1 1 On the ascetic tendencies of the second and third centuries, and the gradual introduction of clerical celibacy (which began with a decree of Bishop Siricius of Rome, 385), see Schaff, Church Hist., vol. ii. 367-414, and vol. iii. 242-250.
1 Westminster Confession, II. iii.
2 That Augustin had considerable acquaintance with Greek is proved by his many references and citations throughout his writings. In this work, see XII. vii. 11; XII. xiv. 22; XIII. x. 14; XIV. i. 1; XV. ix. 15. His statement in III. i. 1, is, that he was "not so familiar with the Greek tongue (Graecae linguae non sit nobis tantus habitus), as to be able to read and understand the books that treat of such [metaphysical] topics." In V. viii. 10, he remarks that he does not comprehend the distinction which the Greek Trinitarians make between ou0sia and u9po/stasij; which shows that he had not read the work of Gregory of Nyssa, in which it is defined with great clearness. One may have a good knowledge of a language for general purposes, and yet be unfamiliar with its philosophical nomenclature.
3 For an analysis of Augustin's Trinitarianism, see Bauv: Dreieinigkeitslehre I. 828-885; Gangauf: Des Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen; Schaff: History, iii. 684 sq.
4 The Mohammedan conception of the Divine Unity, also, is deistic. In energetically rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity, the Mohammedan is the Oriental Unitarian.
5 "That view of the divine nature which makes it inconsistent with the Incarnation and Trinity is philosophically imperfect, as well as scripturally incorrect." H. B. Smith: Faith and Philosophy, p. 191.
6 Upon the necessary conditions of self consciousness in God, see Müller: On Sin, II. 136 sq. (Urwick's Trans ); Dorner: Christian Doctrine, I. 412-465; Christlieb: Modern Doubt, Lecture III.; Kurtz: Sacred History,§ 2; Billroth: Religions Philosophie, § 89, 90; Wilberforce: Incarnation, Chapter III; Kidd: On the Trinity, with Candlish's Introduction; Shedd: History of Doctrine, I. 365-368.
1 [Augustin here puts generare for creare-which is rarely the case with him, since the distinction between generation and creation is of the highest importance in discussing the doctrine of the Trinity. His thought here is, that God does not bring himself into being, because he always is. Some have defined God as the Self-caused: causa sut. But the category of cause and effect is inapplicable to the Infinite Being.-W. G. T. S.]
7 [God's being is necessary; that of the creature is contingent. Hence the name I Am, or Jehovah,-which denotes this difference. God alone has immortality a parte ante, as well as a parte post.-W. G. T. S.].
12 [St.Paul,, in this place, denominates imperfect but true believers "carnal," in a relative sense, only. They are comparatively carnal, when contrasted with the law of God, which is absolutely and perfectly spiritual. (Rom. vii. 14.) They do not, however, belong to the class of carnal or natural men, in distinction from spiritual. The persons whom the Apostle here denominates "carnal," are "babes in Christ."-W. G. T. S.]
15 [This request of Augustin to his reader, involves an admirable rule for authorship generally-the desire, namely, that truth be attained, be it through himself or through others. MiIton teaches the same, when he says that the author must "study and love learning for itself, not for lucre, or any other end, but the service of God and of truth, and perhaps that lasting fame and perpetuity of praise, which God and good men have consented shall be the reward of those whose published labors advance the good of mankind."-W. G. T. S.].
18 [Augustin teaches the Nicene doctrine of a numerical unity of essence in distinction from a specific unity. The latter is that of mankind. In this case there is division of substance-part after part of the specific nature being separated and formed, by propagation, into individuals. No human individual contains the whole specific nature. But in the case of the numerical unity of the Trinity, there is no division of essence. The whole divine nature is in each divine person. The three divine persons do not constitute a species-that is, three divine individuals made by the division and distribution of one common divine nature-but are three modes or "forms" (Phil. ii. 6) of one undivided substance, numerically and identically the same in each.-W. G. T. S.].
24 [The term Trinity denotes the Divine essence in all three modes. The term Father (or Son, or Spirit) denotes the essence in only one mode. Consequently, there is something in the Trinity that cannot be attributed to any one of the Persons, as such; and something in a Person that cannot be attributed to the Trinity, as such. Trinality cannot be ascribed to the first Person; paternity cannot be ascribed to the Trinity.-W. G. T. S.]
28 [Augustin here postulates the theistic doctrines of two substances-infinite and finite; in contradiction to the postulate of pantheism, that there is only one substance-the infinite.-W. G. T. S.]
35 [Nothing is more important, in order to a correct interpretation of the New Testament, than a correct explanation of the term God. Sometimes it denotes the Trinity, and sometimes a person of the Trinity. The context always shows which it is. The examples given here by Augustin are only a few out of many.-W. G. T. S.].
42 [It is not generally safe to differ from Augustin in trinitarian exegesis. But in Phil. ii. 6 "God" must surely denote the Divine Essence, not the first Person of the Essence. St. Paul describes "Christ Jesus" as "subsisting" (u9pa/rxwn) originally, that is prior to incarnation, "in a form of God"(e0n morfh= u=eou=), and because he so subsisted, as being "equal with God." The word morfh= is anarthrous in the text: a form, not the form, as the A.V and R.V. render. St. Paul refers to one of three "forms" of God-namely, that particular form of Sonship, which is peculiar to the second person of the Godhead. Had the apostle employed the article with morfh/, the implication would be that there is only one "form of God"-that is, only one person in the Divine Essence.
If then u=eou=, in this place, denotes the Father, as Augustin says, St. Paul would teach that the Logos subsisted "in a form of the Father," which would imply that the Father had more than one "form," or else (if morfh/ be rendered with the article) that the Logos subsisted in the "form" of the Father, neither of which is true. But if "God," in this place, denotes the Divine Essence, then St. Paul teaches that the unincarnate Logos subsisted in a particular "form" of the Essence-the Father and Spirit subsisting in other "forms" of it.
The student will observe that Augustin is careful to teach that the Logos when he took on him "a form of a servant," did not lay aside "a form of God." He understands the kenosis (e0ke/nwse) to be, the humbling of the divinity by its union with the humanity, not the exinanition of it in the extremest sense of entirely divesting himself of the divinity, nor the less extreme sense of a total non-use of it during the humiliation.-W.G.T.S.].
48 Phil. iii. 3 (Vulgate, etc.).
69 In recubituCant. i. 11; see LXX.
78 10 [The common explanation is better, which regards the "kingdom'" that is to be delivered up, to be the mediatorial commission. When Christ shall have finished his work of redeeming men, he no longer discharges the office of a mediator. It seems incongruous to denominate the beatific vision of God by the redeemed a surrender of A kingdom. In I. x. 21, Augustin says that when the Redeemer brings the redeemed from faith to sight, "He is said to `deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father. 0' "-W.G.T.S.]
100 [An act belonging eminently and officially to a particular trinitarian person is not performed to the total exclusion of the other persons, because of the numerical unity of essence. The whole undivided essence is in each person; consequently, what the essence in one of its personal modes, or forms, does officially and eminently, is participated in by the essence in its other modes or forms. Hence the interchange of persons in Scripture. Though creation is officially the Father's work, yet the Son creates (Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 3). The name Saviour is given to the Father (1 Tim. i. 1). Judgment belongs officially to the Son (John v. 22; Matt xxv. 31); yet the Father judgeth (1 Pet. i. 17). The Father raises Christ (Acts xiii. 30); yet Christ raises himself (John x. 18; Acts x. 41; Rom. xiv. 9).-W. G. T. S.].
105 [The redeemed must forever stand in the relation of redeemed sinners to their Redeemer. Thus standing, they will forever need Christ's sacrifice and intercession in respect to their, past sins in this earthly state. But as in the heavenly state they are sinless, and are incurring no new guilt, it is true that they do not require the fresh application of atoning blood for new sins, nor Christ's intercession for such. This is probably what Augustin means by saying that Christ "no longer makes intercession for us," when he has delivered up the kingdom to God. When the Mediator has surrendered his commission, he ceases to redeem sinners from death, while yet he continues forever to be the Head of those whom he has redeemed, and their High Priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek (Heb. vii. 19.)-W. G. T. S.]
107 [The animal soul is different in kind from the rational soul though both constitute one person; while the rational soul of a man is the same in kind with that of another man. Similarly, says Augustin, there is a difference in kind between the human nature and the divine nature of Christ, though constituting one theanthropic person, while the divine nature of the Son is the same in substance with that of the Father, though constituting two different persons, the Father and Son.-W. G. T. S.].
117 Isa lxi. 1; Luke iv. 18, 19.
122 John v. 26. [In communicating the Divine Essence to the Son, in eternal generation, the essence is communicated with all its attributes. Self existence is one of these attributes. In this way, the Father "gives to the Son to have life in himself," when he makes common (koinwnei=n), between Himself and the Son, the one Divine Essence.-W. G. T. S.]
130 [The more common explanation of this text in modern exegesis makes the ignorance to be literal, and referable solely to the human nature of our Lord, not to his person as a whole. Augustin's explanation, which Bengel, on Mark xiii. 32, is inclined to favor, escapes the difficulty that arises from a seeming division of the one theanthopic person into two portions. one of which knows, and the other does not. Yet this same difficulty besets the fact of a growth in knowledge, which is plainly taught in Luke i. 80. In this case, the increase in wisdom must relate to the humanity alone.-W. G. T. S.]
172 [Augustin in this discussion, sometimes employs the phrase "Son of man" to denote the human nature of Christ, in distinction from the divine. But in Scripture and in trinitarian theology generally, this phrase properly denotes the whole theanthropic, person under a human title-just as "man", (1 Tim. ii. 5), "last Adam" (1 Cor. xv. 45), and "second man" (1 Cor. xv. 47), denote not the human nature, but the whole divine-human person under a human title. Strictly used, the phrase "Son of man" does not designate the difference between the divine and human natures in the thenothropos, but between the person of the un-incarnate and that of the incarnate Logos. Augustin's meaning is, that the Son of God will judge men at the last day, not in his original "form of God," but as this is united with human nature-as the Son of man.-W. G. T. S.]
177 Transit in Vulg.; and so in Greek.
182 [Augustin here seems to teach that the phenomenal appearance of Christ to the redeemed in heaven will be different from that to all men in the day of judgment. He says that he will show himself to the former "in the form of God;" to the latter, "in the form of the Son of man." But, surely, it is one and the same God-man who sits on the judgment throne, and the heavenly throne His appearance must be the same in both instances: namely, that of God incarnate. The effect of his phenomenal appearance upon the believer will, indeed, be very different from that upon the unbeliever. For the wicked, this vision of God incarnate will be one of terror; for the redeemed one of joy.-W. G. T. S.]
185 [Augustin's reading of this text is that of the uncials; and in that form which omits the article with a0gau=ou=.-W. G. T. S.]
188 [That is, a mere man. Augustin here, as in some other places, employs the phrase "Son of man" to denote the human nature by itself-not the divine and human natures united in one person, and designated by this human title. The latter is the Scripture usage. As "Immanuel" does not properly denote the divine nature, but the union of divinity and humanity, so "Son of man" does not properly denote the human nature, but the union of divinity and humanity.-W. G. T. S.]
4 [Augustin here brings to view both the trinitarian and the theanthropic or mediatorial subordination. The former is the status of Sonship. God the Son is God of God. Sonship as a relation is subordinate to paternity. But a son must be of the same grade of being, and of the same nature with his father. A human son and a human father are alike and equally human. And a Divine Son and a Divine father are alike and equally divine. The theanthropic or mediatorial subordination is the status of humiliation, by reason of the incarnation. In the words of Augustin, it is "that by which we understand the Son as less, in that he has taken upon Him the creature." The subordination in this case is that of voluntary condescension, for the purpose of redeeming sinful man.-W.G.T.S.]
9 Matt. xiv. 26, and John ix. 6, 7.
40 [The reference is to sxhma, in Phil. ii. 8-the term chosen by St. Paul to describe the "likeness of men," which the second trinitarian person assumed. The variety in the terms by which St. Paul describes the incarnation is very striking. The person incarnated subsists first in a "form of God;" he then takes along with this (still retaining this) a "form of a servant;" which form of a servant is a "likeness of men;" which likeness of men is a "scheme" (A.V. "fashion") or external form of a man.-W.G.T.S.]
51 [A theophany, though a harbinger of the incarnation, differs from it, by not effecting a hypostatical or personal union between God and the creature. When the Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a dove, he did not unite himself with it. The dove did not constitute an integral part of the divine person who employed it. Nor did the illuminated vapor in the theophany of the Shekinah. But when the Logos appeared in the form of a man, he united himself with it, so that it became a constituent part of his person. A theophany, as Augustin notices, is temporary and transient. The incarnation is perpetual.-W.G.T.S.]
57 4 (For an example of the manner in which the patristic writers present the doctrine of the divine invisibility, see Irenaeus, Adv. Haereses, IV. xx.-W.G.T.S.]
75 [The theophanies of the Pentateuch are trinitarian in their implication. They involve distinctions in God-God sending, and God sent; God speaking of God, and God speaking to God. The trinitarianism of the Old Testament has been lost sight of to some extent in the modern construction of the doctrine. The patristic, mediaeval, and reformation theologies worked this vein with thoroughness, and the analysis of Augustin in this reference is worthy of careful study.-W.G.T.S.]
77 This clause is not in the Hebrew.
79 [It is difficult to determine the details of this theophany, beyond all doubt: namely, whether the"Jehovah" who "went his way as soon as he had left communing with Abraham." (Gen. xviii. 33) joins the " two angels" that "came to Sodom at even" (Gen xix. 1); or whether one of these "two angels" is Jehovah himself. One or the other supposition must be made; because a person is addressed by Lot as God (Gen. xix. 18-20), and speaks to Lot as God (Gen. xix. 21, 22), and acts as God (Gen. xix. 24). The Masorite marking of the word "lords" in Gen. xix. 2, as "profane," i.e., to be taken in the human sense, would favor the first supposition. The interchange of the singular and plural, in the whole narrative is very striking. "It came to pass, when they had brought them forth abroad, that he said, escape for thy life. And Lot said unto them. Oh not so, my Lord: behold now, thy servant hath found grace in thysight. And hesaid unto him, see I have accepted thee; I will not overthrow the city of which thou hast spoken." (Gen. xix. 17-21.)-W.G.T.S.]
102 Clift-A.V. Spelunca is one reading in S. Aug., but the Benedictines read specula = watch-tower, which the context proves to be certainly right.
114 Col. ii. 20. Viventes de hoc mundo decernitis.
117 [Augustin here gives the Protestant interpretation of the word "rock," in the passage, "on this rock I will build my church."-W.G.T.S.]
121 [The meaning seems to be, that the vivid realization that Christ's body rose from the dead is the reward of a Christian's faith. The unbeliever has no such reward.-W.G.T.S.]
129 Isa. vi. 10; Matt. xiii. 15.
132 [This explanation of the "back parts" of Christ to mean his resurrection, and of "the place that is by him," to mean the church, is an example of the fanciful exegesis into which Augustin, with the fathers generally, sometimes falls. The reasoning, here, unlike that in the preceding chapter, is not from the immediate context, and hence extraneous matter is read into the text.-W.G.T.S.]
135 [The original has an awkward anacoluthon in the opening sentence of this chapter, which has been removed by omitting "quamquam," and substituting "autem" for "ergo."-W.G.T.S.]
1 [The English translator renders "animalium" by "psychical," to agree with yuxiko/j in 1 Cor. ii. 14. The rendering "natural" of the A.V. is more familiar.-W G. T. S.]
2 [This is an important passage with reference to Augustin's learning. From it, it would appear that he had not read the Greek Trinitarians in the original, and that only "a little" of these had been translated, at the time when he was composing this treatise. As this was from A.D. 400 to A.D. 416-, the treatises of Athanasius (d. 373), Basil (d. 379), Gregory of Nyssa (d. 400?), and Gregory of Nazianzum (d. 390?) had been composed and were current in the Eastern church. That Augustin thought out this profound scheme of the doctrine of the Trinity by the close study of Scripture alone, and unassisted by the equally profound trinitarianism of the Greek church, is an evidence of the depth and strength of his remarkable intellect.-W. G. T. S.]
9 See above, Book ii. chap. vii. n. 13.
13 [The original is: "ut sit participatio ejus in idipsum." The English translator renders: "So that it may partake thereof in itself." The thought of Augustin is, that the believing soul though mutable partakes of the immutable; and he designates the immutable as the in idipsum: the self-existent. In that striking passage in the Confessions, in which he describes the spiritual and extatic meditations of himself and his mother, as they looked out upon the Mediterranean from the windows at Ostia-a scene well known from Ary Schefer's painting-he denominates God the idipsum: the "self same" (Confessions IX. x). Augustin refers to the same absolute immutability of God, in this place. By faith, man is "a partaker of a divine nature," (2 Pet. i. 4.)-W.G.T.S.].
29 [One chief reason why a miracle is incredible for the skeptic, is the difficulty of working it. If the miracle were easy of execution for man-who for the skeptic is the measure of power-his disbelief of it would disappear. In reference to this objection, Augustin calls attention to the fact, that so far as difficulty of performance is concerned, the products of nature are as impossible to man as supernatural products. Aaron could no more have made an almond rod blossom and fructuate on an almond tree, than off it. That a miracle is difficult to be wrought is, consequently, no good reason for disbelieving its reality.-W.G.T.S.]
34 [Augustin is not alone in his belief that the bee is an exception to the dictum; omne animal ex ovo. As late as 1744, Thorley, an English "scientist," said that "the manner in which bees propagate their species is entirely hid from the eyes of all men; an the most strict, diligent, and curious observers and inquisitors have not been able to discover it. It is a secret, and will remain a mystery. Dr. Butler says that they do not copulate as other living creatures do." (Thorley: Melisselogia. Section viii.) The observations of Huber and others have disproved this opinion. Some infer that ignorance of physics proves ignorance of philosophy and theology. The difference between matter and mind is so great, that erroneous opinions in one province are compatible with correct ones in the other. It does not follow that because Augustin had wrong notions about bees, and no knowledge at all of the steam engine and telegraph, his knowledge of God and the soul was inferior to that of a modern materialist.-W.G.T.S.]
35 [The English translator renders "virtus" in its secondary sense of "goodness." Augustin employs it here, in its primary sense of "energy," "force."-W.G.T.S.]
39 [This is the same as the theological distinction between substances and their modifications. "The former," says Howe, "are the proper object of creation strictly taken; the modifications of things are not properly created, in the strictest sense of creation, but are educed and brought forth out of those substantial things that were themselves created, or made out of nothing."-Germs are originated ex nihilo, and fall under creation proper; their evolution and development takes place according to the nature and inherent force of the germ, and falls under providence, in distinction from creation. See the writer's Theological Essays, 133-137.-W.G.T.S.]
41 Ex. vii. 12, and viii. 7, 18, 19.
63 ["Substance," from sub stans, is a passive term, denoting latent and potential being. "Essence," from esse, is an active term, denoting energetic being. The schoolmen, as Augustin does here, preferred the latter term to the former, though employing both to designate the divine nature.-W.G.T.S.]
70 Ex. ii. 15 and iii. 7, and Acts vii. 29-33.
88 [The reference here is to the difference between a theophany, and an incarnation; already alluded to, in the note on p. 149.-W.G. T. S.]
5 Ps. lxviii. 9.-Pluviam voluntariam.
12 [This singleness and doubleness is explained in chapter 3.-W.G.T.S.].
25 Ps. xxii. 1, and Matt. xxvii. 46.
74 Mark xv. 37, 39, 43, 44, and John xix. 30-34.
86 [The wood of the cross is meant. One of the ancient symbols of the church was a ship.-W.G.T.S.].
101 [The allusion is to the Wisdom of Proverbs, and of the Book of Wisdom which Augustin regards as canonical, as his frequent citations show.-W.G.T.S.].
112 [Augustin here, as in previous instances, affirms the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son.-W.G.T.S.].
118 [The term "beginning" is employed "relatively, and not according to substance," as Augustin says. The Father is "the beginning of the whole deity," with reference to the personal distinctions of Father, Son, and Spirit-the Son being from the Father, and the Spirit from Father and Son. The trinitarian relations or modes of the essence, "begin" with the first person, not the second or the third. The phrase "whole deity," in the above statement, is put for "trinity," not for "essence." Augustin would not say that the Father is the "beginning" (principium) of the divine essence considered abstractly, but only of the essence as trinal. In this sense, Trinitarian writers denominate the Father "fons trinitatis", and sometimes "fons deitatis." Turrettin employs this latter phraseology (iii. xxx. i. 8); so does Owen (Communion with Trinity, Ch. iii.); and Hooker (Polity, v. liv.) But in this case, the guarding clause of Turretin is to be subjoined: "fons deitatis, si modus subsistendi spectatur." The phrase "fons trinitatis," or "principium trinitatis," is less liable to be misconceived, and more accurate than "fons deitatis," or "principum deitatis."-W. G. T. S.].
126 [The original is: "propter principii commendationem," which the English translator renders "On account of commending to our thoughts the principle [of the Godhead]." The technical use of "principium" is missed. Augustin says that the phrases, "sending the Son," and "sending the Spirit," have reference to the "visible creature" through which in the theophanies each was manifested; but still more, to the fact that the Father is the "beginning" of the Son, and the Father and Son are the "beginning" of the Spirit. This fact of a "beginning," or emanation (manatio) of one from another, is what is commended to our thoughts.-W.G.T.S.]
9 The terms "unbegotten" and "begotten" are interchangeable with the terms Father and Son. This follows from the relation of a substantive to its adjective. In whatever sense a substantive is employed, in the same sense must the adjective formed from it be employed. Consequently, if the first person of the Trinity may be called Father in a sense that implies deity, he may be called Unbegotten in the same sense. And if the second person may be called Son in a sense implying deity, he may be called Begotten in the same sense. The Ancient church often employed the adjective, and spoke of God the Unbegotten and God the Begotten (Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 25, 53; ii. 12, 13. Clem. Alex. Stromata v. xii.). This phraseology sounds strange to the Modern church, yet the latter really says the same thing when it speaks of God the Father, and God the Son.-W.G.T.S.]
16 [This phraseology appears in the analytical statements of the so-called (cap. 11-16), and affords ground for the opinion that this symbol is a Western one, originating in the school of Augustin.-W.G.T.S.].
18 [It is remarkable that Augustin, understanding thoroughly the distinction between essence and person, should not have known the difference between ou0sia and upo/stoaij. It would seem. as if his only moderate acquaintance with the Greek language would have been more than compensated by his profound trinitarian knowledge.
In respect to the term "substantia"-when it was discriminated from "essentia," as it is here by Augustin-it corresponds to u/po/stasij, of which it is the translation. In this case, God is one essence in three substances. But when "substantia" was identified with "essentia," then to say that God is one essence in three substances would be a self-contradiction. The identification of the two terms led subsequently to the coinage, in the mediaeval Latin, of the term "subsistantia," to denote u9po/stasij.-W.G.T.S.]
25 [The reason which Augustin here assigns, why the name Holy Spirit is given to the third person-namely, because spirituality is a characteristic of both the Father and Son, from both of whom he proceeds-is not that assigned in the more developed trinitarianism. The explanation in this latter is, that the third person is denominated the Spirit because of the peculiar manner in which the divine essence is communicated to him-namely, by spiration or out-breathing: spiritus quia spiratus. This is supported by the etymological signification of pneu=ma, which is breath; and by the symbolical action of Christ in John xx. 22, which suggests the eternal spiration, or out-breathing of the third person. The third trinitarian person is no more spiritual, in the sense of immaterial, than the first and second persons, and if the term "Spirit" is to be taken in this the ordinary signification, the "trinitarian relation," or personal peculiarity, as Augustin remarks, "is not itself apparent in this name;" because it would mention nothing distinctive of the third person, and not belonging to the first and second. But taken technically to denote the spiration or out-breathing by the Father and Son, the trinitarian peculiarity is apparent in the name.
And the epithet "Holy" is similarly explained. The third person is the Holy Spirit, not because he is any more holy than the first and second, but because he is the source and author of holiness in all created spirits. This is eminently and officially his work. In this way also, the epithet "Holy"-which in its ordinary use would specify nothing peculiar to the third person,-mentions a characteristic that differentiates him from the Father and Son.-W.G.T.S.]
26 2 Cor. v. 5, and Eph. i. 14.
35 [The term "beginning" (principium), when referring to the relation of the Trinity, or of any person of the Trinity, to the creature, denotes creative energy, whereby a new substance is originated from nothing. This is the reference in chapter 13. But when the term refers to the relations of the persons of the Trinity to each other, it denotes only a modifying energy, whereby an existing uncreated substance is communicated by generation and spiration. This is the reference in chapter 14.
When it is said that the Father is the "beginning" of the Son, and the Father and Son are the "beginning" of the Spirit, it is not meant that the substance of the Son is created ex nihilo by the Father, and the substance of the Spirit is created by the Father and Son, but only that the Son by eternal generation receives from the Father the one uncreated and undivided substance of the Godhead, and the Spirit by eternal spiration receives the same numerical substance from the Father and Son. The term "beginning" relates not to the essence, but to the personal peculiarity. Sonship originates in fatherhood; but deity is unoriginated. The Son as the second person "begins" from the Father, because the Father communicates the essence to him. His sonship, not his deity or godhood, "begins" from the Father. And the same holds true of the term "beginning" as applied to the Holy Spirit. The "procession" of the Holy Spirit "begins" by spiration from the Father and Son, but not his deity or godhood.-W.G.T.S.].
36 ["Matter" denotes the material as created ex nihilo: "nature" the material as formed into individuals. In this reference, Augustin speaks of "the nature of the soul" of the people of Israel as existing while "as yet that people existed not" individually- having in mind their race-existence in Adam.-W.G. T.S.]
2 [The term "God," in the proposition, "the Word was with God," must refer to the Father, not to "the Father and Son together," because the Son could not be said to be "with" himself. St. John says that "the word was God" (qeo\j). The absence of the article with qeo\j denotes the abstract deity, or the divine nature without reference to the persons in it. He also says that "the Word was with God" (to\n qeo\n). The presence of the article in this instance denotes one of the divine persons in the essence: namely, the Father, with whom the Word was from eternity, and upon whose "bosom" he was from eternity. (John i. 18).-W.G.T.S.]
14 [The Divine Unity is trinal, not triple. The triple is composed of three different substances. It has parts, and is complex. The trinal is without parts, and is incomplex. It denotes one simple substance in three modes or forms. "We may speak of the trinal, but not of the triple deity." Hollaz, in Hase's Hutterus, 172.-W.G.T.S.]
15 [Each trinitarian person is as great as the Trinity, if reference be had to the essence, but not if reference be had to the persons. Each person has the entire essence, and the Trinity has the entire essence. But each person has the essence with only one personal characteristic; while the Trinity has the essence with all three personal characteristics. No trinitarian person is as comprehensive as the triune Godhead, because he does not possess the two personal characteristics belonging to the other two persons. The Father is God, but he is not God the Son and God the Holy Spirit.-W.G.T.S.]
16 [The addition of finite numbers, however great, to an infinite number, does not increase the infinite. Similarly, any addition of finite being to the Infinite Being is no increase. God plus the universe is no larger an infinite than God minus the universe. The creation of the universe adds nothing to the infinite being and attributes of God. To add contingent being to necessary being, does not make the latter any more necessary. To add imperfect being to perfect being, does not make the latter more perfect. To add finite knowledge to infinite knowledge, does not produce a greater amount of knowledge. This truth has been overlooked by Hamilton. Mansell, and others, in the argument against the personality of the Infinite, in which the Infinite is confounded with the All, and which assumes that the All is greater than the Infinite-in other words, that God plus the universe is greater than God minus the universe.-W.G.T.S.]
24 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Darkly, A.V..
3 [Augustin sometimes denominates the Son "begotten" (genitus), and sometimes "born" (natus). Both terms signify that the Son is of the Father; God of God, Light of Light, Essence of Essence.-W.G.T.S.]
21 Gen. xlvi. 27, and Deut. x. 22.
23 [Augustin's meaning is, that the term "substance" is not an adequate one whereby to denote a trinitarian distinction, because in order to denote such a distinction it must be employed relatively, while in itself it has an absolute signification. In the next chapter he proceeds to show this.-W.G.T.S.]
31 [Augustin would find this "image" in the ternaries of nature and the human mind which illustrate the Divine trinality. The remainder of the treatise is mainly devoted to this abstruse subject; and is one of the most metaphysical pieces of composition in patristic literature. The exegetical portion of the work ends substantially with the seventh chapter. The remainder is ontological, yet growing out of, and founded upon the biblical data and results of the first part.-W. G. T. S.]
1 [In this and the following chapter, the meaning of Augustin will be clearer, if the Latin "veritas," "vera," and "vere," are rendered occasionally, by "reality," "real," and "really." He is endeavoring to prove the equality of the three persons, by the fact that they are equally real (true), and the degree of their reality (truth) is the same. Real being is true being; reality is truth. In common phraseology, truth and reality are synonymous.-W.G.T.S.]
2 Read si for sicut, if for as. Bened. ed.
12 [The "wish" and "love" which Augustin here attributes to the non-righteous man is not true and spiritual, but selfish. In chapter vii. 10, he speaks of true love as distinct from that kind of desire which is a mere wish. The latter he calls cupiditas. "That is to be called love which is true, otherwise it is desire (cupiditas); and so those who desire (cupidi) are improperly said to love (diligere), just as they who love (diligunt) are said improperly to desire (cupere)."-W.G.T.S.]
10 [Augustin here begins his discussion of some ternaries that are found in the Finite, that illustrate the trinality of the Infinite. Like all finite analogies, they fail at certain points. In the case chosen-namely, the lover, the loved, and love-the first two are substances, the last is not. The mind is a substance, but its activity in loving is not. In chapter iv. 5, Augustin asserts that "love and knowledge exist substantially, as the mind itself does." But no psychology, ancient or modern, has ever maintained that the agencies of a spiritual entity or substance are themselves spiritual entity or substances. The activities of the human mind in cognizing, loving, etc., are only its energizing, not its substance.
The ambiguity of the Latin contributes to this error. The mind and its loving, and also the mind and its cognizing, are denominated "duo quoedam" the mind, love, and knowledge, are denominated "tria quoedem." By bringing the mind and its love and knowledge under the one term "quoedam," and then giving the meaning of "substance" to "thing," in "something," the result follows that all three are alike and equally "substantial."
This analogy taken from the mind and its activities illustrates the trinality of the Divine essence, but fails to illustrate the substantiality of the three persons. The three Divine persons are not the Divine essence together with two of its activities (such, e.g., as creation and redemption), but the essence in three modes, or "forms," as St. Paul denominates them in Phil. iii. 6.
If Augustin could prove his assertion that the activities of the human spirit in knowing and loving are strictly "substantial," then this ternary would illustrate not only the trinality of the essence, but the essentiality and objectivity of the persons. The fact which he mentions, that knowledge and love are inseparable from the knowing and loving mind, does not prove their equal substantiality with the mind.-W.G.T.S.].
11 [Augustin here illustrates, by the ternary of mind, love, and knowledge, what the Greek Trinitarians denominate the perixw/rhsij of the divine essence. By the figure of a circulation, they describe the eternal inbeing and indwelling of one person in another. This is founded on John xiv. 10, 11; xvii. 21, 23. "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? I pray that they all may be one, as thou Father art in Me, and I in Thee." Athanasius (Oratio, iii. 21) remarks that Christ here prays that the disciples "may imitate the trinitarian unity of essence, in their unity of affection." Had it been possible for the disciples to be in the essence of the Father as the Son is, he would have prayed that they all may be "one in Thee," instead of "one in Us."
The Platonists, also, employed this figure of circulatory movement, to explain the self-reflecting and self-communing nature of the human mind. "It is not possible for us to know what our souls are, but only by their kinh/seij kuklikai, their circular and reflex motions and converse with themselves, which only can steal from them their own secrets." J. Smith: Immortality of the Soul, Ch. ii.
Augustin's illustration, however, is imperfect, because "the three things" which circulate are not "each of them severally a substance." Only one of them, namely, the mind, is a substance.-W.G.T.S.]
12 [The inward production of a thought in the finite essence of the human spirit which is expressed outwardly in a spoken word, is analogous to the eternal generation of the Eternal Wisdom in the infinite essence of God expressed in the Eternal Word. Both are alike, in that something spiritual issues from something spiritual, without division or diminution of substance. But a thought of the human mind is not an objective thing or substance; while the Eternal Word is.-W.G.T.S.]
24 [The meaning of this obscure chapter seems to be, that only what the mind is pleased with, is the real expression and index of the mind-its true "word." The true nature of the mind is revealed in its sympathies. But this requires some qualification. For in the case of contrary qualities, like right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, the real nature of the mind is seen also in its antipathy as well as in its sympathy; in its hatred of wrong as well as in its love of right. Each alike is a true index of the mind, because each really implies the other.-W.G.T.S.]
27 [It is not these three together that constitute the one substance. The mind alone is the substance-the knowledge and the love being only two activities of it. When the mind is not cognizing or loving, it is still an entire mind. As previously remarked in the annotation on IX. ii. this ternary will completely illustrate a trinality of a certain kind, but not that of the Trinity; in which the "tria quoedam" are three subsistences, each of which is so substantial as to be the subject of attributes, and to be able to employ them. The human mind is substantial enough to possess and employ the attributes of knowledge and love. We say that the mind knows and loves. But an activity of the mind is not substantial enough to possess and employ the attributes of knowledge and love. We cannot say that the loving loves; or the loving knows; or the knowing loves, etc.-W.G.T.S.].
2 Ps. ix., cxi., and cxxxviii., Deut. vi. 5, and Matt. xxii. 37.
3 [The distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substance is one that Augustin often insists upon. See Confessions VII. i-iii. The doctrine that all substance is extended body, and that there is no such entity as spiritual unextended substance, is combatted by Plato in the Theatetus. For a history of the contest and an able defence of the substantiality of spirit, see Cudworth's. Intellectual System, III. 384 sq. Harrison's Ed.-W.G.T.S.]
6 [This ternary of memory, understanding, and will, is a better analogue to the Trinity than the preceding one in chapter IX- namely, mind, knowledge, and love. Memory, understanding, and will have equal substantiality, while mind, knowledge, and love have not. The former are three faculties, in each of which is the whole mind or spirit. The memory is the whole mind as remembering; the understanding is the whole mind as cognizing; and the will is the whole mind as determining. The one essence of the mind is in each of these three modes, each of which is distinct from the others; and yet there are not three essences or minds In the other ternary, of mind, knowledge, and love, the last two are not faculties but single acts of the mind. A particular act of cognition is not the whole mind in the general mode of cognition. This would make it a faculty. A particular act of loving, or of willing, is not the whole mind in the general mode of loving, or of willing. This would make the momentary and transient act a permanent faculty. This ternary fails, as we have noticed in a previous annotation (IX. ii. 2), in that only the mind is a substance.
The ternary of memory, understanding, and will is an adequate analogue to the Trinity in respect to equal substantiality. But it fails when the separate consciousness of the Trinitarian distinctions is brought into consideration. The three faculties of memory, understanding, and will, are not so objective to each other as to admit of three forms of consciousness, of the use of the personal pronouns, and of the personal actions that are ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It also fails, in that these three are not all the modes of the mind. There are other faculties: e. g., the imagination. The whole essence of the mind is in this also.-W.G.T.S.]
9 Vid. Retract. Bk. II. c. 15, where Augustin adds that it is possible to love the bodily species to the praise of the Creator, in which case there is no "estrangement."
11 Psalms cxx., and following.
13 [Augustin's map of consciousness is as follows: (1). The corporeal species=the external object (outward appearance). (2). The sensible species=the sensation (appearance for the sense). (3). The mental species in its first form=present perception. (4). The mental species in its second form=remembered perception. These three "species" or appearances of the object: namely, corporeal, sensible, and mental, according to him, are combined in one synthesis with the object by the operation of the will. By "will," he does not mean distinct and separate volitions: but the spontaneity of the ego-what Kant denominates the mechanism of the understanding, seen in the spontaneous employment of the categories of thought, as the mind ascends from empirical sensation to rational conception.
The English translator has failed to make clear the sharply defined psychology of these chapters, by loosely rendering "sentire," "to perceive," and "cogitare" to think.-W.G.T.S.]
14 Vid. Retract. 11. xv. 2. [Augustin here says that when he wrote the above, he forgot what is said in Leviticus xi. 20, of "fowls that creep, going upon all four, which have legs above their feet to leap withal upon the earth."-W.G.T.S.]
1 [The distinction drawn here is between that low form of intelligence which exists in the brute, and that high form characteristic of man. In the Kantian nomenclature, the brute has understanding, but unenlightened by reason; either theoretical or practical. He has intelligence, but not as modified by the forms of space and time and the categories of quantity, quality, relation etc.; and still less as modified and exalted by the ideas of reason- namely, the mathematical ideas, and the moral ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. The animal has no rational intelligence. He has mere understanding without reason.-W.G.T.S.]
35 [Augustin here teaches that the inward lust is guilt as well as the outward action prompted by it. This is in accordance with Matt v. 28; Acts viii. 21-22; Rom. vii. 7; James i. 14.-W.G. T. S.]
36 [Augustin means, that while he has given an allegorical and mystical interpretation to the narrative of the fall, in Genesis, he also holds to its historical sense.-W.G.T.S.]
48 [This fine specimen of the "obstetric method" of Socrates is given in Plato's dialogue, Meno.-W.G.T.S.]
9 Bks. viii. c. 4, etc., x. c. 1.
11 [The prophet Nathan enunciates the same truth, in his words to David, "Go do all that is in thine heart; for the Lord is with thee." 2 Sam. vii. 3.-W.G.T.S.]
12 Andreia, Act ii. Scene i, v. 5, 6.
17 John xx. 22, vii. 39, and xv. 26.
18 Eph. iv. 8 and Ps. lxviii. 18.
24 Gen. vi. 3. "Strive with man," A.V..
40 [In this representation of Augustin, the relics of that misconception which appears in the earlier soteriology, paricularly that of Irenaeus, are seen: namely, that the death of Christ ransoms the sinner from Satan. Certain texts which teach that redemption delivers from the captivity to sin and Satan, were interpreted to teach deliverance from the claims of Satan. Augustin's soteriology is more free from this error than that of Irenaeus, yet not entirely free from it. The doctrine of justification did not obtain its most consistent and complete statement in the Patristic church.-W. G. T. S.]
60 Bk. viii. cc. 8 seqq., and Bk. x. c. 1, etc.
63 [The ternary is this: 1. The idea of a truth or fact held in the memory. 2. The contemplation of it as thus recollected. 3. The love of it. This last is the "will" that "unites" the first two.-W. G. T. S.]
1 Ecclus. xxiv. 5. and 1 Cor. i. 24.
21 [This occured in the the case of Edward Irving. Oliphant's Life of Irving.-W. G. T. S.].
35 [Augustin here understands "Sheol," to denote the place of retribution for the wicked.-W.G.T.S.].
50 [In the case of knowledge that is remembered, there is something latent and potential-as when past acquisitions are recalled by a voluntary act of recollection. The same is true of innate ideas-these also are latent, and brought into consciousness by reflection. But no man can either remember, or elicit, his original holiness and blessedness, because this is not latent and potential, but wholly lost by the fall-W.G.T.S.]
64 [Justification is instantaneous: sanctification is gradual. Baptism is the sign, not the cause, of the former. "As many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized with reference to (ei0j) his death;" and "are intombed with him by the baptism that has reference to (ei0j) his death." Rom. vi. 3, 4. According to St. Paul, baptism supposes a trust in the atonement of Christ, and is a seal of it. In saying that "the forgiveness of all thine iniquity takes place in baptism," Augustin is liable to be understood as teaching the efficiency of baptism in producing forgiveness. This is the weak side of the Post Nicene soteriology.-W.G.T.S.].
18 [In the Infinite Being, qualities are inseparable from essence; in the finite being, they are separable. If man or angel ceases to be good, or wise, or righteous, he does not thereby cease to be man or angel. But it God should lose goodness, wisdom or righteousness, he would no longer be God. This is the meaning of Augustin, when he says that "goodness" as well as "spirit" must be predicated of God, "according to substance"-that is, that qualities in God are essential qualities. They are so one with the essence, that they are inseparable.-W.G.T.S.]
52 [Not the Old Academy of Plato and his immediate disciples, who were anti-skeptical; but the new Academy, to which Augustin has previously referred (XIV. xix. 26). This was skeptical-W.G.T.S.]
53 Libri Tres contra Academicos.
67 Isa. xxviii. 11 and 1 Cor. xiv. 21.
104 [The reader will observe that Augustin has employed the term "memory" in a wider sense than in the modern ordinary use. With him, it is the mind as including all that is potential or latent in it. The innate ideas, in this use, are laid up in the "memory," and called into consciousness or "remembered" by reflection. The idea of God, for example, is not in the "memory" when not elicited by reflection. The same is true of the ideas of space and time, etc.-W.G.T.S.]
132 [Says Turrettin, III. xxix. 21. "The Father does not generate the Son either as previously existing, for in this case there would be no need of generation; nor yet as not yet existing, for in this case the Son would not be eternal; but as co-existing, because he is from eternity in the God-head."-W.G.T.S.]
133 [The term "unbegotten" is not found in Scripture, but it is implied in the terms "begotten" and "only-begotten," which are found. The term "unity" is not applied to God in Scripture, but it is implied in the term "one" which is so applied.-W.G.T.S.]
134 [The spiration and procession of the Holy Spirit is not by two separate acts, one of the Father, and one of the Son-as perhaps might be inferred from Augustin's remark that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally." As Turrettin says: "The Father and Son spirate the Spirit, not as two different essences in each of which resides a spirative energy, but as two personal subsistences of one essence, who concur in one act of spiration." Institutio III. xxxi. 6.-W.G.T.S.]
137 [Generation and procession are each an emanation of the essence by which it is modified. Neither of them is a creation ex nihilo. The school-men attempted to explain the difference between the two emanations, by saying that the generation of the Son is by the mode of the intellect-hence the Son is called Wisdom, or Word (Logos); but the procession of the Spirit is by the mode of the will-hence the Spirit is called Love. Turrettin distinguishes the difference by the following particulars: 1. In respect to the source. Generation is from the Father alone; procession is from Father and Son. 2. In respect to effects. Generation yields not only personality, but resemblance. The Son is the "image" of the Father, but the Spirit is not the image of the Father and Son. Generation is accompanied with the power to communicate the essence; procession is not. 3. In respect to order of relationship. Generation is second, procession is third. In the order of nature, not of time (for both generation and procession are eternal, therefore simultaneous), procession is after generation. Institutio III. xxxi. 3.-W.G.T.S.]
138 Serm. in Joh. Evang. tract.. 99, n. 8, 9.
144 Gal. iv. 5 and John iii. 17.
1 "Scripsi etiam librum `de Fide, Spe et Charitate 0' cum a me ad quem scriptus est postulasset ut aliquod opusculum haberet meum de suis manibus nunquam recessurum, quod genus Graeci" Enchiridion vocant. Ubi satis diligenter mihi videor esse complexus quomodo sit colendus Deus quam sapientiam esse hominis utique veram Divina Scriptura definit. Hic libersic incipit, `Dici non potest, dilectissime fili Laurenti, quantum tuâ eruditione delecter. 0'"
2 Wisd. vi. 24. [Greek text, ver. 25: plh=u=oj sofw=n swthri/a ko/smou.-P. S.]
54 John iii. 36. These words, attributed by the author to Christ, were really spoken by John the Baptist..
63 Luke i. 28 ("thou that are highly favored," A. V.).
64 Luke i. 30 ("Thou hast found favor with God," A. V.).
68 A quotation from a form of the Apostles' Creed anciently in use in the Latin Church.
73 "Uterumque armato milite complent.".-Virgil, Aen. ii. 20.
74 Num. xxi. 7 ("serpents," A. and R. V.).
81 Ps. li. 5 (The A. V. has the singular, "iniquity" and "sin").
85 Ps. ii. 7; Heb. i. 5, v. 5. It is by a mistake that Augustin quotes these words as pronounced at our Lord's baptism.
96 John v. 29 (damnation, A. V.).
98 Ps. xliii. 1 ("Plead my cause against an ungodly nation," A. V.)
108 Ps. cxlviii. 2, ["host," R. V.].
110 Zech. i. 9 ("The angel that talked with me," A. V.).