ought to will good for its own intrinsic value. It must affirm His

obligation to choose the highest possible good as the great end of His

being. If God is good, the highest good of Himself, and of the

universe, must have been the end which He had in view in the work of

creation. This is of infinite value, and ought to be willed by God. If

God is good, this must have been His end. We have also seen:



That providential and moral governments are indispensable means

of securing the highest good of the universe.



The highest good of moral agents is conditionated upon their

holiness. Holiness consists in conformity to moral law. Moral law

implies moral government. Moral government is a government of

moral law and of motives. Motives are presented by providential

government; and providential government is, therefore, a means of

moral government. Providential and moral government must be

indispensable to securing the highest good of the universe.



Civil and family governments are indispensable to the securing of

this end, and are, therefore, really a part of the providential and moral

government of God.



In the discussion of this question I remark, 



1. Human beings will not agree in opinion on any subject without

similar degrees of knowledge. No human community exists, or ever

will exist, the members of which will agree in opinion on all subjects. 

This creates a necessity for human legislation and adjudication, to

apply the great principles of moral law to all human affairs. There are

multitudes of human wants and necessities that cannot properly be

met, except through the instrumentality of human governments.



2. This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this

world. This is as certain as that the human body will always need

sustenance and clothing; and that the human soul will always need

instruction; and that the means of instruction will not come

spontaneously, without expense and labor. It is as certain as that men

of all ages and circumstances will never possess equal talents and

degrees of information on all subjects. If all men were perfectly holy

and disposed to do right, the necessity for human governments would

not be set aside, because this necessity is founded in the ignorance of

mankind, though greatly aggravated by their wickedness. The

decisions of legislators and judges must be authoritative, so as to

settle questions of disagreement in opinion, and at once to bind and

protect all parties.



The Bible presents human governments not only as existing, but as

deriving their authority and right to punish evildoers, and to protect the

righteous, from God. But:



3. Human governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part

of the moral government of God.



"He changeth the times and the seasons; He removeth kings, and

setteth up kings: He giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to

them that know understanding" (Daniel 2:21). "This matter is by the

decree of the watchers, and the demand by the word of the holy ones;

to the intent that the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the

kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will, and setteth up

over it the basest of men." "They shall drive thee from men, and thy

dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall make thee

to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of heaven,

and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most High

ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will"

(Daniel 4:17, 25). "He was driven from the sons of men; and his heart

was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses:

they fed him with grass like oxen, and his body was wet with the dew

of heaven till he knew that the Most High God ruleth in the kingdom of

men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will" (Daniel 5:21). 

"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no

power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God. 

Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of

God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For

rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not

be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have

praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But

if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in

vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon

him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for

wrath but also for conscience's sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute

also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very

thing. Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is

due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor"

(Romans 13:1-7). "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and

powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work" (Titus

3:1). "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's

sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as unto

them that are sent by Him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the

praise of them that do well" (1 Peter 2:13, 14). These passages prove

conclusively, that God establishes human government, as parts of

moral government.



4. It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of

human government.



As the great law of benevolence, or universal good willing, demands

the existence of human governments, all men are under a perpetual

and unalterable moral obligation to aid in their establishment and

support. In popular or elective governments, every man having a right

to vote, every human being who has moral influence, is bound to exert

that influence in the promotion of virtue and happiness. And as human

governments are plainly indispensable to the highest good of man,

they are bound to exert their influence to secure a legislation that is in

accordance with the law of God. The obligation of human beings to

support and obey human governments, while they legislate upon the

principles of the moral law, is as unalterable as the moral law itself.



5. I will answer objections.



Objection: 1. The kingdom of God is represented in the Bible as

subverting all other kingdoms.



Answer: This is true, but all that can be meant by it is, that the time

shall come when God shall be regarded as the supreme and universal

sovereign of the universe, when His law shall be regarded as

universally obligatory; when all kings, legislators, and judges shall act

as His servants, declaring, applying, and administering the great

principles of His law to all the affairs of human beings. Thus God will

be the supreme sovereign, and earthly rulers will be governors, kings,

and judges under Him, and acting by His authority as revealed in the

Bible.



Objection: 2. It is alleged that God only providentially establishes

human governments, and that He does not approve of their selfish and

wicked administration; that He only uses them providentially, as He

does Satan, for the promotion of His own designs.



Answer: God nowhere commands mankind to obey Satan, but He

does command them to obey magistrates and rulers. "Let every soul

be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God:

the powers that be are ordained of God" (Romans 13:1). "Submit

yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it

be to the king as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are

sent by Him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of

them that do well" (1 Peter 2:13, 14).



He nowhere recognizes Satan as His servant, sent and set by Him to

administer justice and execute wrath upon the wicked; but He does

this in respect to human governments. "Whosoever therefore resisteth

the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall

receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good

works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do

that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is

the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil,

be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of

God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore

ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience's

sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also; for they are God's

ministers, attending continually upon this very thing" (Romans 13:2-6).



It is true indeed that God approves of nothing that is ungodly and

selfish in human governments. Neither did He approve of what was

ungodly and selfish in the scribes and Pharisees; and yet Christ said to

His disciples, "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat. 

Therefore, whatsoever things they command you, that observe and

do; but do ye not after their works, for they say, and do not" (Matt.

23:2-3). Here the plain common-sense principle is recognized, that we

are to obey when the requirement is not inconsistent with the moral

law, whatever may be the character or the motive of the ruler. We are

always to obey heartily as unto the Lord, and not unto men, and

render obedience to magistrates for the honor and glory of God, and

as doing service to Him.



Objection: 3. It is said that Christians should leave human

governments to the management of the ungodly, and not be diverted

from the work of saving souls, to intermeddle with human

governments.



Answer: To uphold and assist good government is not being diverted

from the work of saving souls. The promotion of public and private

order and happiness is one of the indispensable means of doing good

and saving souls. It is nonsense to admit that Christians are under an

obligation to obey human government, and still have nothing to do with

the choice of those who shall govern.



Objection: 4. It is affirmed that we are commanded not to avenge

ourselves, that "Vengeance is Mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord"

(Romans 12:19). It is said, that if I may not avenge or redress my own

wrongs in my own person, I may not do it through the instrumentality

of human government.



Answer: It does not follow, that because you may not take it upon

yourself to redress your own wrongs by a summary and personal

infliction of punishment upon the transgressor, that therefore human

governments may not punish them. All private wrongs are a public

injury; and irrespective of any particular regard to your personal

interest, magistrates are bound to punish crime for the public good. 

While God has expressly forbidden you to redress your own wrongs,

by administering personal and private chastisement, He has expressly

recognized the right, and made it the duty of public magistrates to

punish crimes.



Objection: 5. It is alleged, that love is so much better than law, that

where love reigns in the heart, law can be universally dispensed with.



Answer: This supposes that, if there is only love, there need be no

rule of duty; no revelation, directing love in its efforts to secure the end

upon which it terminates. But this is as untrue as possible. The

objection overlooks the fact, that law is in all worlds the rule of duty,

and that legal sanctions make up an indispensable part of that circle of

motives that are suited to the nature, relations, and government of

moral beings.



Objection: 6. It is asserted, that Christians have something else to do

besides meddling with politics.



Answer: In a popular government, politics are an important part of

religion. No man can possibly be benevolent or religious, to the full

extent of his obligations, without concerning himself, to a greater or

less extent, with the affairs of human government. It is true, that

Christians have something else to do than to go with a party to do evil,

or to meddle with politics in a selfish or ungodly manner. But they are

bound to meddle with politics in popular governments, because they

are bound to seek the universal good of all men; and this is one

department of human interests, materially affecting all their higher

interests.



Objection: 7. It is said that human governments are nowhere

expressly authorized in the Bible.



Answer: This is a mistake. Both their existence and lawfulness are

as expressly recognized in the above quoted scriptures as they can

be. But if God did not expressly authorize them, it would still be both

the right and the duty of mankind to institute human governments,

because they are plainly demanded by the necessities of human

nature. It is a first truth, that whatever is essential to the highest good

of moral beings in any world, they have a right to pursue, and are

bound to pursue according to the best dictates of reason and

experience. So far, therefore, are men from needing any express

authority to establish human governments, that no inference from the

silence of scripture could avail to render their establishment unlawful. 

It has been shown, in these lectures on moral government, that moral

law is a unit that it is that rule of action which is in accordance with

the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings that

whatever is in accordance with, and demanded by the nature,

relations, and circumstances of moral beings, is obligatory on them. It

is moral law, and no power in the universe can set it aside. Therefore,

were the scriptures entirely silent (which they are not) on the subject of

human governments, and on the subject of family government, as they

actually are on a great many important subjects, this would be no

objection to the lawfulness and expediency, necessity and duty of

establishing human governments.



Objection: 8. It is said that human governments are founded in and

sustained by force, and that this is inconsistent with the spirit of the

gospel.



Answer: There cannot be a difference between the spirit of the Old

and the New Testament, or between the spirit of the law and the

gospel, unless God has changed, and unless Christ has undertaken to

make void the law through faith, which cannot be. "Do we then make

void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law"

(Romans 3:32). Just human governments, and such governments

only are contended for, will not exercise force, unless it is demanded

to promote the highest public good. If it be necessary to this end, it

can never be wrong. Nay, it must be the duty of human governments

to inflict penalties, when their infliction is demanded by the public

interest.



Objection: 9. It has been said by some persons, that church

government is sufficient to meet the necessities of the world, without

secular or state governments.



Answer: What! Church governments regulate commerce, make

internal arrangements, such as roads, bridges, and taxation, and

undertake to manage all the business affairs of the world! 

Preposterous and impossible! Church government was never

established for any such end; but simply to regulate the spiritual, in

distinction from the secular concerns of men to try offenders and

inflict spiritual chastisement, and never to perplex and embarrass itself

with managing the business and commercial interests of the world.



Objection: 10. It is said, that were all the world holy, legal penalties

would not be needed.



Answer: Were all men perfectly holy, the execution of penalties

would not be needed; but still, if there were law, there must be

penalties; and it would be both the right and the duty of magistrates to

inflict them, whenever the needful occasion should call for their

execution. But the state of the world supposed is not at hand, and

while the world is what it is, laws must remain, and be enforced.



Objection: 11. It is asserted, that family government is the only form

of government approved of God.



Answer: This is a ridiculous assertion, because God as expressly

commands obedience to magistrates as to parents. He makes it as

absolutely the duty of magistrates to punish crime, as of parents to

punish their own disobedient children. The right of family government,

though commanded by God, is not founded in the arbitrary will of God,

but in the highest good of human beings; so that family government

would be both necessary and obligatory, had God not commanded it. 

So the right of human government has not its foundation in the

arbitrary will of God, but in the necessities of human beings. The

larger the community the more absolute the necessity of government. 

If in the small circle of the family, laws and penalties are needed, how

much more in the larger communities of states and nations. Now,

neither the ruler of a family, nor any other human ruler, has a right to

legislate arbitrarily, or enact, or enforce any other laws, than those that

are demanded by the nature, relations, and circumstances of human

beings. Nothing can be obligatory on moral beings, but that which is

consistent with their nature, relations, and circumstances. But human

beings are bound to establish family governments, state governments,

national governments, and in short, whatever government may be

requisite for the universal instruction, government, virtue, and

happiness of the world, or any portion of it.



Christians therefore have something else to do than to confound the

right of government with the abuse of this right by the ungodly. 

Instead of destroying human governments, Christians are bound to

reform and uphold them. To attempt to destroy, rather than reform

human governments, is the same in principle as is often aimed at, by

those who are attempting to destroy, rather than to reform, the church. 

There are those who, disgusted with the abuses of Christianity

practiced in the church, seem bent on destroying the church

altogether, as the means of saving the world. But what mad policy is

this! It is admitted that selfish men need, and must feel the restraints

of law; but yet it is contended that Christians should have no part in

restraining them by law. But suppose the wicked should agree among

themselves to have no law, and therefore should not attempt to

restrain themselves, nor each other by law; would it be neither the

right nor the duty of Christians to attempt their restraint, through the

influence of wholesome government? It would be strange, that selfish

men should need the restraints of law, and yet that Christians should

have no right to meet this necessity, by supporting governments that

will restrain them. It is right and best that there should be law. It is

even absolutely necessary that there should be law. Universal

benevolence demands it; can it then be wrong in Christians to have

anything to do with it?



Point out the limits or boundaries of the right of government.



Observe, the end of government is the highest good of human

beings, as a part of universal good. All valid human legislation must

propose this as its end, and no legislation can have any authority that

has not the highest good of the whole for its end. No being can

arbitrarily create law. All law for the government of moral agents must

be moral law: that is, it must be that rule of action best suited to their

natures and relations. All valid human legislation must be only

declaratory of this one only law. Nothing else than this can by any

possibility be law. God puts forth no enactments, but such as are

declaratory of the common law of the universe; and should He do

otherwise, they would not be obligatory. Arbitrary legislation can never

be really obligatory.



The right of human government is founded in the intrinsic value of

the good of being, and is conditionated upon its necessity, as a means

to that end. So far as legislation and control are indispensable to this

end, so far and no farther does the right to govern extend. All

legislation and all constitutions not founded upon this basis, and not

recognizing the moral law as the only law of the universe, are null and

void, and all attempts to establish and enforce them are odious

tyranny and usurpation. Human beings may form constitutions,

establish governments, and enact statutes for the purpose of

promoting the highest virtue and happiness of the world, and for the

declaration and enforcement of moral law; and just so far human

governments are essential to this end, but absolutely no farther.



It follows, that no government is lawful or innocent that does not

recognize the moral law as the only universal law, and God as the

Supreme Lawgiver and Judge, to whom nations in their national

capacity, as well as all individuals, are amenable. The moral law of

God is the only law of individuals and of nations, and nothing can be

rightful government but such as is established and administered with a

view to its support.

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LECTURE 21



HUMAN GOVERNMENT



I propose now to make several remarks respecting forms of

government, the right and duty of revolution, etc.



1. The particular forms of state government must, and will, depend

upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.



When virtue and intelligence are nearly universal, democratic forms

of government are well suited to promote the public good. In such a

state of society, democracy is greatly conducive to the general

diffusion of knowledge on governmental subjects; and although, in

some respects less convenient, yet in a suitable state of society, a

democracy is in many respects the most desirable form of

government.



God has always providentially given to mankind those forms of

government that were suited to the degrees of virtue and intelligence

among them. If they have been extremely ignorant and vicious, He

has restrained them by the iron rod of human despotism. If more

intelligent and virtuous, He has given them the milder form of limited

monarchies. If still more intelligent and virtuous, He has given them

still more liberty, and providentially established republics for their

government. Whenever the general state of intelligence has permitted

it, He has put them to the test of self-government and self-restraint, by

establishing democracies.



If the world ever becomes perfectly virtuous, governments will be

proportionally modified, and employed in expounding and applying the

great principles of moral law.



2. That form of government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet

the necessities of the people.



This follows as a self-evident truth, from the consideration, that

necessity is the condition of the right of human government. To meet

this necessity is the object of government; and that government is

obligatory and best which is demanded by the circumstances,

intelligence, and morals of the people.



Consequently, in certain states of society, it would be a Christian's

duty to pray for and sustain even a military despotism; in a certain

other state of society, to pray for and sustain a monarchy; and in other

states, to pray for and sustain a republic; and in a still more advanced

stage of virtue and intelligence, to pray for and sustain a democracy; if

indeed a democracy is the most wholesome form of self government,

which may admit of doubt. It is ridiculous to set up the claim of a

Divine right for any given form of government. That form of

government which is demanded by the state of society, and the virtue

and intelligence of the people, has of necessity the Divine right and

sanction, and none other has or can have.



3. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue

and intelligence, or the vice and ignorance, of the people, demand

them.



This is a thing of course. When one form of government fails to

meet any longer the necessities of the people, it is the duty of the

people to revolutionize. In such cases, it is vain to oppose revolution;

for in some way the benevolence of God will bring it about. Upon this

principle alone, can what is generally termed the American Revolution

be justified. The intelligence and virtue of our Puritan forefathers

rendered a monarchy an unnecessary burden, and a republican form

of government both appropriate and necessary; and God always

allows His children as much liberty as they are prepared to enjoy.



The stability of our republican institutions must depend upon the

progress of general intelligence and virtue. If in these respects the

nation falls, if general intelligence, public and private virtue, sink to that

point below which self-control becomes practicably impossible, we

must fall back into monarchy, limited or absolute; or into civil or military

despotism; just according to the national standard of intelligence and

virtue. This is just as certain as that God governs the world, or that

causes produce their effects.



Therefore, it is the maddest conceivable policy, for Christians to

attempt to uproot human governments, while they ought to be

engaged in sustaining them upon the great principles of the moral law. 

It is certainly the grossest folly, if not abominable wickedness, to

overlook either in theory or practice, these plain, common sense and

universal truths.



4. In what cases are we bound to disobey human governments?



(1.) We may yield obedience, when the thing required does not

involve a violation of moral obligation.



(2.) We are bound to obey when the thing required has no moral

character in itself; upon the principle, that obedience in this case is a

less evil than resistance and revolution. But:



(3.) We are bound in all cases to disobey, when human legislation

contravenes moral law, or invades the rights of conscience.



Apply the foregoing principles to the rights and duties of

governments and subjects in relation to the execution of the necessary

penalties of law: the suppression of mobs, insurrections, rebellion; and

also in relation to war, slavery, Sabbath desecration, etc.



1. It is plain that the right and duty to govern for the security and

promotion of the public interests, implies the right and duty to use any

means necessary to this result. It is absurd to say that the ruler has

the right to govern, and yet that he has not a right to use the

necessary means. Some have taken the ground of the inviolability of

human life, and have insisted that to take life is wrong per se, and of

course that governments are to be sustained without taking life. 

Others have gone so far as to assert, that governments have no right

to resort to physical force to sustain the authority of law. But this is a

most absurd philosophy, and amounts just to this: The ruler has a right

to govern while the subject is pleased to obey; but if the subject

refuses obedience, why then the right to govern ceases: for it is

impossible that the right to govern should exist when the right to

enforce obedience does not exist. This philosophy is, in fact, a denial

of the right to use the necessary means for the promotion of the great

end for which all moral agents ought to live. And yet, strange to tell,

this philosophy professes to deny the right to use force, and to take life

in support of government, on the ground of benevolence, that is, that

benevolence forbids it. What is this but maintaining that the law of

benevolence demands that we should love others too much to use the

indispensable means to secure their good? Or that we should love the

whole too much to execute the law upon those who would destroy all

good? Shame on such philosophy! It overlooks the foundation of

moral obligation, and of all morality and religion. Just as if an

enlightened benevolence could forbid the due, wholesome, and

necessary execution of law. This philosophy impertinently urges the

commandment, "Thou shalt not kill" (Deut. 5:17), as prohibiting all

taking of human life. But it may be asked, why say human life? The

commandment, so far as the letter is concerned, as fully prohibits the

killing of animals or vegetables as it does of men. The question is,

what kind of killing does this commandment prohibit? Certainly not all

killing of human beings, for in the next chapter the Jews were

commanded to kill human beings for certain crimes. The ten

commandments are precepts, and the Lawgiver, after laying down the

precepts, goes on to specify the penalties that are to be inflicted by

men for a violation of these precepts. Some of these penalties are

death, and the penalty for the violation of the precept under

consideration is death. It is certain that this precept was not intended

to prohibit the taking of life for murder. A consideration of the law in its

tenor and spirit renders it most evident that the precept in question

prohibits murder, and the penalty of death is added by the lawgiver to

the violation of this precept. Now how absurd and impertinent it is, to

quote this precept in prohibition of taking life under the circumstances

included in the precept!



Men have an undoubted right to do whatever is plainly indispensable

to the highest good of man; and, therefore, nothing can, by any

possibility be law, that should prohibit the taking of human life, when it

becomes indispensable to the great end of government. This right is

every where recognized in the Bible, and if it were not, still the right

would exist. This philosophy that I am opposing, assumes that the will

of God creates law, and that we have no right to take life, without an

express warrant from Him. But the facts are, that God did give to the

Jews, at least, an express warrant and injunction to take life for certain

crimes; and, if He had not, it would have been duty to do so whenever

the public good required it. Let it be remembered, that the moral law is

the law of nature, and that everything is lawful and right that is plainly

demanded for the promotion of the highest good of being.



The philosophy of which I am speaking lays much stress upon what

it calls inalienable rights. It assumes that man has a title or right to life,

in such a sense, that he cannot forfeit it by crime. But the fact is, there

are no rights inalienable in this sense. There can be no such rights. 

Whenever any individual by the commission of crime comes into such

a relation to the public interest, that his death is a necessary means of

securing the highest public good, his life is forfeited, and to take the

forfeiture at his hands is the duty of the government.



2. It will be seen, that the same principles are equally applicable to

insurrections, rebellions, etc. While government is right, it is duty, and

while it is right and duty, because necessary as a means to the great

end upon which benevolence terminates, it must be both the right and

the duty of government, and of all the subjects, to use any

indispensable means for the suppression of insurrections, rebellion,

etc., as also for the due administration of justice in the execution of

law.



3. These principles will guide us in ascertaining the right, and of

course the duty of governments in relation to war.



Observe, war to be in any case a virtue, or to be less than a crime of

infinite magnitude, must not only be honestly believed, by those who

engage in it, to be demanded by the law of benevolence, but it must

also be engaged in by them with an eye single to the glory of God, and

the highest good of being. That war has been in some instances

demanded by the spirit of the moral law, there can be no reasonable

doubt, since God has sometimes commanded it, which He could not

have done had it not been demanded by the highest good of the

universe. In such cases, if those who were commanded to engage in

war, had benevolent intentions in prosecuting it as God had in

commanding it, it is absurd to say that they sinned. Rulers are

represented as God's ministers to execute wrath upon the guilty. If, in

the providence of God, He should find it duty to destroy or to rebuke a

nation for His own glory, and the highest good of being, He may

beyond question command that they should be chastised by the hand

of man. But in no case is war anything else than a most horrible

crime, unless it is plainly the will of God that it should exist, and unless

it be actually undertaken in obedience to His will. This is true of all,

both of rulers and of subjects, who engage in war. Selfish war is

wholesale murder. For a nation to declare war, or for persons to

enlist, or in any way designedly to aid or abet, in the declaration or

prosecution of war, upon any other conditions than those just

specified, involves the guilt of murder.



There can scarcely be conceived a more abominable and fiendish

maxim than "our country right or wrong." Recently this maxim seems

to have been adopted and avowed in relation to the war of the United

States with Mexico. It seems to be supposed by some, that it is the

duty of good subjects to sympathize with, and support government in

the prosecution of a war in which they have unjustly engaged, and to

which they have committed themselves, upon the ground that since it

is commenced it must be prosecuted as the less of two evils. The

same class of men seem to have adopted the same philosophy in

respect to slavery. Slavery, as it exists in this country, they

acknowledge to be indefensible on the ground of right. It is a great evil

and a great sin, but it must be let alone as the less of two evils. It

exists, say they, and it cannot be abolished without disturbing the

friendly relations and federal union of the States, therefore the

institution must be sustained. The philosophy is this: war and slavery

as they exist in this nation are unjust, but they exist, and to sustain

them is duty, because their existence, under the circumstances, is the

less of two evils.



Nothing can sanctify any crime but that which renders it no crime, but

a virtue. But the philosophers, whose views I am examining, must, if

consistent, take the ground, that since war and slavery exist, although

their commencement was unjust and sinful, yet since they exist, it is no

crime but a virtue to sustain them, as the least of two natural evils. But

I would ask, to whom are they the least of two evils? To ourselves or

to being in general? The least of two present, or of two ultimate evils? 

Our duty is not to calculate the evils in respect merely to ourselves, or

to this nation and those immediately oppressed and injured, but to look

abroad upon the world and the universe, and inquire what are the evils

resulting, and likely to result, to the world, to the church, and to the

universe, from the declaration and prosecution of such a war, and from

the support of slavery by a nation professing what we profess a

nation boasting of liberty; who have drawn the sword and bathed it in

blood in defense of the principle, that all men have an inalienable right

to liberty; that they are born free and equal. Such a nation proclaiming

such a principle, and fighting in the defense of it, standing with its

proud foot on the neck of three millions of crushed and prostrate

slaves! O horrible! This a less evil to the world than emancipation, or

even than the dismemberment of our hypocritical union! "O shame,

where is thy blush!" The prosecution of a war, unjustly engaged in, a

less evil than repentance and restitution! It is impossible. Honesty is

always and necessarily the best policy. Nations are bound by the

same law as individuals. If they have done wrong, it is always duty,

and honorable for them to repent, confess and make restitution. To

adopt the maxim, "Our country right or wrong," and to sympathize with

the government, in the prosecution of a war unrighteously waged,

must involve the guilt of murder. To adopt the maxim, "Our union,

even with perpetual slavery," is an abomination so execrable, as not to

be named by a just mind without indignation.



4. The same principles apply to governmental Sabbath desecration. 

The Sabbath is plainly a divine institution, founded in the necessities of

human beings. The letter of the law of the Sabbath forbids all labor of

every kind, and under all circumstances on that day. But, as has been

said in a former lecture, the spirit of the law of the Sabbath, being

identical with the law of benevolence, sometimes requires the violation

of the letter of the law. Both governments and individuals may do, and

it is their duty to do, on the Sabbath whatever is plainly required by the

great law of benevolence. But nothing more, absolutely. No human

legislature can nullify the moral law. No human legislation can make it

right or lawful to violate any command of God. All human enactments

requiring or sanctioning the violation of any command of God, are not

only null and void, but they are a blasphemous usurpation and

invasion of the prerogative of God.



5. The same principles apply to slavery. No human constitution or

enactment can, by any possibility, be law, that recognizes the right of

one human being to enslave another, in a sense that implies

selfishness on the part of the slave holder. Selfishness is wrong per

se. It is, therefore, always and unalterably wrong. No enactment,

human or divine, can legalize selfishness and make it right, under any

conceivable circumstances. Slavery or any other evil, to be a crime,

must imply selfishness. It must imply a violation of the command,

"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 19:19). If it implies a

breach of this, it is wrong invariably and necessarily, and no

legislation, or any thing else, can make it right. God cannot authorize

it. The Bible cannot sanction it, and if both God and the Bible were to

sanction it, it could not be lawful. God's arbitrary will is not law. The

moral law, as we have seen, is as independent of His will, as His own

necessary existence is. He cannot alter or repeal it. He could not

sanctify selfishness and make it right. Nor can any book be received

as of divine authority that sanctions selfishness. God and the Bible

quoted to sustain and sanctify slave holding in a sense implying

selfishness! 'This blasphemous! That slave holding, as exists in this

country, implies selfishness, at least in almost all instances, is too plain

to need proof. The sinfulness of slave holding and war, in almost all

cases, and in every case where the terms slave holding and war are

used in their popular signification, will appear irresistibly, if we consider

that sin is selfishness, and that all selfishness is necessarily sinful. 

Deprive a human being of liberty who has been guilty of no crime; rob

him of himself his body his soul his time, and his earnings, to

promote the interest of his master, and attempt to justify this on the

principles of moral law! It is the greatest absurdity, and the most

revolting wickedness.

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LECTURE 22



MORAL DEPRAVITY



In discussing the subject of human depravity, I shall:



Define the term depravity.



The word is derived from the Latin de and pravus. Pravus means

"crooked." De is intensive. Depravatus literally and primarily means

"very crooked," not in the sense of original or constitutional

crookedness, but in the sense of having become crooked. The term

does not imply original mal-conformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed

from right or straight. It always implies deterioration, or fall from a

former state of moral or physical perfection.



Depravity always implies a departure from a state of original integrity,

or from conformity to the laws of the being who is the subject of

depravity. Thus we should not consider that being depraved, who

remained in a state of conformity to the original laws of his being,

physical and moral. But we justly call a being depraved, who has

departed from conformity to those laws, whether those laws be

physical or moral.



Point out the distinction between physical and moral depravity.



Physical depravity, as the word denotes, is the depravity of

constitution, or substance, as distinguished from depravity of free

moral action. It may be predicated of body or of mind. Physical

depravity, when predicated of the body, is commonly and rightly called

disease. It consists in a physical departure from the laws of health; a

lapsed, or fallen state, in which healthy organic action is not sustained. 

When physical depravity is predicated of mind, it is intended that the

powers of the mind, either in substance, or in consequence of their

connection with, and dependence upon, the body, are in a diseased,

lapsed, fallen, degenerate state, so that the healthy action of those

powers is not sustained.



Physical depravity, being depravity of substance as opposed to

depravity of the actions of free will, can have no moral character. It

may as we shall see, be caused by moral depravity; and a moral agent

may be blameworthy for having rendered himself physically depraved,

either in body or mind. But physical depravity, whether of body or of

mind, can have no moral character in itself, for the plain reason that it

is involuntary, and in its nature is disease, and not sin. Let this be

remembered.



Moral depravity is the depravity of free will, not of the faculty itself,

but of its free action. It consists in a violation of moral law. Depravity

of the will, as a faculty, is, or would be, physical, and not moral

depravity. It would be depravity of substance, and not of free,

responsible choice. Moral depravity is depravity of choice. It is a

choice at variance with moral law, moral right. It is synonymous with

sin or sinfulness. It is moral depravity, because it consists in a

violation of moral law, and because it has moral character.



Of what physical depravity can be predicated.



1. It can be predicated of any organized substance. That is, every

organized substance is liable to become depraved. Depravity is a

possible state of every organized body or substance in existence.



2. Physical depravity may be predicated of mind, as has already

been said, especially in its connection with an organized body. As

mind, in connection with body, manifests itself through it, acts by

means of it, and is dependent upon it, it is plain that if the body

become diseased, or physically depraved, the mind cannot but be

affected by this state of the body, through and by means of which it

acts. The normal manifestations of mind cannot, in such case, be

reasonably expected. Physical depravity may be predicated of all the

involuntary states of the intellect, and of the sensibility. That is, the

actings and states of the intellect may become disordered, depraved,

deranged, or fallen from the state of integrity and healthiness. This

every one knows, as it is matter of daily experience and observation. 

Whether this in all cases is, and must be, caused by the state of the

bodily organization, that is, whether it is always and necessarily to be

ascribed to the depraved state of the brain and nervous system, it is

impossible for us to know. It may, for aught we know, in some

instances at least, be a depravity or derangement of the substance of

the mind itself.



The sensibility, or feeling department of the mind, may be sadly and

physically depraved. This is a matter of common experience. The

appetites and passions, the desires and cravings, the antipathies and

repellencies of the feelings fall into great disorder and anarchy. 

Numerous artificial appetites are generated, and the whole sensibility

becomes a wilderness, a chaos of conflicting and clamorous desires,

emotions and passions. That this state of the sensibility is often, and

perhaps in some measure always, owing to the state of the nervous

system with which it is connected, through and by which it manifests

itself, there can be but little room to doubt. But whether this is always

and necessarily so, no one can tell. We know that the sensibility

manifests great physical depravity. Whether this depravity belong

exclusively to the body, or to the mind, or to both in conjunction, I will

not venture to affirm. In the present state of our knowledge, or of my

knowledge, I dare not hazard an affirmation upon the subject. The

human body is certainly in a state of physical depravity. The human

mind also certainly manifests physical depravity. But observe,

physical depravity has in no case any moral character, because it is

involuntary.



Of what moral depravity can be predicated.



1. Not of substance; for over involuntary substance the moral law

does not directly legislate.



2. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any involuntary acts or

states of mind. These surely cannot be violations of moral law apart

from the ultimate intention; for moral law legislates directly only over

free, intelligent choices.



3. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any unintelligent act of

will, that is, of acts of will that are put forth in a state of idiocy, of

intellectual derangement, or of sleep. Moral depravity implies moral

obligation; moral obligation implies moral agency; and moral agency

implies intelligence, or knowledge of moral relations. Moral agency

implies moral law, or the development of the idea of duty, and a

knowledge of what duty is.



4. Moral depravity can only be predicated of violations of moral law,

and of the free volitions by which those violations are perpetrated. 

Moral law, as we have seen, requires love, and only love, to God and

man, or to God and the universe. This love, as we have seen, is

goodwill, choice, the choice of an end, the choice of the highest

well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences.



Moral depravity is sin. Sin is a violation of moral law. We have seen

that sin must consist in choice, in the choice of self-indulgence or

self-gratification as an end.



5. Moral depravity cannot consist in any attribute of nature or

constitution, nor in any lapsed and fallen state of nature; for this is

physical and not moral depravity.



6. It cannot consist in anything that is an original and essential part of

mind, or of body; nor in any involuntary action or state of either mind or

body.



7. It cannot consist in anything back of choice, and that sustains to

choice the relation of a cause. Whatever is back of choice, is without

the pale of legislation. The law of God, as has been said, requires

good willing only; and sure it is, that nothing but acts of will can

constitute a violation of moral law. Outward actions, and involuntary

thoughts and feelings, may be said in a certain sense to possess

moral character because they are produced by the will. But, strictly

speaking, moral character belongs only to choice, or intention.



It was shown in a former lecture, that sin does not, and cannot

consist in malevolence, properly speaking, or in the choice of sin or

misery as an end, or for its own sake. It was also shown, that all sin

consists, and must consist in selfishness, or in the choice of

self-gratification as a final end. Moral depravity then, strictly speaking,

can only be predicated of selfish ultimate intention.



Moral depravity, as I use the term, does not consist in, nor imply a

sinful nature, in the sense that the substance of the human soul is

sinful in itself. It is not a constitutional sinfulness. It is not an

involuntary sinfulness. Moral depravity, as I use the term, consists in

selfishness; in a state of voluntary committal of the will to

self-gratification. It is a spirit of self-seeking, a voluntary and entire

consecration to the gratification of self. It is selfish ultimate intention; it

is the choice of a wrong end of life; it is moral depravity, because it is a

violation of moral law. It is a refusal to consecrate the whole being to

the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and obedience to

the moral law, and consecrating it to the gratification of self. Moral

depravity sustains to the outward life, the relation of a cause. This

selfish intention, or the will in this committed state, of course, makes

efforts to secure its end, and these efforts make up the outward life of

the selfish man. Moral depravity is sinfulness, not of nature but of

voluntary state. It is a sinfully committed state of the will to

self-indulgence. It is not a sinful nature but a sinful heart. It is a sinful

ultimate aim, or intention. The Greek term amartia, rendered sin in our

English Bible, signifies to miss the mark, to aim at the wrong end. Sin

is a wrong aim, or intention. It is aiming at, or intending

self-gratification as the ultimate and supreme end of life, instead of

aiming, as the moral law requires, at the highest good of universal

being, as the end of life.



Mankind are both physically and morally depraved.



1. There is, in all probability, no perfect health of body among all the

ranks and classes of human beings that inhabit this world. The

physical organization of the whole race has become impaired, and

beyond all doubt has been becoming more and more so since

intemperance of any kind was first introduced into our world. This is

illustrated and confirmed by the comparative shortness of human life. 

This is a physiological fact.



2. As the human mind in this state of existence is dependent upon

the body for all its manifestations, and as the human body is

universally in a state of greater or less physical depravity or disease, it

follows that the manifestations of mind thus dependent on a physically

depraved organization, will be physically depraved manifestations. 

Especially is this true of the human sensibility. The appetites,

passions, and propensities are in a state of most unhealthy

development. This is too evident, and too much a matter of universal

notoriety, to need proof or illustration. Every person of reflection has

observed, that the human mind is greatly out of balance, in

consequence of the monstrous development of the sensibility. The

appetites, passions, and propensities have been indulged, and the

intelligence and conscience stultified by selfishness. Selfishness, be it

remembered, consists in a disposition or choice to gratify the

propensities, desires, and feelings. This of course, and of necessity,

produces just the unhealthy and monstrous developments which we

daily see: sometimes one ruling passion or appetite lording it, not only

over the intelligence and over the will, but over all the other appetites

and passions, crushing and sacrificing them all upon the altar of its

own gratification. See that bloated wretch, the inebriate! His appetite

for strong drink has played the despot. His whole mind and body,

reputation, family, friends, health, time, eternity, all, all are laid by him

upon its filthy altar. There is the debauchee, the glutton, the gambler,

the miser, and a host of others, each in his turn giving striking and

melancholy proof of the monstrous development and physical

depravity of the human sensibility.



3. That men are morally depraved is one of the most notorious facts

of human experience, observation and history. Indeed, I am not aware

that it has ever been doubted, when moral depravity has been

understood to consist in selfishness. The moral depravity of the

human race is everywhere assumed and declared in the Bible, and so

universal and notorious is the fact of human selfishness, that should

any man practically call it in question should he, in his business

transactions, and in his intercourse with men, assume the contrary, he

would justly subject himself to the charge of insanity. There is not a

fact in the world more notorious and undeniable than this. Human

moral depravity is as palpably evident as human existence. It is a fact

everywhere assumed in all governments, in all the arrangements of

society, and it has impressed its image, and written its name, upon

every thing human.



Subsequent to the commencement of moral agency, and previous to

regeneration, the moral depravity of mankind is universal.



By this it is not intended to deny that, in some instances, the Spirit of

God may, from the first moment of moral agency, have so enlightened

the mind as to have secured conformity to moral law, as the first moral

act. This may or may not be true. It is not my present purpose to

affirm or to deny this, as a possibility, or as a fact.



But by this is intended, that every moral agent of our race is, from

the dawn of moral agency to the moment of regeneration by the Holy

Spirit, morally depraved, unless we except those possible cases just

alluded to. The Bible exhibits proof of it:



1. In those passages that represent all the unregenerate as

possessing one common wicked heart or character. "And God saw

that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every

imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Gen.

6:5). "This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun,

that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men

is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after

that they go to the dead" (Eccl. 9:3). "The heart is deceitful above all

things and desperately wicked: who can know it?" (Jere. 17:9). 

"Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to

the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Romans 8:7).



2. In those passages that declare the universal necessity of

regeneration. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say

unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of

God" (John 3:3).



3. Passages that expressly assert the universal moral depravity of all

unregenerate moral agents of our race. "What then? Are we better

than they? No, in no wise: for we have before proved both Jews and

Gentiles, that they are all under sin; as it is written, There is none

righteous, no, not one. There is none that understandeth, there is

none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they

are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no

not one. Their throat is an open sepulcher; with their tongues they

have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth

is full of cursing and bitterness: their feet are swift to shed blood:

destruction and misery are in their ways: and the way of peace have

they not known: there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we

know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are

under the law: that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world

may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law

there shall no flesh be justified in His sight; for by the law is the

knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:9-20).



4. Universal history proves it. What is this world's history but the

shameless chronicle of human wickedness?



5. Universal observation attests it. Who ever saw one unregenerate

human being that was not selfish, that did not obey his feelings rather

than the law of his intelligence, that was not under some form, or in

some way, living to please self? Such an unregenerate human being,

I may safely affirm, was never seen since the fall of Adam.



6. I may also appeal to the universal consciousness of the

unregenerate. They know themselves to be selfish, to be aiming to

please themselves, and they cannot honestly deny it.



The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race is

total.



By this is intended, that the moral depravity of the unregenerate is

without any mixture of moral goodness or virtue, that while they remain

unregenerate, they never in any instance, nor in any degree, exercise

true love to God and to man. It is not intended, that they may not

perform many outward actions, and have many inward feelings, that

are such as the regenerate perform and experience: and such too as

are accounted virtue by those who place virtue in the outward action. 

But it is intended, that virtue does not consist either in involuntary

feelings or in outward actions, and that it consists alone in entire

consecration of heart and life to God and the good of being, and that

no unregenerate sinner previous to regeneration, is or can be, for one

moment, in this state.



When virtue is clearly seen to consist in the heart's entire

consecration to God and the good of being, it must be seen, that the

unregenerate are not for one moment in this state. It is amazing, that

some philosophers and theologians have admitted and maintained,

that the unregenerate do sometimes do that which is truly virtuous. 

But in these admissions they necessarily assume a false philosophy,

and overlook that in which all virtue does and must consist, namely,

supreme ultimate intention. They speak of virtuous actions and of

virtuous feelings, as if virtue consisted in them, and not in the

intention.



Henry P. Tappan, for example, for the most part an able, truthful,

and beautiful writer, assumes, or rather affirms, that volitions may be

put forth inconsistent with, and contrary to the present choice of an

end, and that consequently, unregenerate sinners, whom he admits to

be in the exercise of a selfish choice of an end, may and do

sometimes put forth right volitions, and perform right actions, that is,

right in the sense of virtuous actions. But let us examine this subject. 

We have seen that all choice and all volition must respect either an

end or means, that is, that everything willed or chosen, is willed or

chosen for some reason. To deny this, is the same as to deny that

anything is willed or chosen, because the ultimate reason for a choice

and the thing chosen are identical. Therefore, it is plain, as was

shown in a former lecture, that the will cannot embrace at the same

time, two opposite ends; and that while but one end is chosen, the will

cannot put forth volitions to secure some other end, which end is not

yet chosen. In other words, it certainly is absurd to say, that the will,

while maintaining the choice of one end, can use means for the

accomplishment of another and opposite end.



When an end is chosen, that choice confines all volition to securing

its accomplishment, and for the time being, and until another end is

chosen, and this one relinquished, it is impossible for the will to put

forth any volition inconsistent with the present choice. It therefore

follows, that while sinners are selfish, or unregenerate, it is impossible

for them to put forth a holy volition. They are under the necessity of

first changing their hearts, or their choice of an end, before they can

put forth any volitions to secure any other than a selfish end. And this

is plainly the everywhere assumed philosophy of the Bible. That

uniformly represents the unregenerate as totally depraved, and calls

upon them to, repent, to make to themselves a new heart; and never

admits directly, or by way of implication, that they can do anything

good or acceptable to God, while in the exercise of a wicked or selfish

heart.

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LECTURE 23



MORAL DEPRAVITY



Let us consider the proper method of accounting for the universal

and total moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our

race.



In the discussion of this subject, I will:



1. Endeavor to show how it is not to be accounted for.



In examining this part of the subject, it is necessary to have distinctly

in view that which constitutes moral depravity. All the error that has

existed upon this subject, has been founded in false assumptions in

regard to the nature or essence of moral depravity. It has been almost

universally true, that no distinction has been made between moral and

physical depravity; and consequently, physical depravity has been

confounded with and treated of, as moral depravity. This of course

has led to vast confusion and nonsense upon this subject. Let the

following fact, which has been shown in former lectures, be distinctly

borne in mind.



That moral depravity consists in selfishness, or in the choice of

self-interest, self-gratification, or self-indulgence, as an end.



Consequently it cannot consist, 



(1.) In a sinful constitution, or in a constitutional appetency or craving

for sin. This has been shown in a former lecture, on what is not

implied in disobedience to the moral law.



(2.) Moral depravity is sin itself and not the cause of sin. It is not

something prior to sin, that sustains to it the relation of a cause, but it

is the essence and the whole of sin.



(3.) It cannot be an attribute of human nature, considered simply as

such, for this would be physical, and not moral depravity.



(4.) Moral depravity is not then to be accounted for by ascribing it to

a nature or constitution sinful in itself. To talk of a sinful nature, or

sinful constitution, in the sense of physical sinfulness, is to ascribe

sinfulness to the Creator, who is the author of nature. It is to overlook

the essential nature of sin, and to make sin a physical virus, instead of

a voluntary and responsible choice. Both sound philosophy and the

Bible, make sin to consist in obeying the flesh, or in the spirit of

self-pleasing, or self-indulgence, or, which is the same thing, in

selfishness in a carnal mind, or in minding the flesh. But writers on

moral depravity have assumed, that moral depravity was distinct from,

and the cause of sin, that is, of actual transgression. They call it

original sin, indwelling sin, a sinful nature, an appetite for sin, an

attribute of human nature, and the like. We shall presently see what

has led to this view of the subject.



I will, in the next place, notice a modern, and perhaps the most

popular view of this subject, which has been taken by any late writer,

who has fallen into the error of confounding physical and moral

depravity. I refer to the prize essay of Dr. Woods, of Andover, Mass. 

He defines moral depravity to be the same as "sinfulness." He also, in

one part of his essay, holds and maintains, that it is always and

necessarily, voluntary. Still, his great effort is to prove that sinfulness

or moral depravity, is an attribute of human nature. It is no part of my

design to expose the inconsistency of holding moral depravity to be a

voluntary state of mind, and yet a natural attribute, but only to examine

the philosophy, the logic, and theory of his main argument. The

following quotation will show the sense in which he holds moral

depravity to belong to the nature of man. At page 54 he says:



"The word depravity, relating as it here does to man's moral

character, means the same as sinfulness, being the opposite of moral

purity, or holiness." In this use of the word there is a general

agreement. But what is the meaning of native, or natural? Among the

variety of meanings specified by Johnson, Webster, and others, I refer

to the following, as relating particularly to the subject before us.



Native. Produced by nature. Natural, or such as is according to

nature; belonging by birth; original. Natural has substantially the same

meaning: `produced by nature; not acquired.' So Crabbe: `Of a

person we say, his worth is native, to designate it as some valuable

property born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon him; but

we say of his disposition, that it is natural, as opposed to that which is

acquired by habit.' And Johnson defines nature to be `the native state

or properties of any thing, by which it is discriminated from others.' He

quotes the definition of Boyle: `Nature sometimes means what belongs

to a living creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth, as when

we say a man is noble by nature, or a child is naturally froward.' `This,'

he says, `may be expressed by saying, the man was born so.'



"After these brief definitions, which come to nearly the same thing, I

proceed to inquire, what are the marks or evidence which show

anything in man to be natural, or native; and how far these marks are

found in relation to depravity."



Again, page 66, he says:



"The evil, then, cannot be supposed to originate in any unfavorable

external circumstances, such as corrupting examples, or insinuating

and strong temptations; for if we suppose these entirely removed, all

human beings would still be sinners. With such a moral nature as they

now have, they would not wait for strong temptations to sin. Nay, they

would be sinners in opposition to the strongest motives to the contrary. 

Indeed, we know that human beings will turn those very motives which

most powerfully urge to holiness, into occasions of sin. Now, does not

the confidence and certainty with which we foretell the commission of

sin, and of sin unmixed with moral purity, presuppose a full conviction

in us, and a conviction resting upon what we regard as satisfactory

evidence, that sin, in all its visible actings, arises from that which is

within the mind itself, and which belongs to our very nature as moral

beings? Have we not as much evidence that this is the case with

moral evil as with any of our natural affections or bodily appetites?"



This quotation, together with the whole argument, shows that he

considers moral depravity to be an attribute of human nature, in the

same sense that the appetites and passions are. Before I proceed

directly to the examination of his argument, that sinfulness, or moral

depravity, is an "attribute of human nature," I would premise, that an

argument, or fact, that may equally well consist with either of two

opposing theories, can prove neither. The author in question presents

the following facts and considerations in support of his great position,

that moral depravity, or sinfulness, is an attribute of human nature; and

three presidents of colleges indorse the soundness and

conclusiveness of the argument.



He proves his position first from the "universality of moral

depravity." To this I answer, that this argument proves nothing to the

purpose, unless it be true, and assumed as a major premise, that

whatever is universal among mankind, must be a natural attribute of

man as such; that whatever is common to all men, must be an

attribute of human nature. But this assumption is a begging of the

question. Sin may be the result of temptation; temptation may be

universal, and of such a nature as uniformly, not necessarily, to result

in sin, unless a contrary result be secured by a Divine moral suasion. 

This I shall endeavor to show is the fact. This argument assumes, that

there is but one method of accounting for the universality of human

sinfulness. But this is the question in debate, and is not to be thus

assumed as true.



Again: Selfishness is common to all unregenerate men. Is

selfishness a natural attribute? We have seen, in a former lecture,

that it consists in choice. Can choice be an attribute of human nature?



Again: This argument is just as consistent with the opposite theory,

to wit, that moral depravity is selfishness. The universality of

selfishness is just what might be expected, if selfishness consists in

the committal of the will to the gratification of self. This will be a thing

of course, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, greatly to enlighten the

intellect, and break up the force of habit, and change the attitude of the

will, already, at the first dawn of reason, committed to the impulses of

the sensibility. If moral depravity is to be accounted for, as I shall

hereafter more fully show, by ascribing it to the influence of temptation,

or to a physically depraved constitution, surrounded by the

circumstances in which mankind first form their moral character, or put

forth their first moral choices, universality might of course be expected

to be one of its characteristics. This argument, then, agreeing equally

well with either theory, proves neither.



His second argument is, that "Moral depravity develops itself in early

life." Answer:



This is just what might be expected upon the opposite theory. If

moral depravity consist in the choice of self-gratification, it would of

course appear in early life. So this argument agrees quite as well with

the opposing theory, and therefore proves nothing. But this

argument is good for nothing, unless the following be assumed as a

major premise, and unless the fact assumed be indeed a truth,

namely, "Whatever is developed in early life, must be an attribute of

human nature." But this again is assuming the truth of the point in

debate. This argument is based upon the assumption that a course of

action common to all men, and commencing at the earliest moment of

their moral agency, can be accounted for only by ascribing it to an

attribute of nature, having the same moral character as that which

belongs to the actions themselves. But this is not true. There may be

more than one way of accounting for the universal sinfulness of human

actions from the dawn of moral agency. It may be ascribed to the

universality and peculiar nature of temptation, as has been said.



His third argument is, that "Moral depravity is not owing to any

change that occurs subsequent to birth." Answer:



No, the circumstances of temptation are sufficient to account for it

without supposing the nature to be changed. This argument proves

nothing, unless it be true, that the peculiar circumstances of temptation

under which moral agents act, from the dawn of moral agency, cannot

sufficiently account for their conduct, without supposing a change of

nature subsequent to birth. What then, does this arguing prove?



Again, this argument is just as consistent with the opposing theory,

and therefore proves neither.



His fourth argument is, "That moral depravity acts freely and

spontaneously." Answer:



"The moral agent acts freely, and acts selfishly, that is, wickedly. 

This argument assumes, that if a moral agent acts freely and wickedly

moral depravity, or sin, must be an attribute of his nature. Or more

fairly, if mankind universally, in the exercise of their liberty, act sinfully,

sinfulness must be an attribute of human nature." But what is sin? 

Why sin is a voluntary transgression of law, Dr. Woods being judge. 

Can a voluntary transgression of law be denominated an attribute of

human nature?



But again, this argument alleges nothing but what is equally

consistent with the opposite theory. If moral depravity consist in the

choice of self-gratification as an end, it would of course freely and

spontaneously manifest itself. This argument then, is good for

nothing.



His fifth argument is, "That moral depravity is hard to overcome, and

therefore it must be an attribute of human nature." Answer:



If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome at

all, without a change of the human constitution. It is hard to overcome,

just as selfishness naturally would be, in beings of a physically

depraved constitution, and in the presence of so many temptations to

self-indulgence. If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be

overcome without a change of personal identity. But the fact that it

can be overcome without destroying the consciousness of personal

identity, proves that it is not an attribute of human nature.



His sixth argument is, that "We can predict with certainty, that in due

time it will act itself out." Answer:



Just as might be expected. If moral depravity consists in selfishness,

we can predict with certainty, that the spirit of self-pleasing will, in due

time, and at all times, act itself out. We can also predict, without the

gift of prophecy, that with a constitution physically depraved, and

surrounded with objects to awaken appetite, and with all the

circumstances in which human beings first form their moral character,

they will seek universally to gratify themselves, unless prevented by

the illuminations of the Holy Spirit. This argument is just as consistent

with the opposite theory, and therefore proves neither.



It is unnecessary to occupy any more time with the treatise of Dr.

Woods. I will now quote the standards of the Presbyterian church,

which will put you in possession of their views upon this subject. At

pp. 30, 31, of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, we have the

following: "By this sin, they (Adam and Eve) fell from their original

righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin,

and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They

being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the

same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity,

descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original

corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made

opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all

actual transgressions."



Again, pp. 152-154, Shorter Catechism. "Question 22. Did all

mankind fall in that first transgression? Answer: The covenant being

made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his

posterity; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation,

sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression.



"Question 23. Into what estate did the fall bring mankind? Answer:

The fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.



"Question 24. What is sin? Answer: Sin is any want of conformity

unto, or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the

reasonable creature.



"Question 25. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate where

into man fell? Answer: The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man

fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of that

righteousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his

nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite

unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that

continually, which is commonly called original sin, and from which do

proceed all actual transgressions.



"Question 26. How is original sin conveyed from our first parents

unto their posterity? Answer: Original sin is conveyed from our first

parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as all that

proceed from them in that way, are conceived and born in sin."



These extracts show, that the framers and defenders of this

confession of faith, account for the moral depravity of mankind by

making it to consist in a sinful nature, inherited by natural generation

from Adam. They regard the constitution inherited from Adam, as in

itself sinful, and the cause of all actual transgression. They make no

distinction between physical and moral depravity. They also

distinguish between original and actual sin. Original sin is the

sinfulness of the constitution, in which Adam's posterity have no other

hand than to inherit it by natural generation, or by birth. This original

sin, or sinful nature, renders mankind utterly disabled from all that is

spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all that is evil. This is their

account of moral depravity. This, it will be seen, is substantially the

ground of Dr. Woods:



It has been common with those who confound physical with moral

depravity, and who maintain that human nature is itself sinful, to quote

certain passages of Scripture to sustain their position. An examination

of these proof texts, must, in the next place, occupy our attention. But

before I enter upon this examination, I must first call your attention to

certain well-settled rules of biblical interpretation.



(1.) Different passages must be so interpreted, if they can be, as not

to contradict each other.



(2.) Language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter of

discourse.



(3.) Respect is always to be had to the general scope and design of

the speaker or writer.



(4.) Texts that are consistent with either theory, prove neither.



(5.) Language is to be so interpreted, if it can be, as not to conflict

with sound philosophy, matters of fact, the nature of things, or

immutable justice.



Let us now, remembering and applying these plain rules of sound

interpretation, proceed to the examination of those passages that are

supposed to establish the theory of depravity I am examining.



"Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own

likeness and after his own image, and called his name Seth" (Gen.

5:3). It is not very easy to see, why this text should be pressed into

the service of those who hold that human nature is in itself sinful. Why

should it be assumed that the likeness and image here spoken of was

a moral likeness or image? But unless this be assumed, the text has

nothing to do with the subject.



Again: it is generally admitted, that in all probability Adam was a

regenerate man at the time and before the birth of Seth. Is it intended

that Adam begat a saint or a sinner? If, as is supposed, Adam was a

saint of God, if this text is anything to the purpose, it affirms that Adam

begat a saint. But this is the opposite of that in proof of which the text

is quoted.



Another text is: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not

one" (Job 14:4). This text is quoted in support of the position of the

Presbyterian Confession of Faith, that children inherit from their

parents, by natural generation, a sinful nature. Upon this text, I

remark, that all that can be made of it, even if we read it without regard

to the translation or the context, is, that a physically depraved parent

will produce a physically depraved offspring. That this is its real

meaning, is quite evident, when we look into the context. Job is

treating of the frail and dying state of man, and manifestly has in the

text and context his eye wholly on the physical state, and not on the

moral character of man. What he intends is; who can bring other than

a frail, dying offspring from a frail dying parent? Not one. This is

substantially the view that Professor Stuart takes of this text. The

utmost that can be made of it is, that as he belonged to a race of

sinners, nothing else could be expected than that he should be a

sinner, without meaning to affirm anything in regard to the quo modo

of this result.



Again: "What is man that he should be clean, and he that is born of a

woman that he should be righteous" (Job 15:14).



These are the words of Eliphaz, and it is improper to quote them as

inspired truth. For God Himself testifies that Job's friends did not hold

the truth. But, suppose we receive the text as true, what is its import? 

Why, it simply asserts, or rather implies, the righteousness or

sinfulness of the whole human race. It expresses the universality of

human depravity, in the very common way of including all that are born

of woman. This certainly says nothing, and implies nothing, respecting

a sinful constitution. It is just as plain, and just as warrantable, to

understand this passage as implying that mankind have become so

physically depraved, that this fact, together with the circumstances

under which they come into being, and begin their moral career, will

certainly, (not necessarily), result in moral depravity. I might use just

such language as that found in this text, and, naturally enough,

express by it my own views of moral depravity, to wit, that it results

from a physically depraved constitution; and the circumstances of

temptation under which children come into this world, and begin and

prosecute their moral career; certainly this is the most that can be

made of this text.



Again: "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother

conceive me" (Psalms 51:5).



Upon this I remark, that it would seem, if this text is to be understood

literally, that the Psalmist intended to affirm the sinful state of his

mother, at the time of his conception, and during gestation. But, to

interpret these passages as teaching the constitutional sinfulness of

man, is to contradict God's own definition of sin, and the only definition

that human reason or common sense can receive, to wit, that "sin is a

transgression of the law." This is, no doubt, the only correct definition

of sin. But we have seen that the law does not legislate over

substance, requiring men to have a certain nature, but over voluntary

action only. If the Psalmist really intended to affirm, that the substance

of his body was sinful from its conception, then he not only arrays

himself against God's own definition of sin, but he also affirms sheer

nonsense. The substance of an unborn child sinful! It is impossible! 

But what did the Psalmist mean? I answer: This verse is found in

David's penitential psalm. He was deeply convinced of sin, and was,

as he had good reason to be, much excited, and expressed himself,

as we all do in similar circumstances, in strong language. His eye, as

was natural and is common in such cases, had been directed back

along the pathway of life up to the days of his earliest recollection. He

remembered sins among the earliest acts of his recollected life. He

broke out in the language of this text to express, not the anti-scriptural

and nonsensical dogma of a sinful constitution, but to affirm in his

strong, poetic language, that he had been a sinner from the

commencement of his moral existence, or from the earliest moment of

his capability of being a sinner. This is the strong language of poetry.



Some suppose that, in the passage in question, the Psalmist referred

to, and meant to acknowledge and assert, his low and despicable

origin, and to say, I was always a sinner, and my mother that

conceived me was a sinner, and I am but the degenerate plant of a

strange vine, without intending to affirm anything in respect to the

absolute sinfulness of his nature.



Again, "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as

soon as they be born, speaking lies" (Psalms 58:3). Upon this text I

remark that it has been quoted at one time to establish the doctrine of

a sinful nature, and at another to prove that infants commit actual sin

from the very day and hour of their birth. But certainly no such use

can be legitimately made of this text. It does not affirm anything of a

sinful nature, but this has been inferred from what it does affirm, that

the wicked are estranged from their birth. But does this mean, that

they are really and literally estranged from the day and hour of their

birth, and that they really go astray the very day they are born,

speaking lies? This every one knows to be contrary to fact. The text

cannot then be pressed to the letter. What then does it mean? It must

mean, like the text last examined, that the wicked are estranged and

go astray from the commencement of their moral agency. If it means

more than this, it would contradict other plain passages of scripture. It

affirms, in strong, graphic, and poetic language, the fact, that the first

moral conduct and character of children is sinful. This is all that in

truth it can assert; and it doubtless dates the beginning of their moral

depravity at a very early period, and expresses it in very strong

language, as if it were literally from the hour of birth. But when it adds,

that they go astray, speaking lies, we know that this is not, and cannot

be, literally taken, for, as every one knows, children do not speak at all

from their birth. Should we understand the Psalmist as affirming, that

children go astray as soon as they go at all, and speak lies as soon as

they speak at all, this would not prove that their nature was in itself

sinful, but might well consist with the theory that their physical

depravity, together with their circumstances of temptation, led them

into selfishness, from the very first moment of their moral existence.



Again, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born

of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:6).



Upon this I remark that it may, if literally taken, mean nothing more

than this, that the body which is born of flesh is flesh, and that

which is born of the spirit is spirit; that is, that this birth of which he was

speaking was of the soul, and not of the body. But it may be

understood to mean, that which results from the influence of the

flesh is flesh, in the sense of sin; for this is a common sense of the

term flesh in the New Testament, and that which results from the

Spirit, is spirit or spiritual, in the sense of holy. This I understand to be

the true sense. The text when thus understood, does not at all support

the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution, but only this, that the flesh

tends to sin, that the appetites and passions are temptations to sin, so

that when the will obeys them it sins. Whatever is born of the

propensities, in the sense that the will yields to their control, is sinful. 

And, on the other hand, whatever is born of the Spirit, that is, whatever

results from the agency of the Holy Spirit, in the sense that the will

yields to Him, is holy.



Again, "By nature the children of wrath, even as others" (Eph. 2:3). 

Upon this text I remark that it cannot, consistently with natural justice,

be understood to mean, that we are exposed to the wrath of God on

account of our nature. It is a monstrous and blasphemous dogma,

that a holy God is angry with any creature for possessing a nature with

which he was sent into being without his knowledge or consent. The

Bible represents God as angry with men for their wicked deeds, and

not for their nature.



It is common and proper to speak of the first state in which men

universally are, as a natural state. Thus we speak of sinners before

regeneration, as in a state of nature, as opposed to a changed state, a

regenerate state, and a state of grace. By this we do not necessarily

mean, that they have a nature sinful in itself, but merely that before

regeneration they are universally and morally depraved, that this is

their natural, as opposed to their regenerate state. Total moral

depravity is the state that follows, and results from their first birth, and

is in this sense natural, and in this sense alone, can it truly be said,

that they are "by nature children of wrath." Against the use that is

made of this text, and all this class of texts, may be arrayed the whole

scope of scripture, that represents man as to blame, and to be judged

and punished only for his deeds. The subject matter of discourse in

these texts is such as to demand that we should understand them as

not implying, or asserting, that sin is an essential part of our nature.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 24



MORAL DEPRAVITY



FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED IN

SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT HUMAN NATURE IS IN ITSELF

SINFUL.



The defenders of the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, or moral

depravity, urge as an additional argument:



That sin is a universal effect of human nature, and therefore human

nature must be itself sinful.



Answer: This is a non sequitur. Sin may be, and must be, an abuse

of free agency; and this may be accounted for, as we shall see, by

ascribing it to the universality of temptation, and does not at all imply a

sinful constitution. But if sin necessarily implies a sinful nature, how

did Adam and Eve sin? Had they a sinful nature to account for, and to

cause their first sin? How did angels sin? Had they also a sinful

nature? Either sin does not imply a sinful nature, or a nature in itself

sinful, or Adam and angels must have had sinful natures before their

fall.



Again: Suppose we regard sin as an event or effect. An effect only

implies an adequate cause. Free, responsible will is an adequate

cause in the presence of temptation, without the supposition of a sinful

constitution, as has been demonstrated in the case of Adam and of

angels. When we have found an adequate cause, it is unphilosophical

to look for and assign another.



Again: it is said that no motive to sin could be a motive or a

temptation, if there were not a sinful taste, relish, or appetite, inherent

in the constitution, to which the temptation or motive is addressed. For

example, the presence of food, it is said, would be no temptation to

eat, were there not a constitutional appetency terminating on food. So

the presence of any object could be no inducement to sin, were there

not a constitutional appetency or craving for sin. So that, in fact, sin in

action were impossible, unless there were sin in the nature. To this I

reply:



Suppose this objection be applied to the sin of Adam and of angels. 

Can we not account for Eve's eating the forbidden fruit without

supposing that she had a craving for sin? The Bible informs us that

her craving was for the fruit, for knowledge, and not for sin. The words

are, "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and

that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one

wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave also unto her

husband with her, and he did eat" (Gen. 3:6). Here is nothing of a

craving for sin. Eating this fruit was indeed sinful; but the sin consisted

in consenting to gratify, in a prohibited manner, the appetites, not for

sin, but for food and knowledge. But the advocates of this theory say

that there must be an adaptedness in the constitution, a something

within answering to the outward motive or temptation, otherwise sin

were impossible. This is true. But the question is, What is that

something within, which responds to the outward motive? Is it a

craving for sin? We have just seen what it was in the case of Adam

and Eve. It was simply the correlation that existed between the fruit

and their constitution, its presence exciting the desires for food and

knowledge. This led to prohibited indulgence. But all men sin in

precisely the same way. They consent to gratify, not a craving for sin,

but a craving for other things, and the consent to make

self-gratification an end, is the whole of sin.



The theologians whose views we are canvassing, maintain that the

appetites, passions, desires, and propensities, which are constitutional

and entirely involuntary, are in themselves sinful. To this I reply, that

Adam and Eve possessed them before they fell. Christ possessed

them, or He was not a man, nor, in any proper sense, a human being. 

No, these appetites, passions, and propensities, are not sinful, though

they are the occasions of sin. They are a temptation to the will to seek

their unlawful indulgence. When these lusts or appetites are spoken

of as the "passions of sin," or as "sinful lusts or passions," it is not

because they are sinful in themselves, but because they are the

occasions of sin. It has been asked, Why are not the appetites and

propensities to be regarded as sinful, since they are the prevalent

temptations to sin? I reply:



They are involuntary, and moral character can no more be

predicated of them, on account of their being temptations, than it could

of the fruit that was a temptation to Eve. They have no design to

tempt. They are constitutional, unintelligent, involuntary; and it is

impossible that moral character should be predicable of them. A moral

agent is responsible for his emotions, desires, etc., so far as they are

under the direct or indirect control of his will, and no further. He is

always responsible for the manner in which he gratifies them. If he

indulges them in accordance with the law of God, he does right. If he

makes their gratification his end, he sins.



Again: the death and suffering of infants previous to actual

transgression, is adduced as an argument to prove, that infants have a

sinful nature. To this I reply:



That this argument must assume, that there must be sin wherever

there is suffering and death. But this assumption proves too much, as

it would prove that mere animals have a sinful nature, or have

committed actual sin. An argument that proves too much proves

nothing.



Physical sufferings prove only physical, and not moral, depravity. 

Previous to moral agency, infants are no more subjects of moral

government than brutes are; therefore, their sufferings and death are

to be accounted for as are those of brutes, namely, by ascribing them

to physical interference with the laws of life and health.



Another argument for a sinful constitution is, that unless infants have

a sinful nature, they do not need sanctification to fit them for heaven. 

Answer:



This argument assumes, that, if they are not sinful, they must be

holy; whereas they are neither sinful or holy, until they are moral

agents, and render themselves so by obedience or disobedience to

the moral law. If they are to go to heaven, they must be made holy or

must be sanctified. This objection assumes, that previous sinfulness is

a condition of the necessity of being holy. This is contrary to fact. 

Were Adam and angels first sinful before they were sanctified? But it

is assumed that unless moral agents are at first sinners, they do not

need the Holy Spirit to induce them to be holy. That is, unless their

nature is sinful, they would become holy without the Holy Spirit. But

where do we ascertain this? Suppose that they have no moral

character, and that their nature is neither holy nor sinful. Will they

become holy without being enlightened by the Holy Spirit? Who will

assert that they will?



That infants have a sinful nature has been inferred from the

institution of circumcision so early as the eighth day after birth. 

Circumcision, it is truly urged, was designed to teach the necessity of

regeneration, and by way of implication, the doctrine of moral

depravity. It is claimed, that its being enjoined as obligatory upon the

eighth day after birth, was requiring it at the earliest period at which it

could be safely performed. From this it is inferred, that infants are to

be regarded as morally depraved from their birth.



In answer to this I would say, that infant circumcision was doubtless

designed to teach the necessity of their being saved by the Holy Spirit

from the dominion of the flesh; that the influence of the flesh must be

restrained, and the flesh circumcised, or the soul would be lost. This

truth needed to be impressed on the parents, from the birth of their

children. This very significant, and bloody, and painful rite, was well

calculated to impress this truth upon parents, and to lead them from

their birth to watch over the development and indulgence of their

propensities, and to pray for their sanctification. Requiring it at so

early a day was no doubt designed to indicate, that they are from the

first under the dominion of their flesh, without however affording any

inference in favor of the idea, that their flesh was in itself sinful, or that

the action of their will at that early age was sinful. If reason was not

developed, the subjection of the will to appetite could not be sinful. 

But whether this subjection of the will to the gratification of the appetite

was sinful or not, the child must be delivered from it, or it could never

be fitted for heaven, any more than a mere brute can be fitted for

heaven. The fact, that circumcision was required on the eighth day,

and not before, seems to indicate, not that they are sinners absolutely

from birth, but that they very early become so, even from the

commencement of moral agency.



Again: the rite must be performed at some time. Unless a particular

day were appointed, it would be very apt to be deferred, and finally not

performed at all. It is probable, that God commanded that it should be

done at the earliest period at which it could be safely done, not only for

the reasons already assigned, but to prevent its being neglected too

long, and perhaps altogether: and perhaps, also, because it would be

less painful and dangerous at that early age, when the infant slept

most of the time. The longer it was neglected the greater would be the

temptation to neglect it altogether. So painful a rite needed to be

enjoined by positive statute, at some particular time; and it was

desirable on accounts that it should be done as early as it safely could

be. This argument, then, for native constitutional moral depravity

amounts really to nothing.



Again: it is urged, that unless infants have a sinful nature, should

they die in infancy, they could not be saved by the grace of Christ.



To this I answer, that, in this case they would not, and could not, as a

matter of course, be sent to the place of punishment for sinners;

because that were to confound the innocent with the guilty, a thing

morally impossible with God.



But what grace could there be in saving them from a sinful

constitution, that is not exercised in saving them from circumstances

that would certainly result in their becoming sinners, if not snatched

from them? In neither case do they need pardon for sin. Grace is

unearned favor a gratuity. If the child has a sinful nature, it is his

misfortune, and not his crime. To save him from this nature is to save

him from those circumstances that will certainly result in actual

transgression, unless he is rescued by death and by the Holy Spirit. 

So if his nature is not sinful, yet it is certain that his nature and

circumstances are such, that he will surely sin unless rescued by

death or by the Holy Spirit, before he is capable of sinning. It certainly

must be an infinite favor to be rescued from such circumstances, and

especially to have eternal life conferred as a mere gratuity. This surely

is grace. And as infants belong to a race of sinners who are all, as it

were, turned over into the hands of Christ, they doubtless will ascribe

their salvation to the infinite grace of Christ.



Again: is it not grace that saves us from sinning? What then is it but

grace that saves infants from sinning, by snatching them away from

circumstances of temptation? In what way does grace save adults

from sinning, but by keeping them from temptation, or by giving them

grace to overcome it? And is there no grace in rescuing infants from

circumstances that are certain, if they are left in them, to lead them

into sin?



All that can be justly said in either case is, that if infants are saved at

all, which I suppose they are, they are rescued by the benevolence of

God from circumstances that would result in certain and eternal death,

and are by grace made heirs of eternal life. But after all, it is useless

to speculate about the character and destiny of those who are

confessedly not moral agents. The benevolence of God will take care

of them. It is nonsensical to insist upon their moral depravity before

they are moral agents, and it is frivolous to assert, that they must be

morally depraved, as a condition of their being saved by grace.



We deny that the human constitution is morally depraved, because it

is impossible that sin should be a quality of the substance of soul or

body. It is, and must be, a quality of choice or intention, and not of

substance. To make sin an attribute or quality of substance is contrary

to God's definition of sin. "Sin," says the apostle, "is anomia," a

"transgression of, or a want of conformity to, the moral law." That is, it

consists in a refusal to love God and our neighbor, or, which is the

same thing, in loving ourselves supremely.



To represent the constitution as sinful, is to represent God, who is

the author of the constitution, as the author of sin. To say that God is

not the direct former of the constitution, but that sin is conveyed by

natural generation from Adam, who made himself sinful, is only to

remove the objection one step farther back, but not to obviate it; for

God established the physical laws that of necessity bring about this

result.



But how came Adam by a sinful nature? Did his first sin change his

nature? or did God change it as a penalty for sin? What ground is

there for the assertion that Adam's nature became in itself sinful by the

fall? This is a groundless, not to say ridiculous, assumption, and an

absurdity. Sin an attribute of nature! A sinful substance! Sin a

substance! Is it a solid, a fluid, a material, or a spiritual substance?



I have received from a brother the following note on this subject:

"The orthodox creeds are in some cases careful to say that original sin

consists in the substance of neither soul nor body. Thus

Bretschneider, who is reckoned among the rationalists in Germany,

says: `The symbolical books very rightly maintain that original sin is not

in any sense the substance of man, his body or soul, as Flacius

taught, but that it has been infused into human nature by Satan, and

mixed with it, as poison and wine are mixed.'



"They rather expressly guard against the idea that they mean by the

phrase `man's nature,' his substance, but somewhat which is fixed in

the substance. They explain original sin, therefore, not as an essential

attribute of man, that is, a necessary and essential part of his being,

but as an accident, that is, somewhat which does not subsist in itself,

but as something accidental, which has come into human nature. He

quotes the Formula Concordantiae as saying: `Nature does not denote

the substance itself of man, but something which inheres fixed in the

nature or substance.' Accident is defined, `what does not subsist by

itself, but is in some substance and can be distinguished from it.'"



Here, it seems, is sin by itself, and yet not a substance or

subsistence not a part or attribute of soul or body. What can it be? 

Does it consist in wrong action? No, not in action, but is an accident

which inheres fixed in the nature of substance. But what can it be? 

Not substance, nor yet action. But if it be anything, it must be either

substance or action. If it be a state of substance, what is this but

substance in a particular state? Do these writers think by this subtlety

and refinement to relieve their doctrine of constitutional moral

depravity of its intrinsic absurdity?



I object to the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, that it makes all

sin original and actual, a mere calamity, and not a crime. For those

who hold that sin is an essential and inseparable part of our nature, to

call it a crime, is to talk nonsense. What! A sinful nature the crime of

him upon whom it is entailed, without his knowledge or consent? If the

nature is sinful, in such a sense that action must necessarily be sinful,

which is the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, then sin in action must

be a calamity, and can be no crime. It is the necessary effect of a

sinful nature. This cannot be a crime, since the will has nothing to do

with it.



Of course it must render repentance, either with or without the grace

of God, impossible, unless grace sets aside our reason. If repentance

implies self-condemnation, we can never repent in the exercise of our

reason. Constituted as we are, it is impossible that we should

condemn ourselves for a sinful nature, or for actions that are

unavoidable. The doctrine of original sin, or of a sinful constitution,

and of necessary sinful actions, represents the whole moral

government of God, the plan of salvation by Christ, and indeed every

doctrine of the gospel, as a mere farce. Upon this supposition the law

is tyranny, and the gospel an insult to the unfortunate.



It is difficult, and, indeed, impossible for those who really believe this

doctrine to urge immediate repentance and submission on the sinner,

feeling that he is infinitely to blame unless he instantly comply. It is a

contradiction to affirm, that a man can heartily believe in the doctrine in

question, and yet truly and heartily blame sinners for not doing what is

naturally impossible to them. The secret conviction must be in the

mind of such an one, that the sinner is not really to blame for being a

sinner. For in fact, if this doctrine is true, he is not to blame for being a

sinner, any more than he is to blame for being a human being. This

the advocate of this doctrine must know. It is vain for him to set up the

pretence that he truly blames sinners for their nature, or for their

conduct that was unavoidable. He can no more do it, than he can

honestly deny the necessary affirmations of his own reason. 

Therefore the advocates of this theory must merely hold it as a theory,

without believing it, or otherwise they must in their secret conviction

excuse the sinner.



This doctrine naturally and necessarily leads its advocates, secretly

at least, to ascribe the atonement of Christ rather to justice than to

grace to regard it rather as an expedient to relieve the unfortunate,

than to render the forgiveness of the inexcusable sinner possible. The

advocates of the theory cannot but regard the case of the sinner as

rather a hard one, and God as under an obligation to provide a way for

him to escape a sinful nature, entailed upon him in spite of himself,

and from actual transgressions which result from his nature by a law of

necessity. If all this is true, the sinner's case is infinitely hard, and God

would appear the most unreasonable and cruel of beings, if He did not

provide for their escape. These convictions will, and must, lodge in

the mind of him who really believes the dogma of a sinful nature. This,

in substance, is sometimes affirmed by the defenders of the doctrine

of original sin.



The fact that Christ died in the stead and behalf of sinners, proves

that God regarded them not as unfortunate, but as criminal and

altogether without excuse. Surely Christ need not have died to atone

for the misfortunes of men. His death was to atone for their guilt, and

not for their misfortunes. But if they are without excuse for sin, they

must be without a sinful nature that renders sin unavoidable. If men

are without excuse for sin, as the whole law and gospel assume and

teach, it cannot possibly be that their nature is sinful, for a sinful nature

would be the best of all excuses for sin.



This doctrine is a stumbling-block both to the church and the world,

infinitely dishonorable to God, and an abomination alike to God and

the human intellect, and should be banished from every pulpit, and

from every formula of doctrine, and from the world. It is a relic of

heathen philosophy, and was foisted in among the doctrines of

Christianity by Augustine, as every one may know who will take the

trouble to examine for himself. This view of moral depravity that I am

opposing, has long been the stronghold of Universalism. From it, the

Universalists inveigh with resistless force against the idea that sinners

should be sent to an eternal hell. Assuming the long-defended

doctrine of original or constitutional sinfulness, they proceeded to

show, that it would be infinitely unreasonable and unjust in God to

send them to hell. What! Create them with a sinful nature, from which

proceed, by a law of necessity, actual transgressions, and then send

them to an eternal hell for having this nature, and for transgressions

that are unavoidable! Impossible! They say; and the human intellect

responds, Amen.



From the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution also, has naturally

and irresistibly flowed the doctrine of inability to repent, and the

necessity of a physical regeneration. These too have been a sad

stumbling-block to Universalists, as every one knows who is at all

acquainted with the history of Universalism. They infer the salvation of

all men, from the fact of God's benevolence and physical

omnipotence! God is almighty, and He is love. Men are

constitutionally depraved, and are unable to repent. God will not,

cannot send them to hell. They do not deserve it. Sin is a calamity,

and God can save them, and He ought to do so. This is the substance

of their argument. And assuming the truth of their premises, there is

no evading their conclusion. But the whole argument is built on "such

stuff as dreams are made of." Strike out the erroneous dogma of a

sinful nature, and the whole edifice of Universalism comes to the

ground in a moment. We come now to consider:



2. The proper method of accounting for moral depravity.



We have more than once seen that the Bible has given us the history

of the introduction of sin into our world; and that from the narrative, it is

plain, that the first sin consisted in selfishness or in consenting to

indulge the excited constitutional propensities in a prohibited manner. 

In other words, it consisted in yielding the will to the impulses of the

sensibility, instead of abiding by the law of God, as revealed in the

intelligence. Thus, the Bible ascribes the first sin of our race to the

influence of temptation.



The Bible once, and only once, incidentally intimates that Adam's

first sin has in some way been the occasion, not the necessary

physical cause of all the sins of men (Rom. 5:12-19). It neither says

nor intimates anything in relation to the manner in which Adam's sin

has occasioned this result. It only incidentally recognizes the fact, and

then leaves it, just as if the quo modo was too obvious to need

explanation. In other parts of the Bible we are informed how we are to

account for the existence of sin among men. James says, that a man

is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lusts,

(epithumia-"desires") and enticed (James 1:14). That is, his lusts, or

the impulses of his sensibility, are his tempters. When he or his will is

overcome of these, he sins. Paul and other inspired writers represent

sin as consisting in a carnal or fleshly mind, in the mind of the flesh, or

in minding the flesh. It is plain that by the term flesh they mean what

we understand by the sensibility, as distinguished from intellect, and

that they represent sin as consisting in obeying, minding, the impulses

of the sensibility. They represent the world, and the flesh, and Satan,

as the three great sources of temptation. It is plain that the world and

Satan tempt by appeals to the flesh, or to the sensibility. Hence, the

apostles have much to say of the necessity of the destruction of the

flesh, of the members, of putting off the old man with his deeds, etc. 

Now, it is worthy of remark, that all this painstaking, on the part of

Inspiration, to intimate the source from whence our sin proceeds, and

to apprise us of the proper method of accounting for it, and also of

avoiding it, has probably been the occasion of leading certain

philosophers and theologians who have not carefully examined the

whole subject, to take a view of it which is directly opposed to the truth

intended by the inspired writers. Because so much is said of the

influence of the flesh over the mind, they have inferred that the nature

and physical constitution of man is itself sinful. But the representations

of Scripture are, that the body is the occasion of sin. The law in his

members, that warred against the law of his mind, of which Paul

speaks, is manifestly the impulse of the sensibility opposed to the law

of the reason. This law, that is, the impulse of his sensibility, brings

him into captivity, that is, influences his will, in spite of all his

convictions to the contrary.



Moral depravity consists, remember, in the committal of the will to

the gratification or indulgence of self in the will's following, or

submitting itself to be governed by, the impulses and desires of the

sensibility, instead of submitting itself to the law of God revealed in the

reason.



This definition of the thing shows how it is to be accounted for,

namely: the sensibility acts as a powerful impulse to the will, from the

moment of birth, and secures the consent and activity of the will to

procure its gratification, before the reason is at all developed. The will

is thus committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite, when first

the idea of moral obligation is developed. This committed state of the

will is not moral depravity, and has no moral character, until the idea of

moral obligation is developed. The moment this idea is developed,

this committal of the will to self-indulgence must be abandoned, or it

becomes selfishness, or moral depravity. But, as the will is already in

a state of committal, and has to some extent already formed the habit

of seeking to gratify feeling, and as the idea of moral obligation is at

first but feebly developed, unless the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light

on the soul, the will, as might be expected, retains its hold on

self-gratification. Here alone moral character commences, and must

commence. No one can conceive of its commencing earlier.



This selfish choice is the wicked heart the propensity to sin that

causes what is generally termed actual transgression. This sinful

choice is properly enough called indwelling sin. It is the latent,

standing, controlling preference of the mind and the cause of all the

outward and active life. It is not the choice of sin itself, distinctly

conceived of, or chosen as sin, but the choice of self-gratification,

which choice is sin.



Again: It should be remembered, that the physical depravity of our

race has much to do with our moral depravity. A diseased physical

system renders the appetites, passions, tempers, and propensities

more clamorous and despotic in their demands, and of course

constantly urging to selfishness, confirms and strengthens it. It should

be distinctly remembered that physical depravity has no moral

character in itself. But yet it is a source of fierce temptation to

selfishness. The human sensibility is, manifestly, deeply physically

depraved; and as sin, or moral depravity, consists in committing the

will to the gratification of the sensibility, its physical depravity will

mightily strengthen moral depravity. Moral depravity is then

universally owing to temptation. That is, the soul is tempted to

self-indulgence, and yields to the temptation, and this yielding, and not

the temptation, is sin or moral depravity. This is manifestly the way in

which Adam and Eve became morally depraved. They were tempted,

even by undepraved appetite, to prohibited indulgence, and were

overcome. The sin did not lie in the constitutional desire of food, or of

knowledge, nor in the excited state of these appetites or desires, but in

the consent of the will to prohibited indulgence. Just in the same way

all sinners become such, that is, they become morally depraved, by

yielding to temptation to self-gratification under some form. Indeed, it

is impossible that they should become morally depraved in any other

way. To deny this were to overlook the very nature of moral depravity.



To sum up the truth upon this subject in few words, I would say:



1. Moral depravity in our first parents was induced by temptation

addressed to the unperverted susceptibilities of their nature. When

these susceptibilities became strongly excited, they overcame the will;

that is, the human pair were over-persuaded, and fell under the

temptation. This has been repeatedly said, but needs repetition in a

summing up.



2. All moral depravity commences in substantially the same way. 

Proof:



(1.) The impulses of the sensibility are developed, gradually,

commencing from the birth, and depending on physical development

and growth.



(2.) The first acts of will are in obedience to these.



(3.) Self-gratification is the rule of action previous to the development

of reason.



(4.) No resistance is offered to the will's indulgence of appetite, until

a habit of self-indulgence is formed.



(5.) When reason affirms moral obligation, it finds the will in a state of

habitual and constant committal to the impulses of the sensibility.



(6.) The demands of the sensibility have become more and more

despotic every hour of indulgence.



(7.) In this state of things, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, the idea of

moral obligation will be but dimly developed.



(8.) The will of course rejects the bidding of reason, and cleaves to

self-indulgence.



(9.) This is the settling of a fundamental question. It is deciding in

favor of appetite, against the claims of conscience and of God.



(10.) Light once rejected, can be afterwards more easily resisted,

until it is nearly excluded altogether.



(11.) Selfishness confirms, and strengthens, and perpetuates itself

by a natural process. It grows with the sinner's growth, and

strengthens with his strength; and will do so for ever, unless overcome

by the Holy Spirit through the truth.



Remarks 



1. Adam, being the natural head of the race, would naturally, by the

wisest constitution of things, greatly affect for good or evil his whole

posterity.



2. His sin in many ways exposed his posterity to aggravated

temptation. Not only the physical constitution of all men, but all the

influences under which they first form their moral character, are widely

different from what they would have been, if sin had never been

introduced.



3. When selfishness is understood to be the whole of moral

depravity, its quo modo, or in what way it comes to exist, is manifest. 

Clear conceptions of the thing will instantly reveal the occasion and

manner.



4. The only difficulty in accounting for it, has been the false

assumption, that there must be, and is, something lying back of the

free actions of the will, which sustains to those actions the relation of a

cause, that is itself sinful.



5. If holy Adam, and holy angels could fall under temptations

addressed to their undepraved sensibility, how absurd it is to

conclude, that sin in those who are born with a physically depraved

constitution, cannot be accounted for, without ascribing it to original

sin, or to a nature that is in itself sinful.



6. Without divine illumination, the moral character will of course be

formed under the influence of the flesh. That is, the lower propensities

will of course influence the will, unless the reason be developed by the

Holy Spirit.



7. The dogma of constitutional moral depravity, is a part and parcel

of the doctrine of a necessitated will. It is a branch of a grossly false

and heathenish philosophy. How infinitely absurd, dangerous, and

unjust, then, to embody it in a standard of Christian doctrine, to give it

the place of an indispensable article of faith, and denounce all who will

not swallow its absurdities, as heretics!



8. We are unable to say precisely at what age infants become moral

agents, and of course how early they become sinners. Doubtless

there is much difference among children in this respect. Reason is

developed in one earlier than in another, according to the constitution

and circumstances.



A thorough consideration of the subject, will doubtless lead to the

conviction, that children become moral agents much earlier than is

generally supposed. The conditions of moral agency are, as has been

repeatedly said in former lectures, the possession of the powers of

moral agency, together with the development of the ideas of the good

or valuable, of moral obligation or oughtness of right and wrong of

praise and blameworthiness. I have endeavored to show, in former

lectures, that mental satisfaction, blessedness or happiness, is the

ultimate good. Satisfaction arising from the gratification of the

appetites, is one of the earliest experiences of human beings. This no

doubt suggests or develops, at a very early period, the idea of the

good or the valuable. The idea is doubtless developed, long before

the word that expresses it is understood. The child knows that

happiness is good, and seeks it in the form of self-gratification, long

before the terms that designate this state of mind are at all

understood. It knows that its own enjoyment is worth seeking, and

doubtless very early has the idea, that the enjoyment of others is worth

seeking, and affirms to itself, not in words, but in idea, that it ought to

please its parents and those around it. It knows, in fact, though

language is as yet unknown, that it loves to be gratified, and to be

happy, that it loves and seeks enjoyment for itself, and doubtless has

the idea that it ought not to displease and distress those around it, but

that it ought to endeavor to please and gratify them. This is probably

among the first ideas, if not the very first idea, of the pure reason that

is developed, that is, the idea of the good, the valuable, the desirable;

and the next must be that of oughtness, or of moral obligation, or of

right and wrong, etc. I say again, these ideas are, and must be

developed, before the signs or words that express them are at all

understood, and the words would never be understood except the idea

were first developed. We always find, at the earliest period at which

children can understand words, that they have the idea of obligation,

of right and wrong. As soon as these words are understood by them,

they recognize them as expressing ideas already in their own minds,

and which ideas they have had further back than they can remember. 

Some, and indeed most persons, seem to have the idea, that children

affirm themselves to be under moral obligation, before they have the

idea of the good; that they affirm their obligation to obey their parents

before they know, or have the idea of the good or of the valuable. But

this is, and must be a mistake. They may and do affirm obligation to

obey their parents, before they can express in language, and before

they would understand, a statement of the ground of their obligation. 

The idea, however, they have, and must have, or they could not affirm

obligation.



9. Why is sin so natural to mankind? Not because their nature is

itself sinful, but because the appetites and passions tend so strongly to

self-indulgence. These are temptations to sin, but sin itself consists

not in these appetites and propensities, but in the voluntary committal

of the will to their indulgence. This committal of the will is selfishness,

and when the will is once given up to sin, it is very natural to sin. The

will once committed to self-indulgence as its end, selfish actions are in

a sense spontaneous.



10. The constitution of a moral being as a whole, when all the

powers are developed, does not tend to sin, but strongly in an

opposite direction; as is manifest from the fact that when reason is

thoroughly developed by the Holy Spirit, it is more than a match for the

sensibility, and turns the heart to God. The difficulty is, that the

sensibility gets the start of reason, and engages the attention in

devising means of self-gratification, and thus retards, and in a great

measure prevents, the development of the ideas of the reason which

were designed to control the will. It is this morbid development that

the Holy Spirit is given to rectify, by so forcing truth upon the attention,

as to secure the development of the reason. By doing this, He brings

the will under the influence of truth. Our senses reveal to us the

objects correlated to our animal nature and propensities. The Holy

Spirit reveals God and the spiritual world, and all that class of objects

that are correlated to our higher nature, so as to give reason the

control of the will. This is regeneration and sanctification, as we shall

see in its proper place.

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LECTURE 25



ATONEMENT



We come now to the consideration of a very important feature of the

moral government of God; namely, the atonement. In discussing this

subject, I will:



Call attention to several well-established principles of government.



1. We have already seen that moral law is not founded in the mere

arbitrary will of God or of any other being, but that it has its foundation

in the nature and relations of moral agents, that it is that rule of action

or of willing which is imposed on them by the law of their own intellect.



2. As the will of no being can create moral law, so the will of no being

can repeal or alter moral law. It being just that rule of action that is

agreeable to the nature and relations of moral agents, it is as

immutable as those natures and relations.



3. There is a distinction between the letter and the spirit of moral law. 

The letter relates to the outward life or action; the spirit respects the

motive or intention from which the act should proceed. For example:

the spirit of the moral law requires disinterested benevolence, and is

all expressed in one word love. The letter of the law is found in the

commandments of the decalogue, and in divers other precepts relating

to outward acts.



4. To the letter of the law there may be many exceptions, but to the

spirit of moral law there can be no exception. That is, the spirit of the

moral law may sometimes admit and require, that the letter of the law

shall be disregarded or violated; but the spirit of the law ought never to

be disregarded or violated. For example: the letter of the law prohibits

all labor on the Sabbath day. But the spirit of the law often requires

labor on the Sabbath. The spirit of the law requires the exercise of

universal and perfect love or benevolence to God and man, and the

law of benevolence often requires that labor shall be done on the

Sabbath; as administering to the sick, relieving the poor, feeding

animals; and in short, whatever is plainly the work of necessity or

mercy, in such a sense that enlightened benevolence demands it, is

required by the spirit of moral law upon the Sabbath, as well as all

other days. This is expressly taught by Christ, both by precept and

example. So again, the letter of the law says, "The soul that sinneth, it

shall die" (Ezek. 18:20), but the spirit of the law admits and requires

that upon certain conditions, to be examined in their proper place, the

soul that sinneth shall live. The letter of the law is inexorable; it

condemns and sentences to death all violators of its precepts, without

regard to atonement or repentance. The spirit of moral law allows and

requires that upon condition of satisfaction being made to public

justice, and the return of the sinner to obedience, he shall live and not

die.



5. In establishing a government and promulgating law, the lawgiver is

always understood as pledging himself duly to administer the laws in

support of public order, and for the promotion of public morals, toward

the innocent with his favor and protection, and to punish the

disobedient with the loss of his protection and favor.



6. Laws are public property in which every subject of the government

has an interest. Every obedient subject of government is interested to

have law supported and obeyed, and wherever the law is violated,

every subject of the government is injured, and his rights are invaded;

and each and all have a right to expect the government duly to

execute the penalties of law when it is violated.



7. There is an important distinction between retributive and public

justice. Retributive justice consists in treating every subject of

government according to his character. It respects the intrinsic merit

or demerit of each individual, and deals with him accordingly. Public

justice, in its exercise, consists in the promotion and protection of the

public interests, by such legislation and such an administration of law,

as is demanded by the highest good of the public. It implies the

execution of the penalties of law where the precept is violated, unless

something else is done that will as effectually secure the public

interests. When this is done, public justice demands, that the

execution of the penalty shall be dispensed with by extending pardon

to the criminal. Retributive justice makes no exceptions, but punishes

without mercy in every instance of crime. Public justice makes

exceptions, as often as this is permitted or required by the public good. 

Public justice is identical with the spirit of the moral law, and in its

exercise, regards only the law. Retributive justice cleaves to the letter,

and makes no exceptions to the rule, "The soul that sinneth, it shall

die" (Ezek. 18:20).



8. The design of legal penalties is to secure obedience to the

precept. The same is also the reason for executing them when the

precept is violated. The sanctions are to be regarded as an

expression of the views of the lawgiver, in respect to the importance of

his law; and the execution of penalties is designed and calculated to

evince his sincerity in enacting, and his continued adherence to, and

determination to abide by, the principles of his government as

revealed in the law; his abhorrence of all crime; his regard to the public

interests; and his unalterable determination to carry out, support and

establish, the authority of his law.



9. It is a fact well established by the experience of all ages and

nations, that the exercise of mercy, in setting aside the execution of

penalties, is a matter of extreme delicacy and danger. The influence

of law,