LECTURE 30



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION



Wherein saints and sinners must differ.



1. Let it be distinctly remembered, that all unregenerate persons,

without exception, have one heart, that is, they are selfish. This is

their whole character. They are universally and only devoted to

self-gratification. Their unregenerate heart consists in this selfish

disposition, or in this selfish choice. This choice is the foundation of,

and the reason for, all their activity. One and the same ultimate

reason actuates them in all they do, and in all they omit, and that

reason is either presently or remotely, directly or indirectly, to gratify

themselves.



2. The regenerate heart is disinterested benevolence. In other

words, it is love to God and our neighbor. All regenerate hearts are

precisely similar. All true saints, whenever they have truly the heart of

the saints of God, are actuated by one and the same motive. They

have only one ultimate reason for all they do, and suffer, or omit. They

have one ultimate intention, one end. They live for one and the same

object, and that is the same end for which God lives.



3. The saint is governed by reason, the law of God, or the moral law;

in other words still, the law of disinterested and universal benevolence

is His law. This law is not only revealed and developed in his

intelligence, but it is written in his heart. So that the law of his intellect

is the law of his heart. He not only sees and acknowledges what he

ought to do and be, but he is conscious to himself, and gives evidence

to others, whether they receive it and are convinced by it or not, that

his heart, his will, or intention, is conformed to his convictions of duty. 

He sees the path of duty, and follows it. He knows what he ought to

will, intend, and do, and does it. Of this he is conscious. And of this

others may be satisfied, if they are observing, charitable, and candid.



4. The sinner is contrasted with this, in the most important and

fundamental respects. He is not governed by reason and principle,

but by feeling, desire, and impulse. Sometimes his feelings coincide

with the intelligence, and sometimes they do not. But when they do so

coincide, the will does not pursue its course out of respect or in

obedience to the law of the intelligence, but in obedience to the

impulse of the sensibility, which, for the time being, impels in the same

direction as does the law of the reason. But for the most part the

impulses of the sensibility incline him to worldly gratifications, and in

an opposite direction to that which the intelligence points out. This

leads him to a course of life that is too manifestly the opposite of

reason, to leave any room for doubt as to what his true character is.



5. The saint is justified, and he has the evidence of it in the peace of

his own mind. He is conscious of obeying the law of reason and of

love. Consequently he naturally has that kind and degree of peace

that flows from the harmony of his will with the law of his intelligence. 

He sometimes has conflicts with the impulses of feeling and desire. 

But unless he is overcome, these conflicts, though they may cause

him inwardly, and, perhaps audibly, to groan, do not interrupt his

peace. There are still the elements of peace within him. His heart and

conscience are at one, and while this is so, he has thus far the

evidence of justification in himself. That is, he knows that God cannot

condemn his present state. Conscious as he is of conformity of heart

to the moral law, he cannot but affirm to himself, that the Lawgiver is

pleased with his present attitude. But further, he has also within the

Spirit of God witnessing with his spirit, that he is a child of God,

forgiven, accepted, adopted. He feels the filial spirit drawing his heart

to exclaim, Father, Father. He is conscious that he pleases God, and

has God's smile of approbation.



He is at peace with himself, because he affirms his heart to be in

unison with the law of love. His conscience does not upbraid, but

smile. The harmony of his own being is a witness to himself, that this

is the state in which he was made to exist. He is at peace with God,

because he and God are pursuing precisely the same end, and by the

same means. There can be no collision, no controversy between

them. He is at peace with the universe, in the sense, that he has no

ill-will, and no malicious feelings or wish to gratify, in the injury of any

one of the creatures of God. He has no fear, but to sin against God. 

He is not influenced on the one hand by the fear of hell, nor on the

other by the hope of reward. He is not anxious about his own

salvation, but prayerfully and calmly leaves that question in the hands

of God, and concerns himself only to promote the highest glory of

God, and the good of being. "Being justified by faith, he has peace

with God through our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5:1). "There is now

no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after

the flesh, but after the Spirit" (Romans 8:1).



6. The sinner's experience is the opposite of this. He is under

condemnation, and seldom can so far deceive himself, even in his

most religious moods, as to imagine that he has a consciousness of

acceptance either with his own conscience or with God. There is

almost never a time in which he has not a greater or less degree of

restlessness and misgiving within. Even when he is most engaged in

religion, as he supposes, he finds himself dissatisfied with himself. 

Something is wrong. There is a struggle and a pang. He may not

exactly see where and what the difficulty is. He does not, after all,

obey reason and conscience, and is not governed by the law and will

of God. In not having the consciousness of this obedience, his

conscience does not smile. He sometimes feels deeply, and acts as

he feels, and is conscious of being sincere in the sense of feeling what

he says, and acting in obedience to deep feeling. But this does not

satisfy conscience. He is more or less wretched after all. He has not

true peace. Sometimes he has a self-righteous quiet and enjoyment. 

But this is neither peace of conscience nor peace with God. He, after

all, feels uneasy and condemned, notwithstanding all his feeling, and

zeal, and activity. They are not of the right kind. Hence they do not

satisfy the conscience. They do not meet the demands of his

intelligence. Conscience does not approve. He has not, after all, true

peace. He is not justified; he cannot be fully and permanently satisfied

that he is.



7. Saints are interested in, and sympathize with, every effort to

reform mankind, and promote the interests of truth and righteousness

in the earth. The good of being is the end for which the saint really

and truly lives. This is not merely held by him as a theory, as an

opinion, as a theological or philosophical speculation. It is in his heart,

and precisely for this reason he is a saint. He is a saint just because

the theory, which is lodged in the head of both saint and sinner, has

also a lodgment and reigning power in his heart, and consequently in

his life.



As saints supremely value the highest good of being, they will, and

must, take a deep interest in whatever is promotive of that end. 

Hence, their spirit is necessarily that of the reformer. To the universal

reformation of the world they stand committed. To this end they are

devoted. For this end they live, and move, and have their being. 

Every proposed reform interests them, and naturally leads them to

examine its claims. The fact is, they are studying and devising ways

and means to convert, sanctify, reform mankind. Being in this state of

mind, they are predisposed to lay hold on whatever gives promise of

good to man. True saints love reform. It is their business, their

profession, their life to promote it; consequently, they are ready to

examine the claims of any proposed reform; candid and self-denying,

and ready to be convinced, however much self-denial it may call them

to. They have actually rejected self-indulgence, as the end for which

they live, and are ready to sacrifice any form of self-indulgence, for the

sake of promoting the good of men and the glory of God. The saint is

truly and greatly desirous and in earnest, to reform all sin out of the

world, and just for this reason is ready to hail with joy, and to try

whatever reform seems, from the best light he can get, to bid fair to

put down sin, and the evils that are in the world. Even mistaken men,

who are honestly endeavoring to reform mankind, and denying their

appetites, as many have done in dietetic reform, are deserving of the

respect of their fellow men. Suppose their philosophy to be incorrect,

yet they have intended well. They have manifested a disposition to

deny themselves, for the purpose of promoting the good of others. 

They have been honest and zealous in this. Now no true saint can

feel or express contempt for such reformers, however much mistaken

they may be. No: his natural sentiments and feelings will be, and must

be, the reverse of contempt or censoriousness in respect to them. If

their mistake has been injurious, h may mourn over the evil, but will

not, cannot, severely judge the honest reformer. War, slavery,

licentiousness, and all such like evils and abominations, are

necessarily regarded by the saint as great and sore evils, and he longs

for their complete and final overthrow. It is impossible that a truly

benevolent mind should not thus regard these abominations of

desolation.



The saints in all ages have been reformers. I know it is said, that

neither prophets, Christ, nor apostles, nor primitive saints and martyrs

declaimed against war and slavery, etc. But they did. The entire

instructions of Christ, and of apostles and prophets, were directly

opposed to these and all other evils. If they did not come out against

certain legalized forms of sin, and denounce them by name, and

endeavor to array public sentiment against them, it is plainly because

they were, for the most part, employed in a preliminary work. To

introduce the gospel as a divine revelation; to set up and organize the

visible kingdom of God on earth; to lay a foundation for universal

reform, was rather their business, than the pushing forward of

particular branches of reform. The overthrow of state idolatry, the

great and universal sin of the world in that age; the labor of getting the

world and the governments of earth to tolerate and receive the gospel

as a revelation from the one only living and true God; the controversy

with the Jews, to overthrow their objections to Christianity; in short, the

great and indispensable and preliminary work of gaining for Christ and

His gospel a hearing, and an acknowledgment of its divinity, was

rather their work, the pushing of particular precepts and doctrines of

the gospel to their legitimate results and logical consequences. This

work once done, has left it for later saints to bring the particular truths,

precepts, and doctrines of the blessed gospel to bear down every form

of sin. Prophets, Christ, and His apostles, have left on the pages of

inspiration no dubious testimony against every form of sin. The spirit

of the whole Bible breathes from every page blasting and annihilation

upon every unholy abomination, while it smiles upon everything of

good report that promises blessings to man and glory to God. The

saint is not merely sometimes a reformer; he is always so.



8. The sinner is never a reformer in any proper sense of the word. 

He is selfish and never opposed to sin, or to any evil whatever, from

any such motive as renders him worthy the name of reformer. He

sometimes selfishly advocates and pushes certain outward reforms;

but as certain as it is that he is an unregenerate sinner, so certain is it,

that he is not endeavoring to reform sin out of the world from any

disinterested love to God or to man. Many considerations of a selfish

nature may engage him at times in certain branches of reform. 

Regard to his reputation may excite his zeal in such an enterprise. 

Self-righteous considerations may also lead him to enlist in the army of

reformers. His relation to particular forms of vice may influence him to

set his face against them. Constitutional temperament and tendencies

may lead to his engaging in certain reforms. For example, his

constitutional benevolence, as phrenologists call it, may be such that

from natural compassion he may engage in reforms. But this is only

giving way to an impulse of the sensibility, and it is not principle that

governs him. His natural conscientiousness may modify his outward

character, and lead him to take hold of some branches of reform. But

whatever other motives he may have, sure it is that he is not a

reformer; for he is a sinner, and it is absurd to say that a sinner is truly

engaged in opposing sin as sin. No, it is not sin that he is opposing,

but he is seeking to gratify an ambitious, a self-righteous, or some

other spirit, the gratification of which is selfishness.



But as a general thing, it is easy to distinguish sinners, or deceived

professors from saints by looking steadfastly at their temper and

deportment in their relations to reform. They are self-indulgent, and

just for the reason that they are devoted to self-indulgence. 

Sometimes their self-indulgent spirit takes on one type, and

sometimes another. Of course they need not be expected to ridicule

or oppose every branch of reform, just because it is not every reformer

that will rebuke their favorite indulgences, and call them to reform their

lives. But as every sinner has one or more particular form of

indulgence to which he is wedded, and as saints are devising and

pushing reforms in all directions, it is natural that some sinners should

manifest particular hostility to one reform, and some to another. 

Whenever a reform is proposed that would reform them out of their

favorite indulgences, they will either ridicule it, and those that propose

it, or storm and rail, or in some way oppose or wholly neglect it. Not

so, and so it cannot be, with a true saint. He has no indulgence that

he values when put in competition with the good of being. Nay, he

holds his all and his life at the disposal of the highest good. Has he, in

ignorance of the evils growing out of his course, used ardent spirits,

wine, tobacco, ale, or porter? Has he held slaves; been engaged in

any traffic that is found to be injurious; has he favored war through

ignorance; or, in short, has he committed any mistake whatever? Let

but a reformer come forth and propose to discuss the tendency of

such things; let the reformer bring forth his strong reasons; and, from

the very nature of true religion, the saint will listen with attention, weigh

with candor, and suffer himself to be carried by truth, heart, and hand,

and influence with the proposed reform, if it be worthy of support, how

much soever it conflict with his former habits. This must be true, if he

has a single eye to the good of being, which is the very characteristic

of a saint.



9. The true saint denies himself. Self-denial must be his

characteristic, just for the reason that regeneration implies this. 

Regeneration, as we have seen, consists in turning away the heart or

will from the supreme choice of self-gratification, to a choice of the

highest well-being of God and of the universe. This is denying self. 

This is abandoning self-indulgence, and pursuing or committing the

will, and the whole being to an opposite end. This is the dethroning of

self, and the enthroning of God in the heart. Self-denial does not

consist, as some seem to imagine, in acts of outward austerity, in an

ascetic and penance-doing course of starvation, and mere legal, and

outward retrenchment, in wearing a coat with one button, and in

similar acts of "will worship and voluntary humility, and neglecting the

body"; but self-denial consists in the actual and total renunciation of

selfishness in the heart. It consists in ceasing wholly to live for self,

and can be exercised just as truly upon a throne, surrounded with the

paraphernalia of royalty, as in a cottage of logs, or as in rags, and in

caves and dens of the earth.



The king upon his throne may live and reign to please himself. He

may surround himself with all that can minister to his pleasure, his

ambition, his pride, his lusts, and his power. He may live to and for

himself. Self-pleasing, self-gratification, self-aggrandizement, may be

the end for which he lives. This is selfishness. But he may also live

and reign for God, and for his people. That is, he may be as really

devoted to God, and render this as a service to God, as well as

anything else. No doubt his temptation is great; but, nevertheless, he

may be perfectly self-denying in all this. He may not do what he does

for his own sake, nor be what he is, nor possess what he possesses

for his own sake, but, accommodating his state and equipage to his

relations, he may be as truly self-denying as others in the humbler

walks of life. This is not an impossible, though, in all probability, a rare

case. A man may as truly be rich for God as poor for him, if his

relations and circumstances make it essential to his highest usefulness

that he should possess a large capital. He is in the way of great

temptation; but if this is plainly his duty, and submitted to for God and

the world, he may have grace to be entirely self-denying in these

circumstances, and all the more commendable, for standing fast under

these circumstances.



So a poor man may be poor from principle, or from necessity. He

may be submissive and happy in his poverty. He may deny himself

even the comfort of life, and do all this to promote the good of being,

or he may do it to promote his own interest, temporal or eternal, to

secure a reputation for piety, to appease a morbid conscience, to

appease his fears, or to secure the favor of God. In all things he may

be selfish. He may be happy in this, because it may be real

self-denial: or he may be murmuring at his poverty, may complain, and

be envious at others who are not poor. He may be censorious, and

think everybody proud and selfish who dresses better, or possesses a

better house and equipage than he does. He may set up his views as

a standard, and denounce as proud and selfish all who do not square

their lives by his rule. This is selfishness, and these manifestations

demonstrate the fact. A man may forego the use of a coat, or a cloak,

or a horse, or a carriage, or any and every comfort and convenience of

life, and all this may proceed from either a benevolent or a selfish state

of mind. If it be benevolence and true self-denial, it will be cheerfully

and happily submitted to, without murmuring and repining, without

censoriousness, and without envy towards others, without insisting

that others shall do and be, just what be does and is. He will allow the

judge his ermine, the king his robes of state, and the merchant his

capital, and the husbandman his fields and his flocks, and will see the

reasonableness and propriety of all this.



But if it be selfishness and the spirit of self-gratification instead of

self-denial, he will be ascetic, caustic, sour, ill-natured, unhappy,

severe, censorious, envious, and disposed to complain of, and pick at,

the extravagance and self-indulgence of others.



Especially does the true saint deny his appetites and passions. His

artificial appetites he denies absolutely, whenever his attention is

called to the fact and the nature of the indulgence. The Christian is

such just because he has become the master of his appetites and

passions, has denied them, and consecrated himself to God. The

sinner is a sinner just because his appetites and passions and the

impulses of his desires are his masters, and he bows down to them,

and serves them. They are his masters instead of his servants, as

they are made to be. He is consecrated to them and not to God. But

the saint has ceased to live to gratify his lusts. Has he been a

drunkard, a rake, a tobacco user? Has he been in self-indulgent

habits of any kind? He is reformed: old things are past away, and

behold all things are become new. Has he still any habit the character

of which he has either mistaken or not considered; such as smoking,

chewing, or snuffing tobacco, using injurious stimulants of any kind,

high and unwholesome living, extravagant dressing or equipage,

retiring late at night and rising late in the morning, eating too much, or

between meals, or in short, has there been any form of self-indulgence

about him whatever? Only let his attention be called to it, he will listen

with candor, be convinced by reasonable evidence, and renounce his

evil habits without conferring with flesh and blood. All this is implied in

regeneration, and must follow from its very nature. This also the Bible

everywhere affirms to be true of the saints. "They have crucified the

flesh with its affections and lusts" (Gal. 5:24). It should be forever

remembered, that a self-indulgent Christian is a contradiction. 

Self-indulgence and Christianity are terms of opposition.



10. The sinner does not deny himself. He may not gratify all his

desires, because the desires are often contradictory, and he must

deny one for the sake of indulging another. Avarice may be so strong

as to forbid his indulging in extravagance in eating, drinking, dressing,

or equipage. His love of reputation may be so strong as to prevent his

engaging in anything disgraceful, and so on.



But self-indulgence is his law notwithstanding. The fear of hell, or

his desire to be saved, may forbid his outward indulgence in any

known sin. But still he lives, and moves, and has his being only for the

sake of indulging himself. He may be a miser, and starve and freeze

himself, and deny himself the necessaries of life; yet self-indulgence is

his law. Some lusts he may and must control, as they may be

inconsistent with others. But others he does not control. He is a

slave. He bows down to his lusts and serves them. He is enslaved by

his propensities, so that he cannot overcome them. This

demonstrates that he is a sinner and unregenerate, whatever his

station and profession may be. One who cannot, because he will not,

conquer himself and his lusts this is the definition of an unregenerate

sinner. He is one over whom some form of desire, or lust, or appetite,

or passion has dominion. He cannot, or rather will not, overcome it. 

This one is just as certainly in sin, as that sin is sin.



11. The truly regenerate soul overcomes sin.



Let the Bible be heard upon this subject. "And hereby we do know

that we know Him, if we keep His commandments. He that saith I

know Him, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and the truth

is not in him" (1 John 2:3, 4). "And every man that hath this hope in

him purifieth himself, even as He is pure. Whosoever committeth sin

transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law. And

ye know that He was manifested to take away our sins: and in Him is

no sin. Whosoever abideth in Him sinneth not: whosoever sinneth

hath not seen Him, neither known Him. Little children, let no man

deceive you: he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as He is

righteous. He that committeth sin, is of the devil; for the devil sinneth

from the beginning. For this purpose the Son of God was manifested,

that He might destroy the works of the devil. Whosoever is born of

God doth not commit sin; for His seed remaineth in him: and he cannot

sin, because he is born of God. In this the children of God are

manifest, and the children of the devil; whosoever doth not

righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother" (1

John 3:3-10). "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of

God, and every one that loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is

begotten of Him. By this we know that we love the children of God,

when we love God and keep His commandments. For this is the love

of God, that we keep His commandments; and His commandments

are not grievous. For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the

world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith"

(1 John 5:1-4).



These passages, understood and pressed to the letter, would not

only teach, that all regenerate souls overcome and live without sin, but

also that sin is impossible to them. This last circumstance, as well as

other parts of scripture, forbid us to press this strong language to the

letter. But this much must be understood and admitted, that to

overcome sin is the rule with every one who is born of God, and that

sin is only the exception; that the regenerate habitually live without sin,

and fall into sin only at intervals, so few and far between, that in strong

language it may be said in truth they do not sin. This is surely the

least which can be meant by the spirit of these texts, not to press them

to the letter. And this is precisely consistent with many other passages

of scripture, several of which I have quoted; such as these: "Therefore,

if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed

away; behold, all things are become new" (2 Cor. 5:17). "For in Jesus

Christ, neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision; but

faith which worketh by love." (Gal. 6:6). "For in Christ Jesus neither

circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new

creature" (Gal. 6:15). "There is therefore now no condemnation to

them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after

the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me

free from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in

that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His own Son in the

likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the

righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the

flesh, but after the Spirit" (Romans 8:1-4). "What shall we say then? 

Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How

shall we that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not,

that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized

into His death? Therefore, we are buried with Him by baptism into

death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of

the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we

have been planted together in the likeness of His death, we shall be

also in the likeness of His resurrection: knowing this, that our old man

is crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that

henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from

sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live

with Him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no

more; death hath no more dominion over Him. For in that He died, He

died unto sin once: but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God. Likewise

reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto

God, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Let not sin therefore reign in you

mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. Neither yield

ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield

yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your

members as instruments of righteousness unto God. For sin shall not

have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law but under grace"

(Romans 6:1-14).



The fact is, if God is true, and the Bible is true, the truly regenerate

soul has overcome the world, the flesh, and Satan, and sin, and is a

conqueror, and more than a conqueror. He triumphs over temptation

as a general thing, and the triumphs of temptation over him are so far

between, that it is said of him in the living oracles, that he does not,

cannot sin. He is not a sinner, but a saint. He is sanctified; a holy

person; a child and son of God. If at any time he is overcome, it is

only to rise again, and soon return like the weeping prodigal. "The

steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord: and he delighteth in his

way. Though he fall he shall not be utterly cast down: for the Lord

upholdeth him with his hand" (Psalms 37:23, 24).



12. The sinner is the slave of sin. The seventh of Romans is his

experience in his best estate. When he has the most hope of himself,

and others have the most hope of his good estate, he goes no further

than to make and break resolutions. His life is but a death in sin. He

has not the victory. He sees the right, but does it not. Sin is his

master, to whom he yields himself a servant to obey. He only tries, as

he says, to forsake sin, but does not in fact forsake it, in his heart. 

And yet because he is convicted, and has desires, and forms

resolutions of amendment, he hopes he is regenerated. O, what a

horrible delusion! Stop short with conviction, with the hope that he is

already a Christian! Alas! How many are already in hell who have

stumbled at this stumbling stone!



13. The subject of regeneration may know, and if honest he must

know, for what end he lives. There is, perhaps, nothing of which he

may be more certain than of his regenerate or unregenerate state; and

if he will keep in mind what regeneration is, it would seem that he can

hardly mistake his own character, so far as to imagine himself to be

regenerate when he is not. The great difficulty that has been in the

way of the regenerate soul's knowing his regeneration, and has led to

so much doubt and embarrassment upon this subject, is that

regeneration has been regarded as belonging to the sensibility, and

hence the attention has been directed to the ever-fluctuating feelings

for evidence of the change. No wonder that this has led conscientious

souls into doubt and embarrassment. But let the subject of

regeneration be disenthralled from false philosophy, and let it be

known that the new heart consists in supreme disinterested

benevolence, or in entire consecration to God, and then who cannot

know for what end he lives, or what is the supreme preference or

intention of his soul? If men can settle any question whatever beyond

all doubt by an appeal to consciousness, it would seem that this must

be the question. Hence the Bible enjoins it as an imperative duty to

know ourselves, whether we are Christians. We are to know each

other by our fruits. This is expressly given in the Bible as the rule of

judgment in the case. The question is not so much, What are the

man's opinions?, but, What does he live for? Does he manifest a

charitable state of mind? Does he manifest the attributes of

benevolence in the various circumstances in which he is placed? O,

shall the folly of judging men more by their opinions and feelings, by

the tenor of their lives cease? It seems difficult to rid men of the

prejudice that religion consists in feelings and in experiences in which

they are altogether passive. Hence they are continually prone to

delusion upon the most momentous of all questions. Nothing can

break this spell but the steady and thorough inculcation of the truth, in

regard to the nature of regeneration.

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LECTURE 31



NATURAL ABILITY



We next proceed to the examination of the question of man's ability

or inability to obey the commandments of God. This certainly must be

a fundamental question in morals and religion; and as our views are

upon this subject, so, if we are consistent, must be our views of God,

of His moral government, and of every practical doctrine of morals and

religion. This is too obvious to require proof. The question of ability

has truly been a vexed question. In the discussion of it, I shall

consider the elder President Edwards as the representative of the

common Calvinistic view of this subject, because he has stated it more

clearly than any other Calvinistic author with whom I am acquainted. 

When, therefore, I speak of the Edwardean doctrine of ability and

inability, you will understand me to speak of the common view of

Calvinistic theological writers, as stated, summed up, and defended by

Edwards. In discussing this subject I will endeavor to show:



President Edwards' notion of natural ability.



Edwards considers freedom and ability as identical. He defines

freedom or liberty to consist in the power, opportunity, or advantage,

that any one has, to do as he pleases. "Or, in other words, his being

free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in

any respect as he wills." Works, vol. 2, page 38.



Again, page 39, he says, "One thing more I should observe

concerning what is vulgarly called liberty; namely, that power and

opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his

choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the

word anything of the cause of that choice; or at all considering how the

person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some

external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by

some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a

cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something

foregoing, or not and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing

and exerting his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary

and common notion of freedom." In the preceding paragraph, he

says, "There are two things contrary to what is called liberty in

common speech. One is, constraint; which is a person's being

necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will: the other is, restraint,

which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to

his will."



Power, ability, liberty, to do as you will, are synonymous with this

writer. The foregoing quotations, with many like passages that might

be quoted from the same author, show that natural liberty, or natural

ability, according to him, consists in the natural and established

connection between volition and its effects. Thus he says in another

place, "Men are justly said to be able to do what they can do, if they

will." His definition of natural ability, or natural liberty, as he frequently

calls it, wholly excludes the power to will, and includes only the power

or ability to execute our volitions. Thus it is evident, that natural ability,

according to him, respects external action only, and has nothing to do

with willing. When there is no restraint or hindrance to the execution

of volition, when there is nothing interposed to disturb and prevent the

natural and established result of our volitions, there is natural ability

according to this school. It should be distinctly understood, that

Edwards, and those of his school, hold that choices, volitions, and all

acts of will, are determined, not by the sovereign power of the agent,

but are caused by the objective motive, and that there is the same

connection, or a connection as certain and as unavoidable between

motive and choice, as between any physical cause and its effect: "the

difference being," according to him, "not in the nature of the

connection, but in the terms connected." Hence, according to his

view, natural liberty or ability cannot consist in the power of willing or of

choice, but must consist in the power to execute our choices or

volitions. Consequently, this class of philosophers define free or moral

agency to consist in the power to do as one wills, or power to execute

one's purposes, choices, or volitions. That this is a fundamentally

false definition of natural liberty or ability, and of free or moral agency,

we shall see in due time. It is also plain, that the natural ability or

liberty of Edwards and his school, has nothing to do with morality or

immorality. Sin and holiness, as we have seen in a former lecture, are

attributes of acts of will only. But this natural ability respects, as has

been said, outward or muscular action only. Let this be distinctly

borne in mind as we proceed.



This natural ability is no ability at all.



We know from consciousness that the will is the executive faculty,

and that we can do absolutely nothing without willing. The power or

ability to will is indispensable to our acting at all. If we have not the

power to will, we have not power or ability to do anything. All ability or

power to do resides in the will, and power to will is the necessary

condition of ability to do. In morals and religion, as we shall soon see,

the willing is the doing. The power to will is the condition of obligation

to do. Let us hear Edwards himself upon this subject. Vol. 2. p. 156,

he says, "The will itself, and not only those actions which are the

effects of the will, is the proper object of precept or command. That is,

such a state or acts of men's wills, are in many cases properly

required of them by commands; and not only those alterations in the

state of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. 

This is most manifest; for it is the mind only that is properly and

directly the subject of precepts or commands; that only being capable

of receiving or perceiving commands. The motions of the body are

matters of command only as they are subject to the soul, and

connected with its acts. But the soul has no other faculty whereby it

can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply

with any command, but the faculty of the will; and it is by this faculty

only that the soul can directly disobey or refuse compliance; for the

very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing,

rejecting, etc., are, according to the meaning of terms, nothing but

certain acts of will." Thus we see that Edwards himself held, that the

will is the executive faculty, and that the soul can do nothing except as

it wills to do it, and that for this reason a command to do is strictly a

command to will. We shall see by and by, that he held also that the

willing and the doing are identical, so far as moral obligation, morals,

and religion are concerned. For the present, it is enough to say,

whether Edwards or anybody else ever held it or not, that it is absurd

and sheer nonsense to talk of an ability to do when there is no ability

to will. Every one knows with intuitive certainty that he has no ability to

do what he is unable to will to do. It is, therefore, the vilest folly to talk

of a natural ability to do anything whatever, when we exclude from this

ability the power to will. If there is no ability to will, there is, and can 

be no ability to do; therefore, the natural ability of the Edwardean school

is no ability at all.



Let it be distinctly understood, that whatever Edwards held in

respect to the ability of man to do, ability to will entered not at all into

his idea and definition of natural ability or liberty. But according to him,

natural ability respects only the connection that is established by a law

of nature between volition and its sequents, excluding altogether the

inquiry how the volition comes to exist. This the foregoing quotations

abundantly show. Let the impression, then, be distinct, that the

Edwardean natural ability is no ability at all, and nothing but an empty

name, a metaphysico-theological fiction.



What constitutes natural inability according to this school.



Edwards, vol. 2. p. 35, says, "We are said to be naturally unable

to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most

commonly called nature, does not allow of it; or because of some

impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the

faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects." 

This quotation, together with much that might be quoted from this

author to the same effect, shows that natural inability, according to

him, consists in a want of power to execute our volitions. In the

absence of power to do as we will, if the willing exists and the effect

does not follow, it is only because we are unable to do as we will, and

this is natural inability. We are naturally unable, according to him, to

do what does not follow by a natural law from our volitions. If I will to

move my arm, and the muscles do not obey volition, I am naturally

unable to move my arm. So with anything else. Here let it be distinctly

observed, that natural inability, as well as natural ability, respects and

belongs only to outward action or doing. It has nothing to do with

ability to will. Whatever Edwards held respecting ability to will, which

will be shown in its proper place, I wish it to be distinctly understood

that his natural inability had nothing to do with willing, but only with the

effects of willing. When the natural effect of willing does not follow

volition, its cause, here is a proper natural inability.



This natural inability is no inability at all.



By this is intended that, so far as morals and religion are

concerned, the willing is the doing, and therefore where the willing

actually takes place, the real thing required or prohibited is already

done. Let us hear Edwards upon this subject. Vol. 2, p. 164, he says,

"If the will fully complies and the proposed effect does not prove,

according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the

man is perfectly excused; he has a natural inability to do the thing

required. For the will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be

directly and immediately required by command, and other things only

indirectly, as connected with the will. If, therefore, there be a full

compliance of will, the person has done his duty: and if other things do

not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not criminally owing

to him." Here, then, it is manifest, that the Edwardean notions of

natural ability and inability have no connection with moral law or moral

government, and, of course, with morals and religion. That the Bible

everywhere accounts the willing as the deed, is most manifest. Both

as it respects sin and holiness, if the required or prohibited act of the

will takes place, the moral law and the lawgiver regard the deed as

having been done, or the sin committed, whatever impediment may

have prevented the natural effect from following. Here, then, let it be

distinctly understood and remembered that Edwards' natural inability

is, so far as morals and religion are concerned, no inability at all. An

inability to execute our volitions, is in no case an inability to do our

whole duty, since moral obligation, and of course, duty, respect strictly

only acts of will. A natural inability must consist, as we shall see, in an

inability to will. It is truly amazing that Edwards could have written the

paragraph just quoted, and others to the same effect, without

perceiving the fallacy and absurdity of his speculation without seeing

that the ability or inability about which he was writing, had no

connection with morals or religion. How could he insist so largely that

moral obligation respects acts of will only, and yet spend so much time

in writing about an ability or inability to comply with moral obligation

that respects outward action exclusively? This, on the face of it, was

wholly irrelevant to the subject of morals and religion, upon which

subjects he was professedly writing.



Natural ability is identical with freedom or liberty of will.



It has been, I trust, abundantly shown in a former lecture, and is

admitted and insisted on by Edwards:



1. That moral obligation respects strictly only acts of will.



2. That the whole of moral obligation resolves itself into an

obligation to be disinterestedly benevolent, that is, to will the highest

good of being for its own sake.



3. That willing is the doing required by the true spirit of the moral

law. Ability, therefore, to will in accordance with the moral law, must

be natural ability to obey God. But:



4. This is and must be the only proper freedom of the will, so far as

morals and religion, or so far as moral law is concerned. That must

constitute true liberty of will that consists in the ability or power to will,

either in accordance with, or in opposition to the requirements of moral

law. Or in other words, true freedom or liberty of will must consist in

the power or ability to will in every instance either in accordance with,

or in opposition to, moral obligation. Observe, moral obligation

respects acts of will. What freedom or liberty of will can there be in

relation to moral obligation unless the will or the agent has power or

ability to act in conformity with moral obligation? To talk of a man's

being free to will, or having liberty to will, when he has not the power

or ability, is to talk nonsense. Edwards himself holds that ability to do,

is indispensable to liberty to do. But if ability to do be a sine qua non

of liberty to do, must not the same be true of willing? That is, must not

ability to will be essential to liberty to will? Natural ability and natural

liberty to will, must then be identical. Let this be distinctly

remembered, since many have scouted the doctrine of natural ability

to obey God, who have nevertheless been great sticklers for the

freedom of the will. In this they are greatly inconsistent. This ability is

called a natural ability, because it belongs to man as a moral agent, in

such a sense that without it he could not be a proper subject of

command, of reward or punishment. That is, without this liberty or

ability he could not be a moral agent, and a proper subject of moral

government. He must then either possess this power in himself as

essential to his own nature, or must possess power, or be able to avail

himself of power to will in every instance in accordance with moral

obligation. Whatever he can do, he can do only by willing; he must

therefore either possess the power in himself directly to will as God

commands, or he must be able by willing it to avail himself of power,

and to make himself willing. If he has power by nature to will directly

as God requires, or by willing to avail himself of power so to will, he is

naturally free and able to obey the commandments of God. Then let it

be borne distinctly in mind, that natural ability, about which so much

has been said, is nothing more nor less than the freedom or liberty of

the will of a moral agent. No man knows what he says or whereof he

affirms, who holds to the one and denies the other, for they are truly

and properly identical.



The human will is free, therefore men have power or ability to do all

their duty.



1. The moral government of God everywhere assumes and implies

the liberty of the human will, and the natural ability of men to obey

God. Every command, every threatening, every expostulation and

denunciation in the Bible implies and assumes this. Nor does the

Bible do violence to the human intelligence in this assumption; for:



2. The human mind necessarily assumes the freedom of the

human will as a first truth. First truths, let it be remembered, are those

that are necessarily assumed by every moral agent. They are

assumed always and necessarily by a law of the intelligence, although

they may seldom be the direct objects of thought or attention. It is a

universal law of the intelligence, to assume the truths of causality, the

existence and the infinity of space, the existence and infinity of

duration, and many other truths. These assumptions every moral

agent always and necessarily takes with him, whether these things are

matters of attention or not. And even should he deny any one or all of

these first truths, he knows them to be true notwithstanding, and

cannot but assume their truth in all his practical judgments. Thus,

should any one deny the law and the doctrine of causality, as some in

theory have done, he knows, and cannot but know, he assumes, and

cannot but assume, its truth at every moment. Without this

assumption he could not so much as intend, or think of doing, or of

any one else doing anything whatever. But a great part of his time, he

may not, and does not, make this law a distinct object of thought or

attention. Nor is he directly conscious of the assumption that there is

such a law. He acts always upon the assumption, and a great part of

his time is insensible of it. His whole activity is only the exercise of his

own causality, and a practical acknowledgment of the truth, which in

theory he may deny. Now just so it is with the freedom of the will, and

with natural ability. Did we not assume our own liberty and ability, we

should never think of attempting to do anything. We should not so

much as think of moral obligation, either as it respects ourselves or

others, unless we assumed the liberty of the human will. In all our

judgments respecting our own moral character and that of others, we

always and necessarily assume the liberty of the human will, or natural

ability to obey God. Although we may not be distinctly conscious of

this assumption, though we may seldom make the liberty of the human

will the subject of direct thought or attention, and even though we may

deny its reality, and strenuously endeavor to maintain the opposite,

we, nevertheless, in this very denial and endeavor, assume that we

are free. This truth never was, and never can be rejected in our

practical judgments. All men assume it. All men must assume it. 

Whenever they choose in one direction, they always assume, whether

conscious of the assumption or not, and cannot but assume, that they

have power to will in the opposite direction. Did they not assume this,

such a thing as election between two ways or objects would not be,

and could not be, so much as thought of. The very ideas of right and

wrong, of the praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness of human

beings, imply the assumption, on the part of those who have these

ideas, of the universal freedom of the human will, or of the natural

ability of men as moral agents to obey God. Were not this assumption

in the mind, it were impossible from its own nature and laws that it

should affirm moral obligation, right or wrong, praiseworthiness or

blameworthiness of men. I know that philosophers and theologians

have in theory denied the doctrine of natural ability or liberty, in the

sense in which I have defined it; and I know, too, that with all their

theorizing, they did assume, in common with all other men, that man is

free in the sense that he has liberty or power to will as God

commands. I know that, but for this assumption, the human mind

could no more predicate praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, right or

wrong of man, than it could of the motions of a windmill. Men have

often made the assumption in question without being aware of it, have

affirmed right and wrong of human willing without seeing and

understanding the conditions of this affirmation. But the fact is, that in

all cases the assumption has lain deep in the mind as a first truth, that

men are free in the sense of being naturally able to obey God: and this

assumption is a necessary condition of the affirmation that moral

character belongs to man.



What constitutes moral inability, according to Edwards and those

who hold with him.



I examine their views of moral inability first in order, because from

their views of moral inability we ascertain more clearly what are their

views of moral ability. Edwards regards moral ability and inability as

identical with moral necessity. Concerning moral necessity, he says,

vol. 2, pp. 32, 33, "And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that

necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such

moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, and the

connection which there is in many cases between these and such

certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense that I shall use the

phrase moral necessity in the following discourse. By natural

necessity, as applied to men, I mean such necessity as men are under

through the force of natural causes, as distinguished from what are

called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and

moral motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain

circumstances are the subjects of particular sensations by necessity. 

They feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects

presented before them in a clear light when their eyes are open: so

they assent to the truth of certain propositions as soon as the terms

are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white,

that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural

necessity men's bodies move downwards when there is nothing to

support them. But here several things may be noted concerning these

two kinds of necessity. 1. Moral necessity may be as absolute as

natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected

with its moral cause, natural effect is with its natural cause. Whether

the will is in every case necessarily determined by the strongest

motive, or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a

motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination or not; if

that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but

that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive

presented may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly

and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias

are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going

against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still

greater. And therefore if more were still added to their strength up to a

certain degree, it might make the difficulty so great that it would be

wholly impossible to surmount it, for this plain reason, because

whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount

difficulties, yet that power is not infinite, and so goes not beyond

certain limits. If a certain man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of

this kind, with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of

strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty, yet if the difficulty be

increased to thirty, or a hundred, or to a thousand degrees, and his

strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to

surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed that there may

be such a thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral

causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral

necessity." Page 35, he says: "What has been said of natural and

moral necessity may serve to explain what is intended by natural and

moral inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing when

we cannot do it if we will, because of some impeding defect or

obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of

understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral inability

consists not in any of these things, but either in a want of inclination, or

the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of

the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both

these may be resolved into one, and it may be said in one word that

moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For

when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a

defect of motives or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing

as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the

prevalence of a contrary inclination in such circumstances, and under

the influence of such views."



From these quotations, and much more that might be quoted to the

same purpose, it is plain that Edwards, as the representative of his

school, holds moral inability to consist, either in an existing choice or

attitude of the will opposed to that which is required by the law of God,

which inclination or choice is necessitated by motives in view of the

mind, or in the absence of such motives as are necessary to cause or

necessitate the state of choice required by the moral law, or to

overcome an opposing choice. Indeed he holds these two to be

identical. Observe, his words are, "Or these may be resolved into one,

and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in

opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will

or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives. It is the same

thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the

prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances and under

the influence of such views," that is, in the presence of such motives. 

If there is a present prevalent contrary inclination, it is, according to

him: 1. Because there are present certain reasons that necessitate this

contrary inclination; and 2. Because there are not sufficient motives

present to the mind to overcome these opposing motives and

inclination, and to necessitate the will to determine or choose in the

direction of the law of God. By inclination Edwards means choice or

volition, as is abundantly evident from what he all along says in this

connection. This no one will deny who is at all familiar with his

writings. It was the object of the treatise from which the above

quotations have been made, to maintain that the choice invariably is

as the greatest apparent good is. And by the greatest apparent good

he means, a sense of the most agreeable. By which he means, as he

says, that the sense of the most agreeable, and choice or volition, are

identical. Vol. 2, page 20, he says, "And therefore it must be true in

some sense, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good is. It

must be observed in what sense I use the term `good,' namely, as of

the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use

the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to

the mind." Again, pp. 21, 22, he says: "I have rather chosen to

express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent

good is, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say that the will is

determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most

agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind and the

mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech

be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action,

which is the immediate consequence of the mind's choice, is

determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice

itself." Thus it appears that the sense of the most agreeable, and

choice or volition, according to Edwards, are the same things. Indeed,

Edwards throughout confounds desire and volition, making them the

same thing. Edwards regarded the mind as possessing but two

primary faculties the will and the understanding. He confounded all

the states of the sensibility with acts of will. The strongest desire is

with him always identical with volition or choice, and not merely that

which determines choice. When there is a want of inclination or

desire, or the sense of the most agreeable, there is a moral inability

according to the Edwardean philosophy. This want of the strongest

desire, inclination, or sense of the most agreeable, is always owing; 1.

To the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite desire,

choice, etc. ; and 2. To the want of such objective motives as shall

awaken this required desire, or necessitate this inclination or sense of

the most agreeable. In other words, when volition or choice, in

consistency with the law of God, does not exist, it is, 1. Because an

opposite choice exists, and is necessitated by the presence of some

motive; and 2. For want of sufficiently strong objective motives to

necessitate the required choice or volition. Let it be distinctly

understood and remembered, that Edwards held that motive, and not

the agent, is the cause of all actions of the will. Will, with him, is

always determined in its choice by motives as really as physical effects

are produced by their causes. The difference with him in the

connection of moral and physical causes and effects "lies not in the

nature of the connection, but in the terms connected."



"That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently (by

what has already been proved) has a necessary connection with its

cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and

consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is

excited by some motive, which is manifest; because, if the mind, in

willing after the manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement,

then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it

aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it

does not go after anything, or exert any inclination or preference

towards anything; which brings the matter to a contradiction; because

for the mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an

act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.



"But if every act of the will is excited by a motive, then that motive

is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by motives,

then motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the

same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of

the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do

nothing, as motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so

much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the

notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence

of something else.



"And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they

are necessarily connected with their motives; every effect and event

being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is

the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest that

volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the

will." Vol. 2, pp. 86, 87. Moral inability, then, according to this school,

consists in a want of inclination, desire, or sense of the most

agreeable, or the strength of an opposite desire or sense of the most

agreeable. This want of inclination, etc., or this opposing inclination,

etc., are identical with an opposing choice or volition. This opposing

choice or inclination, or this want of the required choice, inclination, or

sense of the most agreeable is owing, according to Edwards, 1. To the

presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposing choice; and

2. To the absence of sufficient motives to beget or necessitate them. 

Here then we have the philosophy of this school. The will or agent is

unable to choose as God requires in all cases, when, 1. There are

present such motives as to necessitate an opposite choice; and, 2.

When there is not such a motive or such motives in the view of the

mind, as to determine or necessitate the required choice or volition;

that is, to awaken a desire, or to create an inclination or sense of the

agreeable stronger than any existing and opposing desire, inclination,

or sense of agreeable. This is the moral inability of the Edwardeans.



Their moral inability to obey God consists in real disobedience and

a natural inability to obey.



1. If we understand Edwardeans to mean that moral inability

consists:



(1.) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite

choice; and:



(2.) In the want or absence of sufficient motives to necessitate

choice or volition, or, which is the same thing, a sense of the most

agreeable, or an inclination, then their moral inability is a proper

natural inability. Edwards says, he "calls it a moral inability, because it

is an inability of will." But by his own showing, the will is the only

executive faculty. Whatever a man can do at all, he can accomplish

by willing, and whatever he cannot accomplish by willing he cannot

accomplish at all. An inability to will then must be a natural inability. 

We are, by nature, unable to do what we are unable to will to do. 

Besides, according to Edwards, moral obligation respects strictly only

acts of will, and willing is the doing that is prohibited or required by the

moral law. To be unable to will then, is to be unable to do. To be

unable to will as God requires, is to be unable to do what He requires,

and this surely is a proper, and the only proper natural inability.



2. But if we are to understand this school, as maintaining that moral

inability to obey God, consists in a want of the inclination, choice,

desire, or sense of the most agreeable that God requires, or in an

inclination or existing choice, volition, or sense of the most agreeable,

which is opposed to the requirement of God, this surely is really

identical with disobedience, and their moral inability to obey consists in

disobedience. For, be it distinctly remembered, that Edwards holds,

as we have seen, that obedience and disobedience, properly

speaking, can be predicated only of acts of will. If the required state of

the will exists, there is obedience. If it does not exist, there is

disobedience. Therefore, by his own admission and express holding,

if by moral inability we are to understand a state of the will not

conformed, or, which is the same thing, opposed to the law and will of

God, this moral inability is nothing else than disobedience to God. A

moral inability to obey is identical with disobedience. It is not merely

the cause of future or present disobedience, but really constitutes the

whole of present disobedience.



3. But suppose that we understand his moral inability to consist

both in the want of an inclination, choice, volition, etc., or in the

existence of an opposing state of the will, and also:



(1.) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite

choice, and:



(2.) In the want of sufficient motives to overcome the opposing

state, and necessitate the required choice, volition, etc., then his views

stand thus: moral inability to choose as God commands, consists in

the want of this choice, or in the existence of an opposite choice,

which want of choice, or, which is the same thing with him, which

opposite choice is caused:



(a.) By the presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposite

choice, and:



(b.) By the absence of such motives as would necessitate the

required choice. Understand him which way you will, his moral

inability is real disobedience, and is in the highest sense a proper

natural inability to obey. The cause of choice or volition he always

seeks, and thinks or assumes that he finds, in the objective motive,

and never for once ascribes it to the sovereignty or freedom of the

agent. Choice or volition is an event, and must have some cause. He

assumes that the objective motive was the cause, when, as

consciousness testifies, the agent is himself the cause. Here is the

great error of Edwards. Edwards assumed that no agent whatever,

not even God Himself, possesses a power of self determination, that

the will of God and of all moral agents is determined, not by

themselves, but by an objective motive. If they will in one direction or

another, it is not from any free and sovereign self-determination in

view of motives, but because the motives or inducements present to

the mind, inevitably produce or necessitate the sense of the most

agreeable, or choice. If this is not fatalism or natural necessity, what

is?



This pretended distinction between natural and moral inability is

nonsensical.



What does it amount to? Why this:



1. This natural inability is an inability to do as we will, or to execute

our volitions.



2. This moral inability is an inability to will.



3. This moral inability is the only natural inability that has, or can

have, anything to do with duty, or with morality and religion; or, as has

been shown:



4. It consists in disobedience itself. Present moral inability to obey

is identical with present disobedience, with a natural inability to obey! 

It is amazing to see how so great and good a man could involve

himself in a metaphysical fog, and bewilder himself and his readers to

such a degree, that an absolutely senseless distinction should pass

into the current phraseology, philosophy, and theology of the church,

and a score of theological dogmas be built upon the assumption of its

truth. This nonsensical distinction has been in the mouth of the

Edwardean school of theologians, from Edwards' day to the present. 

Both saints and sinners have been bewildered, and, I must say,

abused by it. Men have been told that they are as really unable to will

as God directs, as they were to create themselves; and when it is

replied that this inability excuses the sinner, we are directly silenced by

the assertion, that this is only a moral inability, or an inability of will,

and therefore, that it is so far from excusing the sinner, that it

constitutes the very ground, and substance, and whole of his guilt. 

Indeed! Men are under moral obligation only to will as God directs. 

But an inability thus to will, consisting in the absence of such motives

as would necessitate the required choice, or the presence of such

motives as to necessitate an opposite choice, is a moral inability, and

really constitutes the sinner worthy of an "exceeding great and eternal

weight" of damnation! Ridiculous! Edwards I revere; his blunders I

deplore. I speak thus of this Treatise on the Will, because, while it

abounds with unwarrantable assumptions, distinctions without a

difference, and metaphysical subtleties, it has been adopted as the

text-book of a multitude of what are called Calvinistic divines for scores

of years. It has bewildered the head, and greatly embarrassed the

heart and the action of the church of God. It is time, high time, that its

errors should be exposed, and so exploded, that such phraseology

should be laid aside, and the ideas which these words represent should

cease to be entertained.



What constitutes moral ability according to this school?



It is of course the opposite of moral inability. Moral ability,

according to them, consists in willingness, with the cause of it. That is,

moral ability to obey God consists in that inclination, desire, choice,

volition, or sense of the most agreeable, which God requires together

with its cause. Or it consists in the presence of such motives as do

actually necessitate the above-named state or determination of the

will. Or, more strictly, it consists in this state caused by the presence

of these motives. This is as exact a statement of their views as I can

make. According to this, a man is morally able to do as he does, and

is necessitated to do, or, he is morally able to will as he does will, and

as he cannot help willing. He is morally able to will in this manner,

simply and only because he is caused thus to will by the presence of

such motives as are, according to them, "indissolubly connected" with

such a willing by a law of nature and necessity. But this conducts us

to the conclusion:



Their moral ability to obey God is nothing else than real obedience

and a natural inability to disobey.



Strictly, this moral ability includes both the state of will required by

the law of God, and also the cause of this state, to wit, the presence of

such motives as necessitate the inclination, choice, volition, or sense

of the most agreeable, that God requires. The agent is able thus to

will because he is caused thus to will. Or more strictly, his ability, and

his inclination or willing, are identical. Or still further, according to

Edwards, his moral ability thus to will and his thus willing, and the

presence of the motives that cause this willing, are identical. This is a

sublime discovery in philosophy; a most transcendental speculation! I

would not treat these notions as ridiculous, were they not truly so, or if

I could treat them in any other manner, and still do them anything like

justice. If, where the theory is plainly stated, it appears ridiculous, the

fault is not in me, but in the theory itself. I know it is trying to you, as it

is to me, to connect anything ridiculous with so great and so revered a

name as that of President Edwards. But if a blunder of his has

entailed perplexity and error on the church, surely his great and good

soul would now thank the hand that should blot out the error from

under heaven.



Thus, when closely examined, this long established and venerated

fog-bank vanishes away; and this famed distinction between moral

and natural ability and inability, is found to be "a thing of nought"

(Isaiah 29:21).



I will state what I consider to be the fundamental errors of Edwards

and his school upon the subject of ability.



1. He denied that moral agents are the causes of their own actions. 

He started, of course, with the just assumption, that every event is an

effect, and must have some cause. The choices and volitions of moral

agents are effects of some cause. What is that cause? He assumed

that every act of will must have been caused by a preceding one, or by

the objective motive. By the reductio ad absurdum, he easily showed

the absurdity of the first hypothesis, and consequently assumed the

truth of the last. But how does he know that the sovereign power of

the agent is not the cause? His argument against self-determination

amounts to nothing; for it is, in fact, only a begging of the whole

question. If we are conscious of anything, we are of the affirmation

that we do, in fact, originate our own choices and volitions. Edwards,

as really as any other man, believed himself to originate and be the

proper cause of his own volitions. In his practical judgment he

assumed his own causality, and the proper causality of all moral

agents, or he never could have had so much as a conception of moral

agency and accountability. But in theory, he adopted the capital error

of denying the proper causality of moral agents. This error is

fundamental. Every definition of a moral agent that denies or

overlooks, his proper causality is radically defective. It drops out of the

definition the very element that we necessarily affirm to be essential to

liberty and accountability. Denying, as he did, the proper causality of

moral agents, he was driven to give a false definition of free agency,

as has been shown. Edwards rightly regarded the choices and

volitions of moral agents as effects, but he looks in the wrong direction

for the cause. Instead of heeding the affirmation of his own mind that

causality, or the power of self-determination, is a qua non of moral

agency, he assumed, in theorizing, the direct opposite, and sought for

the cause of choice and volition out of the agent, and in the objective

motive; thus, in fact, denying the validity of the testimony of the pure

reason, and reducing moral agents to mere machines. No wonder that

so capital an error, and defended with so much ability, should have led

one of his own sons into skepticism. But the piety of the president was

stronger than even his powerful logic. Assuming a false major

premise, his straightforward logic conducted him to the dogma of a

universal necessity. But his well-developed reason, and deep piety of

heart, controlled his practical judgment, so that few men have

practically held the doctrines of accountability and retribution with a

firmer grasp.



2. Edwards adopted the Lockean philosophy. He regarded the

mind as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and

the will. He considered all the desires, emotions, affections, appetites,

and passions as voluntary, and as really consisting in acts of will. This

confounding of the states of the sensibility with acts of the will, I regard

as another fundamental error of his whole system of philosophy, so far

as it respects the liberty of the will, or the doctrine of ability. Being

conscious that the emotions, which he calls affections, the desires, the

appetites and passions, were so correlated to their appropriate

objects, that they are excited by the presence or contemplation of

them, and assuming them to be voluntary states of mind, or actions of

the will, he very naturally, and with this assumption, necessarily and

justly, concluded, that the will was governed or decided by the

objective motive. Assuming as he did that the mind has but two

faculties, understanding and will, and that every state of feeling and of

mind that did not belong to the understanding, must be a voluntary

state or act of will, and being conscious that his feelings, desires,

affections, appetites and passions, were excited by the contemplation

of their correlated objects, he could consistently come to no other

conclusion than that the will is determined by motives, and that choice

always is as the most agreeable is.



I will now present another scheme of inability and its philosophy.



1. This philosophy properly distinguishes between the will and the

sensibility. It regards the mind as possessing three primary

departments, powers, or susceptibilities, the intellect, the sensibility,

and the will. It does not always call these departments or

susceptibilities by these names, but if I understand them, the abetters

of this philosophy hold to their existence, by whatever name they may

call them.



2. This philosophy also holds, that the states of the intellect and of

the sensibility are passive and involuntary.



3. It holds that freedom of will is a condition of moral agency.



4. It also teaches that the will is free, and consequently that man is

a free moral agent.



5. It teaches that the will controls the outward life and the attention

of the intellect, directly, and many of the emotions, desires, affections,

appetites, and passions, or many states of the sensibility, indirectly.



6. It teaches that men have ability to obey God so far as acts of will

are concerned, and also so far as those acts and states of mind are

concerned that are under the direct or indirect control of the will.



7. But it holds that moral obligation may, and in the case of man at

least, does extend beyond moral agency and beyond the sphere of

ability; that ability or freedom of will is essential to moral agency, but

that freedom of will or moral agency does not limit moral obligation;

that moral agency and moral obligation are not coextensive;

consequently that moral obligation is not limited by ability or by moral

agency.



8. This philosophy asserts that moral obligation extends to those

states of mind that lie wholly beyond or without the sphere or control of

the will; that it extends not merely to voluntary acts and states,

together with all acts and states that come within the direct or indirect

control of the will but, as was said, it insists that those mental states

that lie wholly beyond the will's direct or indirect control, come within

the pale of moral legislation and obligation: and that therefore

obligation is not limited by ability.



9. This philosophy seems to have been invented to reconcile the

doctrine of original sin, in the sense of a sinful nature, or of

constitutional moral depravity, with moral obligation. Assuming that

original sin in this sense is a doctrine of divine revelation, it takes the

bold and uncompromising ground already stated, namely, that moral

obligation is not merely coextensive with moral agency and ability, but

extends beyond both into the region of those mental states that lie

entirely without the will's direct or indirect control.



10. This bold assertion the abetters of this philosophy attempt to

support by an appeal to the necessary convictions of men and to the

authority of the Bible. They allege that the instinctive judgments of

men, as well as the Bible, everywhere assume and affirm moral

obligation and moral character of the class of mental states in

question.



11. They admit that a physical inability is a bar to or inconsistent

with moral obligation: but they of course deny that the inability to which

they hold is physical.



This brings us to a brief consideration of the claims of this

philosophy of inability.



1. It is based upon a petition principii, or a begging of the question. 

It assumes that the instinctive or irresistible and universal judgments of

men, together with the Bible, assert and assume that moral obligation

and moral character extend to the states of mind in question. It is

admitted that the teachings of the Bible are to be relied upon. It is also

admitted that the first truths of reason, or what this philosophy calls the

instinctive and necessary judgments of all men, must be true. But it is

not admitted that the assertion in question is a doctrine of the Bible or

a first truth of reason. On the contrary both are denied. It is denied, at

least by me, that either reason or divine revelation affirms moral

obligation or moral character of any state of mind, that lies wholly

beyond both the direct and the indirect control of the will. Now this

philosophy must not be allowed to beg the question in debate. Let it

be shown, if it can be, that the alleged truth is either a doctrine of the

Bible or a first truth of reason. Both reason and revelation do assert

and assume, that moral obligation and moral character extend to acts

of will, and to all those outward acts or mental states that lie within its

direct or indirect control. "But further these deponents say not." Men

are conscious of moral obligation in respect to these acts and states of

mind, and of guilt when they fail, in these respects, to comply with

moral obligation. But who ever blamed himself for pain, when, without

his fault, he received a blow, or was seized with the toothache, or a fit

of bilious colic?



2. Let us inquire into the nature of this inability. Observe, it is

admitted by this school that a physical inability is inconsistent with

moral obligation in other words, that physical ability is a condition of

moral obligation. But what is a physical inability? The primary

definition of the adjective physical, given by Webster, is, "pertaining to

nature, or natural objects." A physical inability then, in the primary

sense of the term physical, is an inability of nature. It may be either a

material or a mental inability; that is, it may be either an inability of

body or mind. It is admitted by the school whose views we are

canvassing, that all human causality or ability resides in the will, and

therefore that there is a proper inability of nature to perform anything

that does not come within the sphere of the direct or indirect causality

of, or control of the will. It is plain, therefore, that the inability for which

they contend must be a proper natural inability, or inability of nature. 

This they fully admit and maintain. But this they do not call a physical

inability. But why do they not? Why, simply because it would, by their

own admissions, overthrow their favorite position. They seem to

assume that a physical inability must be a material inability. But where

is the authority for such an assumption? There is no authority for it. A

proper inability of nature must be a physical inability, as opposed to

moral inability, or there is no meaning in language. It matters not at all

whether the inability belongs to the material organism, or to the mind. 

If it be constitutional, and properly an inability of nature, it is nonsense

to deny that this is a physical inability, or to maintain that it can be

consistent with moral obligation. It is in vain to reply that this inability,

though a real inability of nature, is not physical but moral, because a

sinful inability. This is another begging of the question.



The school whose views I am examining, maintain, that this

inability is founded in the first sin of Adam. His first sin plunged

himself and his posterity, descending from him by a natural law, into a

total inability of nature to render any obedience to God. This first sin

of Adam entailed a nature on all his posterity "wholly sinful in every

faculty and part of soul and body." This constitutional sinfulness that

belongs to every faculty and part of soul and body, constitutes the

inability of which we are treating. But mark, it is not physical inability,

because it is a sinful inability! Important theological distinction! As

truly wonderful, surely, as any of the subtleties of the Jesuits. But if

this inability is sinful, it is important to inquire, Whose sin is it? Who is

to blame for it? Why to be sure, we are told that it is the sin of him

upon whom it is thus entailed by the natural law of descent from parent

to child without his knowledge or consent. This sinfulness of nature,

entirely irrespective of, and previous to any actual transgression,

renders its possessor worthy of and exposed to the wrath and curse of

God for ever. This sinfulness, observe, is transmitted by a natural or

physical law from Adam, but it is not a physical inability. It is

something that inheres in, and belongs to every faculty and part of

soul and body. It is transmitted by a physical law from parent to child. 

It is, therefore, and must be a physical thing. But yet we are told that it

cannot be a physical inability, because first, it is sinful, or sin itself;

and, secondly, because a physical inability is a bar to, or inconsistent

with, moral obligation. Here, then, we have their reasons for not

admitting this to be a physical inability. It would in this case render

moral obligation an impossibility; and, besides, if a bar to moral

obligation, it could not be sinful. But it is sinful, it is said, therefore it

cannot be physical. But how do we know that it is sinful? Why, we are

told, that the instinctive judgments f men, and the Bible everywhere

affirm and assume it. We are told, that both the instinctive judgments

of men and the Bible affirm and assume, both the inability in question

and the sinfulness of it: "that we ought to be able, but are not"; that is,

that we are so much to blame for this inability of nature entailed upon

us without our knowledge or consent, by a physical necessity, as to

deserve the wrath and curse of God for ever. We are under a moral

obligation not to have this sinful nature. We deserve damnation for

having it. To be sure, we are entirely unable to put it away, and had

no agency whatever in its existence. But what of that? We are told,

that "moral obligation is not limited by ability"; that our being as unable

to change our nature as we are to create a world, is no reason why we

should not be under obligation to do it, since "moral obligation does

not imply ability of any kind to do what we are under obligation to do!" 

I was about to expose the folly and absurdity of these assertions, but

hush! It is not allowable, we are told, to reason on this subject. We

shall deceive ourselves if we listen to the "miserable logic of our

understandings." We must fall back, then, upon the intuitive

affirmations of reason and the Bible. Here, then, we are willing to

lodge our appeal. The Bible defines sin to be a transgression of the

law. What law have we violated in inheriting this nature? What law

requires us to have a different nature from that which we possess? 

Does reason affirm that we are deserving of the wrath and curse of

God for ever, for inheriting from Adam a sinful nature?



What law of reason have we transgressed in inheriting this nature? 

Reason cannot condemn us, unless we have violated some law which

it can recognize as such. Reason indignantly rebukes such nonsense. 

Does the Bible hold us responsible for impossibilities? Does it require

of us what we cannot do by willing to do it? Nay, verily; but it

expressly affirms, that "if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted

according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not" (2

Cor. 8:12). The plain meaning of this passage is, that if one wills as

God directs, he has thereby met all his obligation; that he has done all

that is naturally possible to him, and therefore nothing more is

required. In this passage, the Bible expressly limits obligation by

ability. This we have repeatedly seen in former lectures. The law

also, as we have formerly seen, limits obligation by ability. It requires

only that we should love the Lord with all our strength, that is, with all

our ability, and our neighbor as ourselves.



Does reason hold us responsible for impossibilities, or affirm our

obligation to do, or be, what it is impossible for us to do and be? No

indeed! Reason never did and never can condemn us for our nature,

and hold us worthy of the wrath and curse of God for possessing it. 

Nothing is more shocking and revolting to reason, than such

assumptions as are made by the philosophy in question. This every

man's consciousness must testify.



But is it not true that some, at least, do intelligently condemn

themselves for their nature, and adjudge themselves to be worthy of

the wrath and curse of God for ever for its sinfulness? The framers of

the Westminster Confession of Faith made this affirmation in words, at

least; whether intelligently or unintelligently, we are left to inquire. The

reason of a moral agent condemning himself, and adjudging himself

worthy of the wrath and curse of God for ever, for possessing a nature

entailed on him by a natural law, without his knowledge or consent!

This can never be.



But is it not true, as is affirmed, that men instinctively and

necessarily affirm their obligation to be able to obey God, while they at

the same time affirm that they are not able? I answer, no. They affirm

themselves to be under obligation simply, and only, because deeply in

their inward being lies the assumption that they are able to comply

with the requirements of God. They are conscious of ability to will, and

of power to control their outward life directly, and the states of the

intellect and of their sensibility, either directly or indirectly, by willing. 

Upon this consciousness they found the affirmation of obligation, and

of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness in respect to these acts and

states of mind. But for the consciousness of ability, no affirmation of

moral obligation, or of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, were

possible.



But do not those who affirm both their inability and their obligation,

deceive themselves? I answer, yes. It is common for persons to

overlook assumptions that lie, so to speak, at the bottom of their

minds. This has been noticed in former lectures, and need not be

here repeated. It is true indeed that God requires of men, especially

under the gospel, what they are unable to do directly in their own

strength. Or more strictly speaking, He requires them to lay hold on

His strength, or to avail themselves of His grace, as the condition of

being what He requires them to be. With strict propriety, it cannot be

said that in this, or in any case, He requires directly any more than we

are able directly to do. The direct requirement in the case under

consideration, is to avail ourselves of, or to lay hold upon His strength. 

This we have power to do. He requires us to lay hold upon His grace

and strength, and thereby to rise to a higher knowledge of Himself,

and to a consequent higher state of holiness than would be otherwise

possible to us. The direct requirement is to believe, or to lay hold

upon His strength, or to receive the Holy Spirit, or Christ, who stands

at the door, and knocks, and waits for admission. The indirect

requirement is to rise to a degree of knowledge of God, and to spiritual

attainments that are impossible to us in our own strength. We have

ability to obey the direct command directly, and the indirect command

indirectly. That is, we are able by virtue of our nature, together with

the proffered grace of the Holy Spirit, to comply with all the

requirements of God. So that in fact there is no proper inability about

it.



But are not men often conscious of there being much difficulty in

the way of rendering to God all that we affirm ourselves under

obligation to render? I answer, yes. But strictly speaking, they must

admit their direct or indirect ability, as a condition of affirming their

obligation. This difficulty, arising out of their physical depravity, and

the power of temptation from without, is the foundation or cause of the

spiritual warfare of which the Scriptures speak, and of which all

Christians are conscious. But the Bible abundantly teaches, that

through grace we are able to be more than conquerors. If we are able

to be this through grace, we are able to avail ourselves of the

provisions of grace, so that there is no proper inability in the case. 

However great the difficulties may be, we are able through Christ to

overcome them all. This we must and do assume as the condition of

the affirmation of obligation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 32



GRACIOUS ABILITY



Grace is unmerited favor. Its exercise consists in bestowing that

which, without a violation of justice, might be withheld.



Ability to obey God, as we have seen, is the possession of power

adequate to the performance of that which is required. If, then, the

terms are used in the proper sense, by a gracious ability must be

intended that the power which men at present possess to obey the

commands of God, is a gift of grace relatively to the command; that is,

the bestowment of power adequate to the performance of the thing

required, is a matter of grace as opposed to justice.



I will show what is intended by the term gracious ability.



The abettors of this scheme hold that by the first sin of Adam, he,

together with all his posterity, lost all natural power and all ability of

every kind to obey God; that therefore they were, as a race, wholly

unable to obey the moral law, or to render to God any acceptable

service whatever; that is, that they became, as a consequence of the

sin of Adam, wholly unable to use the powers of nature in any other

way than to sin. They were able to sin or to disobey God, but entirely

unable to obey Him; that they did not lose all power to act, but that

they had power to act only in one direction, that is, in opposition to the

will and law of God. By a gracious ability they intend, that in

consequence of the atonement of Christ, God has graciously restored

to man ability to accept the terms of mercy, or to fulfil the conditions of

acceptance with God; in other words, that by the gracious aid of the

Holy Spirit which, upon condition of the atonement, God has given to

every member of the human family, all men are endowed with a

gracious ability to obey God. By a gracious ability is intended, then,

that ability or power to obey God, which all men now possess, not by

virtue of their own nature or constitutional powers, but by virtue of the

indwelling and gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, gratuitously

bestowed upon man in consequence of the atonement of Christ. The

inability, or total loss of all natural power to obey God into which men

as a race fell by the first sin of Adam, they call original sin; perhaps

more strictly, this inability is a consequence of that original sin into

which man fell; which original sin itself consisted in the total corruption

of man's whole nature. They hold, that by the atonement Christ made

satisfaction for original sin, in such a sense that the inability resulting

from it is removed, and that now men are by gracious aid able to obey

and accept the terms of salvation. That is, they are able to repent and

believe the gospel. In short, they are able, by virtue of this gracious

ability, to do their duty, or to obey God. This, if I understand these

theologians, is a fair statement of their doctrine of gracious ability.



This doctrine of a gracious ability is an absurdity.



The question is not whether, as a matter of fact, men ever do obey

God without the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. I hold that they

do not. So the fact of the Holy Spirit's gracious influence being

exerted in every case of human obedience, is not a question in debate

between those who maintain, and those who deny the doctrine of

gracious ability, in the sense above explained. The question in debate

is not whether men do, in any case, use the powers of nature in the

manner that God requires, without the gracious influence of the Holy

Spirit, but whether they are naturally able so to use them. Is the fact,

that they never do so use them without a gracious divine influence, to

be ascribed to absolute inability, or to the fact that, from the beginning,

they universally and voluntarily consecrate their powers to the

gratification of self, and that therefore they will not, unless they are

divinely persuaded, by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, in any

case turn and consecrate their powers to the service of God? If this

doctrine of natural inability and of gracious ability be true, it inevitably

follows:



1. That but for the atonement of Christ, and the consequent

bestowment of a gracious ability, no one of Adam's race could ever

have been capable of sinning. For in this case the whole race would

have been wholly destitute of any kind or degree of ability to obey

God. Consequently they could not have been subjects of moral

government, and of course their actions could have had no moral

character. It is a first truth of reason, a truth everywhere and by all

men necessarily assumed in their practical judgments, that a subject

of moral government must be a moral agent, or that moral agency is a

necessary condition of any one's being a subject of a moral

government. And in the practical judgment of men, it matters not at all

whether a being ever was a moral agent, or not. If by any means

whatever he has ceased to be a moral agent, men universally and

necessarily assume, that it is impossible for him to be a subject of

moral government any more than a horse can be such a subject. 

Suppose he has by his own fault made himself an idiot or a lunatic; all

men know absolutely, and in their practical judgment assume, that in

this state he is not, and cannot be a subject of moral government. 

They know that in this state, moral character cannot justly be

predicated of his actions. His guilt in thus depriving himself of moral

agency may be exceeding great, and his guilt in thus depriving himself

of moral agency may equal the sum of all the default of which it is the

cause, but be a moral agent, be under moral obligation, in this state

of dementation or insanity, he cannot. This is a first truth of reason,

irresistibly and universally assumed by all men. If therefore Adam's

posterity had by their own personal act cast away and deprived

themselves of all ability to obey God, in this state they would have

ceased to be moral agents, and consequently they could have sinned

no more. But the case under consideration is not the one just

supposed, but is one where moral agency was not cast away by the

agent himself. It is one where moral agency was never, and never

could have been possessed. In the case under consideration, Adam's

posterity, had he ever had any, would never have possessed any

power to obey God, or to do anything acceptable to him. 

Consequently, they never could have sustained to God the relation of

subjects of His moral government. Of course they never could have

had moral character; right or wrong, in a moral sense, never could

have been predicated of their actions.



2. It must follow from this doctrine of gracious ability and natural

inability, that mankind lost their freedom, or the liberty of will in the first

sin of Adam; that both Adam himself, and all his posterity would and

could have sustained to God only the relation of necessary, as

opposed to free, agents, had not God bestowed upon them a gracious

ability.



But that either Adam or his posterity lost their freedom or free

agency by the first sin of Adam, is not only a sheer but an absurd

assumption. To be sure Adam fell into a state of total alienation from

the law of God, and lapsed into a state of supreme selfishness. His

posterity have unanimously followed his example. He and they have

become dead in trespasses and sins. Now that this death in sin either

consists in, or implies, the loss of free agency, is the very thing to be

proved. But this cannot be proved. I have so fully discussed the

subject of human moral depravity or sinfulness on a former occasion,

as to render it unnecessary to enlarge upon it here.



3. Again, if it be true, as these theologians affirm, that men have

only a gracious ability to obey God, and that this gracious ability

consists in the presence and gracious agency of the Holy Spirit, it

follows that, when the Holy Spirit is withdrawn from man, he is no

longer a free agent, and from that moment he is incapable of moral

action and of course can sin no more. Hence, should he live any

number of years after this withdrawal, neither sin nor holiness, virtue

nor vice, praiseworthiness nor blameworthiness could be predicated of

his conduct. The same will and must be true of all his future eternity.



4. If the doctrine in question be true, it follows, that from the

moment of the withdrawal of the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit,

man is no longer a subject of moral obligation. It is from that moment

absurd and unjust to require the performance of any duty of him. Nay

to conceive of him as being any longer a subject of duty; to think or

speak of duty as belonging to him, is as absurd as to think or speak of

the duty of a mere machine. He has, from the moment of the

withholding of a gracious ability, ceased to be a free and become a

necessary agent, having power to act but in one direction. Such a

being can by no possibility be capable of sin or holiness. Suppose he

still possesses power to act contrary to the letter of the law of God;

what then? This action can have no moral character, because, act in

some way he must, and he can act in no other way. It is nonsense to

affirm that such action can be sinful in the sense of blameworthy. To

affirm that it can, is to contradict a first truth of reason. Sinners, then,

who have quenched the Holy Spirit, and from whom he is wholly

withdrawn, are no longer to be blamed for their enmity against God,

and for all their opposition to Him. They are, according to this

doctrine, as free from blame as are the motions of a mere machine.



5. Again, if the doctrine in question be true, there is no reason to

believe that the angels that fell from their allegiance to God ever

sinned but once. If Adam lost his free agency by the fall, or by his first

sin, there can be no doubt that the angels did so too. If a gracious

ability had not been bestowed upon Adam, it is certain, according to

the doctrine in question, that he never could have been the subject of

moral obligation from the moment of his first sin, and consequently,

could never again have sinned. The same must be true of devils. If

by their first sin they fell into the condition of necessary agents, having

lost their free agency, they have never sinned since. That is, moral

character cannot have been predicable of their conduct since that

event, unless a gracious ability has been bestowed upon them. That

this has been done cannot, with even a show of reason, be pretended. 

The devils, then, according to this doctrine, are not now to blame for

all they do to oppose God and to ruin souls. Upon the supposition in

question, they cannot help it; and you might as well blame the winds

and the waves for the evils which they sometimes do, as blame Satan

for what he does.



6. If this doctrine be true, there is not, and never will be, any sin in

hell, for the plain reason, that there are no moral agents there. They

are necessary agents, unless it be true, that the Holy Spirit and a

gracious ability be continued there. This is not, I believe, contended

for by the abettors of this scheme. But if they deny to the inhabitants

of hell freedom of the will, or, which is the same thing, natural ability to

obey God, they must admit, or be grossly inconsistent, that there is no

sin in hell, either in men or devils. But is this admission agreeable

either to reason or revelation? I know that the abettors of this scheme

maintain, that God may justly hold both men, from whom a gracious

ability is withdrawn, and devils, responsible for their conduct, upon the

ground that they have destroyed their own ability. But suppose this

were true that they had rendered themselves idiots, lunatics, or

necessary as opposed to free agents, could God justly, could

enlightened reason still regard them as moral agents, and as morally

responsible for their conduct? No, indeed! God and reason may justly

blame, and render them miserable, for annihilating their freedom or

their moral agency, but to hold them still responsible for present

obedience, were absurd.



7. We have seen that the ability of all men of sane mind to obey

God, is necessarily assumed as a first truth, and that this assumption

is from the very laws of mind, the indispensable condition of the

affirmation, or even the conception, that they are subjects of moral

obligation; that, but for this assumption, men could not so much as

conceive the possibility of moral responsibility, and of praiseworthiness

and blameworthiness. If the laws of mind remain unaltered, this is and

always will be so. In the eternal world and in hell, men and devils must

necessarily assume their own freedom or ability to obey God, as the

condition of their obligation to do so, and, consequently of their being

capable of sin or holiness. Since revelation informs us that men and

devils continue to sin in hell, we know that there also it must be

assumed as a first truth of reason, that they are free agents, or that

they have natural ability to obey God.



8. But that a gracious ability to do duty or to obey God is an

absurdity, will further appear, if we consider that it is a first truth of

reason, that moral obligation implies moral agency, and that moral

agency implies freedom of will; or in other words, it implies a natural

ability to comply with obligation. This ability is necessarily regarded by

the intelligence as the sine qua non of moral obligation, on the ground

of natural and immutable justice. A just command always implies an

ability to obey it. A command to perform a natural impossibility would

not, and could not, impose obligation. Suppose God should command

human beings to fly without giving them power; could such a

command impose moral obligation? No, indeed! But suppose He

should give them power, or promise them power, upon the

performance of a condition within their reach; then He might in justice

require them to fly, and a command to do so would be obligatory. But

relatively to the requirement, the bestowment of power would not be

grace, but justice. Relatively to the results or the pleasure of flying,

the bestowment of power might be gracious. That is, it might be grace

in God to give me power to fly, that I might have the pleasure and

profit of flying; so that relatively to the results of flying, the giving of

power might be regarded as an act of grace. But, if God requires me

to fly as a matter of duty, He must in justice supply the power or ability

to fly. This would in justice be a necessary condition of the command

imposing moral obligation.



Nor would it at all vary the case if I had ever possessed wings, and

by the abuse of them had lost the power to fly. In this case,

considered relatively to the pleasure, and profit, and results of flying,

the restoring of the power to fly might and would be an act of grace. 

But if God would still command me to fly, He must, as a condition of

my obligation, restore the power. It is vain and absurd to say, as has

been said, that in such a case, although I might lose the power of

obedience, this could not alter the right of God to claim obedience. 

This assertion proceeds upon the absurd assumption that the will of

God makes or creates law, instead of merely declaring and enforcing

the law of nature. We have seen in former lectures, that the only law

or rule of action that is, or can be obligatory on a moral agent, is the

law of nature, or just that course of willing and acting, which is for the

time being, suitable to his nature and relations. We have seen that

God's will never makes or creates law, that it only declares and

enforces it. If therefore, by any means whatever, the nature of a moral

agent should be so changed that his will is no longer free to act in

conformity with, or in opposition to, the law of nature, if God would

hold him still obligated to obey, He must in justice, relatively to His

requirement, restore His liberty or ability. Suppose one had by the

abuse of his intellect lost the use of it, and become a perfect idiot,

could he by any possibility be still required to understand and obey

God? Certainly not. So neither could he be required to perform

anything else that had become naturally impossible to him. Viewed

relatively to the pleasure and results of obedience, the restoring of

power would be an act of grace. But viewed relatively to his duty or to

God's command, the restoring of power to obey is an act of justice and

not of grace. To call this grace were to abuse language, and confound

terms.



In what sense is a gracious ability possible?



1. Not, as we have just seen, in the sense that the bestowment of

power to render obedience to a command possible, can be properly a

gift of grace. Grace is undeserved favor, something not demanded by

justice, that which under the circumstances might be withholden

without injustice. It never can be just in any being to require that which

under the circumstances is impossible. As has been said, relatively to

the requirement and as a condition of its justice, the bestowment of

power adequate to the performance of that which is commanded, is an

unalterable condition of the justice of the command. This I say is a

first truth of reason, a truth everywhere by all men necessarily

assumed and known. A gracious ability to obey a command, is an

absurdity and an impossibility.



2. But a gracious ability considered relatively to the advantages to

result from obedience is possible. Suppose, for example, that a

servant who supports himself and his family by his wages, should by

his own fault render himself unable to labor and to earn his wages. 

His master may justly dismiss him, and let him go with his family to the

poor-house. But in this disabled state his master cannot justly exact

labor of him. Nor could he do so if he absolutely owned the servant. 

Now suppose the master to be able to restore to the servant his former

strength. If he would require service of him, as a condition of the

justice of this requirement, he must restore his strength so far at least

as to render obedience possible. This would be mere justice. But

suppose he restored the ability of the servant to gain support for

himself and his family by labor. This, viewed relatively to the good of

the servant, to the results of the restoration of his ability to himself and

to his family, is a matter of grace. Relatively to the right of the master

in requiring the labor of the servant, the restoration of ability to obey is

an act of justice. But relatively to the good of the servant, and the

benefits that result to him from this restoration of ability, and making it

once more possible for him to support himself and his family, the

giving of ability is properly an act of grace.



Let this be applied to the case under consideration. Suppose the

race of Adam to have lost their free agency by the first sin of Adam,

and thus to have come into a state in which holiness and consequent

salvation were impossible. Now, if God would still require obedience

of them, He must in justice restore their ability. And viewed relatively

to His right to command, and their duty to obey, this restoration is

properly a matter of justice. But suppose He would again place them

in circumstances to render holiness and consequent salvation possible

to them: viewed relatively to their good and profit, this restoration of

ability is properly a matter of grace.



A gracious ability to obey, viewed relatively to the command to be

obeyed, is impossible and absurd. But a gracious ability to be saved,

viewed relatively to salvation, is possible. There is no proof that

mankind ever lost their ability to obey, either by the first sin of Adam,

or by their own sin. For this would imply, as we have seen, that they

had ceased to be free, and had become necessary agents. But if they

had, and God had restored their ability to obey, all that can be justly

said in this case, is, that so far as his right to command is concerned,

the restoration of their ability was an act of justice. But so far as the

rendering of salvation possible to them is concerned, it was an act of

grace.



3. But it is asserted, or rather assumed by the defenders of the

dogma under consideration, that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a

natural inability, and of a gracious ability in man to obey the

commands of God. I admit, indeed, that if we interpret scripture

without regard to any just rules of interpretation, this assumption may

find countenance in the word of God, just as almost any absurdity

whatever may do, and has done. But a moderate share of attention to

one of the simplest and most universal and most important rules of

interpreting language, whether in the Bible or out of it, will strip this

absurd dogma of the least appearance of support from the word of

God. The rule to which I refer is this, "That language is always to be

interpreted in accordance with the subject matter of discourse."



When used of acts of will, the term "cannot," interpreted by this

rule, must not be understood to mean a proper impossibility. If I say, I

cannot take five dollars for my watch, when it is offered to me, every

one knows that I do not and cannot mean to affirm a proper

impossibility. So when the angel said to Lot, "Haste thee, for I cannot

do anything until thou be come thither" (Gen. 19:22), who ever

understood him as affirming a natural or any proper impossibility? All

that he could have meant was, that he was not willing to do anything

until Lot was in a place of safety. Just so when the Bible speaks of our

inability to comply with the commands of God, all that can be intended

is, that we are so unwilling that, without divine persuasion, we, as a

matter of fact, shall not and will not obey. This certainly is the sense in

which such language is used in common life. And in common

parlance, we never think of such language, when used of acts of will,

as meaning anything more than unwillingness, a state in which the will

is strongly committed in an opposite direction.



When Joshua said to the children of Israel, "Ye cannot serve the

Lord, for He is a holy God" (Joshua 24:19), the whole context, as well

as the nature of the case, shows that he did not mean to affirm a

natural, nor indeed any kind of impossibility. In the same connection,

he requires them to serve the Lord, and leads them solemnly to pledge

themselves to serve Him. He undoubtedly intended to say, that with

wicked hearts they could not render Him an acceptable service, and

therefore insisted on their putting away the wickedness of their hearts,

by immediately and voluntarily consecrating themselves to the service

of the Lord. So it must be in all cases where the term "cannot," and

such-like expressions which, when applied to muscular action, would

imply a proper impossibility, are used in reference to acts of will; they

cannot, when thus used, be understood as implying a proper

impossibility, without doing violence to every sober rule of interpreting

language. What would be thought of a judge or an advocate at the bar

of an earthly tribunal, who should interpret the language of a witness

without any regard to the rule, "That language is to be understood

according to the subject-matter of discourse." Should an advocate in

his argument to the court or jury, attempt to interpret the language of a

witness in a manner that made "cannot," when spoken of an act of will,

mean a proper impossibility, the judge would soon rebuke his stupidity,

and remind him that he must not talk nonsense in a court of justice;

and might possibly add, that such nonsensical assertions were

allowable only in the pulpit. I say again, that it is an utter abuse and

perversion of the laws of language, so to interpret the Bible as to make

it teach a proper inability in man to will as God directs. The essence of

obedience to God consists in willing. Language, then, used in

reference to obedience must, when properly understood, be

interpreted in accordance with the subject-matter of discourse. 

Consequently, when used in reference to acts of will, such expressions

as "cannot," and the like, can absolutely mean nothing more than a

choice in an opposite direction.



But it may be asked, Is there no grace in all that is done by the

Holy Spirit to make man wise unto salvation? Yes, indeed, I answer. 

And it is grace, and great grace, just because the doctrine of a natural

inability in man to obey God is not true. It is just because man is well

able to render obedience, and unjustly refuses to do so, that all the

influence that God brings to bear upon him to make him willing, is a

gift and an influence of grace. The grace is great, just in proportion to

the sinner's ability to comply with God's requirements, and the

strength of his voluntary opposition to his duty. If man were properly

unable to obey, there could be no grace in giving him ability to obey,

when the bestowment of ability is considered relatively to the

command. But let man be regarded as free, as possessing natural

ability to obey all the requirements of God, and all his difficulty as

consisting in a wicked heart, or, which is the same thing, in an

unwillingness to obey, then an influence on the part of God designed

and tending to make him willing, is grace indeed. But strip man of his

freedom, render him naturally unable to obey, and you render grace

impossible, so far as his obligation to obedience is concerned.



But it is urged in support of the dogma of natural inability and of a

gracious ability, that the Bible everywhere represents man as

dependent on the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit for all holiness,

and consequently for eternal life. I answer, it is admitted that this is

the representation of the Bible, but the question is, in what sense is he

dependent? Does his dependence consist in a natural inability to

embrace the gospel and be saved? Or does it consist in a voluntary

selfishness in an unwillingness to comply with the terms of salvation? 

Is man dependent on the Holy Spirit to give him a proper ability to

obey God or is he dependent only in such a sense that, as a matter of

fact, he will not embrace the gospel unless the Holy Spirit makes him

willing? The latter, beyond reasonable question, is the truth. This is

the universal representation of scripture. The difficulty to be overcome

is everywhere in the Bible represented to be the sinner's unwillingness

alone. It cannot possibly be anything else; for the willingness is the

doing required by God. "If there is first a willing mind, it is accepted

according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not" (2

Cor. 8:12).



But it is said, if man can be willing of himself, what need of divine

persuasion or influence to make him willing? I might ask, suppose a

man is able but unwilling to pay his debts, what need of any influence

to make him willing? Why, divine influence is needed to make a sinner

willing, or to induce him to will as God directs, just for the same reason

that persuasion, entreaty, argument, or the rod, is needed to make our

children submit their wills to ours. The fact therefore that the Bible

represents the sinner as in some sense dependent upon divine

influence for a right heart, no more implies a proper inability in the

sinner, than the fact that children are dependent for their good

behavior, oftentimes, upon the thorough and timely discipline of their

parents, implies a proper inability in them to obey their parents without

chastisement.



The Bible everywhere, and in every way, assumes the freedom of

the will. This fact stands out in strong relief upon every page of divine

inspiration. But this is only the assumption necessarily made by the

universal intelligence of man. The strong language often found in

scripture upon the subject of man's inability to obey God, is designed

only to represent the strength of his voluntary selfishness and enmity

against God, and never to imply a proper natural inability. It is,

therefore, a gross and most injurious perversion of scripture, as well

as a contradiction of human reason, to deny the natural ability, or

which is the same thing, the natural free agency of man, and to

maintain a proper natural inability to obey God, and the absurd dogma

of a gracious ability to do our duty.



1. The question of ability is one of great practical importance. To

deny the ability of man to obey the commandments of God, is to

represent God as a hard master, as requiring a natural impossibility of

His creatures on pain of eternal damnation. This necessarily begets in

the mind that believes it hard thoughts of God. The intelligence cannot

be satisfied with the justice of such a requisition. In fact, so far as this

error gets possession of the mind and gains assent, just so far it

naturally and necessarily excuses itself for disobedience, or for not

complying with the commandments of God.



2. The moral inability of Edwards is a real natural inability, and so it

has been understood by sinners and professors of religion. When I

entered the ministry, I found the persuasion of an absolute inability on

the part of sinners to repent and believe the gospel, almost universal. 

When I urged sinners and professors of religion to do their duty

without delay, I frequently met with stern opposition from sinners,

professors of religion, and ministers. They desired me to say to

sinners, that they could not repent, and that they must wait God's time,

that is, for God to help them. It was common for the classes of

persons just named to ask me, if I thought sinners could be Christians

whenever they pleased, and whether I thought that any class of

persons could repent, believe, and obey God without the strivings and

new-creating power of the Holy Spirit. The church was almost

universally settled down in the belief of a physical moral depravity,

and, of course, in a belief in the necessity of a physical regeneration,

and also of course in the belief, that sinners must wait to be

regenerated by divine power while they were passive. Professors also

must wait to be revived, until God, in mysterious sovereignty, came

and revived them. As to revivals of religion, they were settled down in

the belief to a great extent, that man had no more agency in producing

them than in producing showers of rain. To attempt to effect the

conversion of a sinner, or to promote a revival, was an attempt to take

the work out of the hands of God, to go to work in your own strength,

and to set sinners and professors to do the same. The vigorous use of

means and measures to promote a work of grace, was regarded by

many as impious. It was getting up an excitement of animal feeling,

and wickedly interfering with the prerogative of God. The abominable

dogmas of physical moral depravity, or a sinful constitution, with a

consequent natural, falsely called moral, inability, and the necessity of

a physical and passive regeneration, had chilled the heart of the church,

and lulled sinners into a fatal sleep. This is the natural tendency of

such doctrines.



3. Let it be distinctly understood before we close this subject, that

we do not deny, but strenuously maintain, that the whole plan of

salvation, and all the influences, both providential and spiritual, which

God exerts in the conversion, sanctification, and salvation, of sinners,

is grace from first to last, and that I deny the dogma of a gracious

ability, because it robs God of His glory. It really denies the grace of

the gospel. The abettors of this scheme, in contending for the grace of

the gospel, really deny it. What grace can there be, that should

surprise heaven and earth, and cause "the angels to desire to look into

it" (1 Peter 1:12), in bestowing ability on those who never had any,

and, of course, who never cast away their ability to obey the

requirements of God? According to them all men lost their ability in

Adam, and not by their own act. God still required obedience of them

upon pain of eternal death. Now He might, according to this view of

the subject, just as reasonably command all men, on pain of eternal

death, to fly, or to undo all that Adam had done, or perform any other

natural impossibility, as to command them to be holy, to repent and

believe the gospel. Now, I ask again, what possible grace was there,

or could there be, in His giving them power to obey Him? To have

required the obedience without giving the power had been infinitely

unjust. To admit the assumption, that men had really lost their ability

to obey in Adam, and call this bestowment of ability for which they

contend, grace, is an abuse of language, an absurdity and a denial of

the true grace of the gospel not to be tolerated. I reject the dogma of

a gracious ability, because it involves a denial of the true grace of the

gospel. I maintain that the gospel, with all its influences, including the

gift of the Holy Spirit, to convict, convert, and sanctify the soul, is a

system of grace throughout. But to maintain this, I must also maintain,

that God might justly have required obedience of men without making

these provisions for them. And to maintain the justice of God in

requiring obedience, I must admit and maintain that obedience was

possible to man.



Let it not be said then, that we deny the grace of the glorious

gospel of the blessed God, nor that we deny the reality and necessity

of the influences of the Holy Spirit to convert and sanctify the soul, nor

that this influence is a gracious one; for all these we most strenuously

maintain. But I maintain this upon the ground, that men are able to do

their duty, and that the difficulty does not lie in a proper inability, but in

a voluntary selfishness, in an unwillingness to obey the blessed

gospel. I say again, that I reject the dogma of a gracious ability, as I

understand its abettors to hold it, not because I deny, but solely

because it denies the grace of the gospel. The denial of ability is

really a denial of the possibility of grace in the affair of man's salvation. 

I admit the ability of man, and hold that he is able, but utterly unwilling

to obey God. Therefore I consistently hold that all the influences

exerted by God to make him willing, are of free grace abounding

through Christ Jesus.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 33



THE NOTION OF INABILITY



I have represented ability, or the freedom of the will, as a first truth

of consciousness, a truth necessarily known to all moral agents. The

inquiry may naturally arise, How then is it to be accounted for, that so

many men have denied the liberty of the will, or ability to obey God? A

recent writer thinks this denial a sufficient refutation of the affirmation,

that ability is a first-truth of consciousness. It is important that this

denial should be accounted for. That mankind affirm their obligation

upon the real, though often latent and unperceived assumption of

ability, there is no reasonable ground of doubt. I have said that first

truths are frequently assumed, and certainly known without being

always the direct object of thought or attention; and also that these

truths are universally held in the practical judgments of men, while

they sometimes in theory deny them. They know them to be true, and

in all their practical judgments assume their truth, while they reason

against them, think they prove them untrue, and not infrequently

affirm, that they are conscious of an opposite affirmation. For

example, men have denied, in theory, the law of causality, while they

have at every moment of their lives acted upon the assumption of its

truth. Others have denied the freedom of the will, who have, every

hour of their lives, assumed, and acted, and judged, upon the

assumption that the will is free. The same is true of ability, which, in

respect to the commandments of God, is identical with freedom. Men

have often denied the ability of man to obey the commandments of

God, while they have always, in their practical judgments of

themselves and of others, assumed their ability, in respect to those

things that are really commanded by God. Now, how is this to be

accounted for?



1. Multitudes have denied the freedom of the will, because they

have loosely confounded the will with the involuntary powers with the

intellect and the sensibility. Locke, as is well known, regarded the

mind as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and

the will. President Edwards, as was said in a former lecture, followed

Locke, and regarded all the states of the